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Dear Reader,

I am excited to share the seventh edition of the *CIRP Journal*, sponsored by Carnegie Mellon University’s Center for International Relations and Politics (CIRP). Since the *CIRP Journal*’s founding, the Institute for Politics and Strategy (IPS) and CIRP have both worked to encourage students to contribute to the *CIRP Journal* and enter the scholarly world of discussion and examination of policy issues. Each year CIRP publishes one issue featuring student contributions from any discipline across campus and a second issue, including this seventh edition, featuring the abridged theses of our master’s students.

The articles presented here demonstrate the breadth of our students’ interests, the depth of their commitment to our global society, and their insight in applying what they have learned in their classes and life experiences to complex political and legal analyses.

This edition of the *CIRP Journal* does not have a strict theme, as the most recent cohort of graduate students had a broad range of specializations and interests. All of the articles loosely relate to how societies are governed, whether it be through analysis of legal interpretations, the effects of different variables on democracies, or changing cybersecurity policy.

The diversity in topics reflects the growth of IPS throughout the maturation of the program at CMU. Our faculty members and thesis advisers have varied backgrounds and expertise. Richard Doherty’s presidency at CMU from 1936-1950 was instrumental in establishing the importance of interdisciplinary work at the university. That tradition has continued until today and is showcased in the *CIRP Journal*, which bridges policy with disciplines across campus.

I would like to thank Dr. Scott Sagan and Dr. Victor Cha for meeting with *CIRP Journal* Associate Editor Hillary Tanoff, and recent graduate and Guest Editor Colin Tait, to discuss national security issues on the Korean Peninsula. Their vast knowledge of the political nuances in the region are invaluable and we believe the interview transcripts will inspire readers to further their understanding of this vital national security interest.

Sincerely,
Kiron Skinner
Publisher and Editor-in-Chief
Dear Reader,

The Institute for Politics and Strategy (IPS) at Carnegie Mellon University began a new program in the fall of 2016 – the Accelerated Master of Science in International Relations and Politics (IRP/AMP). The other contributors in this journal, along with myself, served as the second cohort of graduate students.

In my undergraduate studies, I was part of the Bachelor of Humanities and Arts program with concentrations in Ethics, History, and Public Policy, and Bagpipe Performance, along with minors in Arabic Studies and International Relations and Politics. With a broad spectrum of academic interests, I was initially unsure what my next step would be. However, after immersing myself in IPS courses, I found myself drawn to political science and international security studies.

During my senior year, I was part of the Dietrich Honors Thesis program, which allowed me to set the framework for my graduate thesis during my master’s year. My research focused on the effects international advisers had on peace processes. Specifically, I argued that the Northern Irish peace process in the 1990s had a significant impact on the more recent Colombian process from 2012–2016. I was lucky enough to conduct field work in Northern Ireland during my senior year to assess my theory with peace practitioners who were involved in both the Irish and Colombian peace agreements.

After working with my adviser, Dr. Ignacio Arana, on transforming my original research from the lessons I learned in Northern Ireland, I ultimately traveled to Bogotá, Colombia a year later to collect in-depth interview data from the major negotiators involved in the peace process. The experience I gained from my field work and thesis writing inspired me to pursue a career in conflict and peace studies, while making me aware that the work of political scientists can have real-world implications.

The time I spent at Carnegie Mellon University changed my life for the better and gave me a unique skillset that has prepared me to pursue my career aspirations confidently. The support of IPS and its faculty is invaluable and opened many doors for me throughout my time at Carnegie Mellon, while continuing to do so today.

Sincerely,
Colin Tait
Guest Editor
The cybersecurity of our critical infrastructure impacts almost every aspect of our daily lives. The 2017 National Security Strategy states that “cyberattacks offer adversaries opportunities to seriously damage or disrupt critical infrastructure, cripple American businesses, weaken our Federal networks, and attack the tools and devices that Americans use every day to communicate and conduct business.” Protecting networks, data, and intellectual property means protecting the things that give the United States its vast and unique competitive advantage as a nation compared to its enemies.

Why are some companies better able to comply with cybersecurity requirements than others? This question has several layers and implications for both the academic and public policy communities. Understanding compliance with cybersecurity requirements can help policymakers adjust federal policy to more accurately and effectively govern the cybersecurity of critical infrastructure.

One of the most important sectors of critical infrastructure is the Defense Industrial Base (DIB), defined by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as the “worldwide industrial complex that enables research and development, as well as design, production, delivery, and maintenance of military weapons systems, subsystems, and components or parts, to meet [US] military requirements.” The DIB provides products and services that are essential to “mobilize, deploy, and sustain military operations.” The Defense Industrial Base is a useful case study to examine how the private sector interacts with federal cybersecurity requirements.

Throughout this study, several hypotheses were used to test the research question. My first hypothesis is that there is a clear link from policy cohesion to compliance and a clear link from compliance to security. If policy is not cohesive and clear, then intuitively, it will be difficult to follow. If policy is cohesive, then compliance becomes easier and security also improves drastically.

The second hypothesis is that the primary driver for noncompliance is that federal cybersecurity policy is ineffective. Private companies will not comply with federal policy if it is

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Kellen Carleton graduated with a BS in Policy and Management in 2018 and an MS in International Relations and Politics in 2019. During his time at CMU, he was a member of Sigma Alpha Epsilon, serving on the executive board in several positions. He was also President of the Club Hockey Team. His internships include work in the US Senate during the Washington Semester Program as well as research in cybersecurity. He currently works for Accenture as a Security Analyst.

not successful in prevention and mitigation. One sub-hypothesis for the second hypothesis is that the cost of cybersecurity regulations and policies are a primary driver of noncompliance. Another sub-hypothesis for the second hypothesis is that a perception of the effectiveness of the policy is important to compliance as well. There is a slight difference between the idea of actual policy effectiveness and perceived policy effectiveness. They are intertwined, but perception is also a significant aspect of compliance.

A third hypothesis is that the private sector believes that they can and should be doing this on their own. This speaks to the overall disconnect between the public and private sectors. The relationship is in a precarious place right now.4 There is deep mistrust as hinted before. Both the government and the private sector want the relationship to work in their favor.

To investigate the case study of the Defense Industrial Base (DIB), interviews were conducted with cyber professionals. In order to have a truly representative sample of all of the relevant perspectives, a wide range of people would need to be interviewed. The key stakeholders in this problem are the following types of people: government employees, think tank and academic researchers, and private sector cybersecurity officials. Throughout the interviews, there were a couple of claims that were agreed upon and were relatively straight forward in their explanations.

The DIB is a unique slice of critical infrastructure because of the mission they are tasked with. Collectively, they create many of the weapons and systems for the US military. A senior cyber researcher remarked that “the DIB, out of all of the critical infrastructures, is the most targeted. They have the most to lose and they are very vulnerable to an attack because of that. The current policy is not effective for the current level of threat.”5

The idea that DIB cybersecurity was a major national security risk was agreed upon by everyone that was interviewed. A former US Attorney stated that “cybersecurity is growing into one of the single greatest threats to the United States.”6 A senior think tank engineer echoed a similar sentiment. “Intelligence and data are exploited every day. Hacks are happening to everyone on a daily basis, it is just a matter of how bad it was. The DIB is a specific risk because they create our weapons systems and equipment for our armed forces.”7 The respondents also collectively felt that it was only a matter of time until the rest of the country begins to fully understand the pervasiveness of this threat.

The rest of the interviews were based around four major sets of claims that pertain to the hypotheses. The first claim was that current policy is not cohesive. The second set of claims pertained to reasons for noncompliance. The third claim surrounded the importance of perception in cybersecurity policy and how that differs from policy itself. Perception of the policy and the actual policy are distinct, and each is important in this area. The fourth claim surrounds the relationship between the public and private sectors and that in order for any improvement in this area, that relationship must improve.

Current cybersecurity policy and regulations are not cohesive. The policy is disjointed and

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5 Interview with Senior Cyber Researcher, March 20, 2019.
7 Interview with senior think tank engineer, March 4, 2019.
Kellen Carleton

needs to be reformed. If there are multiple policies, they need to work together in an intuitive way; if there is one policy, it needs to be both cohesive and robust. The main question that was asked to test this idea was to assess if the interview respondents viewed current policy in a positive light and found it clear and easy to follow.

Nine of the ten respondents agreed that the current policy was not clear and easy to understand. A former senior DHS official said that “the overall policy is not quite there yet. It is improving and people are working every day to ensure that the policy space as a whole becomes better. However, it is not fully there yet.” Many believe that the policy is becoming better as we learn more about cybersecurity and how to both defend it and regulate it properly. Others shared perspectives on prioritization, saying that “the current cyber policy needs more clarity from the government on what to prioritize.”

There were three major reasons for noncompliance: cost, ineffectiveness, and the fact that policies were difficult to follow. While eight of the ten respondents agreed that cost was the biggest barrier to compliance with federal cybersecurity requirements, it was not as simple as that. Many pointed to other reasons that were of equal importance or were also major contributing factors.

Ultimately, cost is what the private sector will fixate on, but the other issues of ineffectiveness and the fact that policies are difficult to follow are also important factors. A former FBI Special Agent said that “usually cost is the biggest issue in compliance. Coupled with cost, there is also some credence to the idea that people are unsure of what will be effective, so they do not want to spend on something that is not proven to be successful.” Regulations are expensive to implement and maintain, and cybersecurity regulations and compliance structures are among the most expensive to implement and maintain.

The private sector argues that most regulations are ineffective and not worth the investment. Because there is no standard to assessing cybersecurity efficacy, then it is really a perception problem that is causing the idea that government cybersecurity regulations will be ineffective. This perception factor reveals a larger public-private disconnect, but it is mainly about how the private sector views the policy as ineffective, disjointed, and too costly. Changing this narrative will be a major challenge for the public-private relationship to improve. A common thread from many interviews was that there is so much uncertainty that exists in this field. People are unsure of what to do, what is effective, and how to measure success.

The relationship between the public and private sectors is the crux of the problem in critical infrastructure cybersecurity. These two entities must align their goals and foster a better working relationship. They need each other, and each side is an important piece of this conversation. There are a few facets of note here: talent disparity, agility of organization, organizational goals, and structure. As stated before, the relationship is in a precarious place, and neither side wants to give concessions in terms of information sharing.

On the changing nature of the relationship, a senior think tank political scientist stated that

8 Interview with former DHS official, March 11, 2019.
9 Interview, March 20, 2019.
10 Interview with former FBI special agent, March 16, 2019.
“the issue today is that the government and the private sector have never been so intertwined and dependent on each other. Now they will be forced to work together, even though they do not necessarily want to.” 12 This reluctance to work together is a major problem in this issue, and is one that must improve. Most respondents strongly reiterated the importance of the government in this equation, stating that “[the private sector] needs to realize that they cannot do this themselves. They may believe they are better equipped to do this, which they may be, but the government must have a piece of this. The interests are different, and they need to find a way to bridge that gap.” 13

One last area that was common throughout the interviews was the idea that accountability and enforcement must vastly improve in order for critical infrastructure cybersecurity to improve. Eight of the ten respondents believed that more enforcement capabilities were needed for federal agencies to hold those accountable who continue to breach the systems of private companies and the government. When asked about enforcement capabilities of the federal government, a think tank cyber researcher stated that “more enforcement capability is needed. New laws and regulations will have to be crafted just for this. There is enough uniqueness about cybersecurity that we don’t have enough to apply current and existing laws to this problem.” 14 As jurisdiction over the cyber domain becomes clearer, the enforcement capabilities of those oversight agencies also need to become clearer.

Last, these findings from the interview process were able to yield a framework that can be applied to improvements in policymaking. Four major steps were identified: standardizing definitions, clarifying and crafting new policy, prescribing clear implementation strategies, and driving international legal standards. This study recommends using these findings to execute a policy framework that can serve as an iterative process to continually improve critical infrastructure cybersecurity.

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12 Interview with senior think tank political scientist, March 13, 2019.
13 Interviews with cybersecurity practitioners, March-April 2019.
14 Interview with think tank cyber researcher, March 15, 2019.
Reflections of Resistance: A Generational Comparison of the Sikh Diaspora

IAN ASENJO

Introduction
Resistance leaders often assume popular and influential roles within diaspora communities. In many cases, they leave behind prominent legacies after their deaths. Why do we see variation in the memorialization of these leaders across different communities? Furthermore, how are these perceptions of resistance leaders formed? Understanding these perceptions of resistance leaders in diasporas is important because it informs government actors and academics about the motivations and psychology of ethnic and religious diaspora populations. The more that leaders understand the political circumstances of these communities’ home countries, the better they will be able to engage with these communities.

In this article, I argue that closer proximity to resistance leaders and relevant conflicts can predict one’s willingness to support resistance leaders. However, proximity only has influence when it is transmitted via familial connections. I also argue that gender, religious traditionalism, and family opinion play strong roles in predicting support. I examine these trends by analyzing the important case of Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale and his presence in the Sikh diaspora, focusing on his legacy in the contemporary United States.

Literature
This research sits at the intersection of two literatures. First, there is a wealth of literature about diasporas and their relation to conflict. Second, there is a significant amount of research about the politics of memory, particularly surrounding conflict and traumatic events. Scholarship in these fields should be studied in conjunction.

Some scholars have formulated broader theories about various types of diasporas resulting from cultural, geographic, and sociological trends. Robin Cohen’s introduction to global diasporas surveys themes that are pertinent to different diaspora communities, proposing specific diaspora typologies: “victim, labour, trade, imperial, and cultural.”¹ The various theories and trends these communities evoke can provide some insight into what exactly leads diaspora populations to support resistance leaders.

Scholars who study collective memory evaluate how cultural factors determine how ethnic populations recollect periods of conflict and trauma. They also observe patterns of how

survivors of genocide relate their experiences to their children. Carol Kidron examines how cultural differences of diaspora communities, specifically Jewish and Cambodian genocide survivors, play roles in those communities’ efforts to commemorate the past. In order to uncover the unique psychological trends prevalent within specific ethno-religious communities, it is important to examine how memory of trauma changes over time.

**Theory**

Diaspora communities remember resistance leaders in different ways. In this thesis, I will argue that proximity to specific historical events and time periods have had a discernible impact on the memory of those events.

I hypothesize that one’s willingness to support a resistance leader is dependent upon one’s proximity to the leader or conflict itself. For the purposes of this research, proximity is defined as distance in time and space to a particular conflict or resistance leader. Those who lived through the events surrounding a resistance campaign may be more likely to hold more extreme views of a leader.

I also test for alternative explanations that suggest that demographics or individual-level differences are a stronger determinant of one’s willingness to support a resistance leader. Under this guise, views of Bhindranwale may be driven by other factors such as their ideological beliefs, demographics, or values.

**Case Background**

Before an analysis of Bhindranwale’s legacy can be performed, it is mandatory to have an understanding of his rise to power and his actions during 1984. Bhindranwale was raised and trained as a Sikh preacher and established a large following throughout Punjab, India. He quickly gained popularity as he promoted a more separatist, militant, and orthodox interpretation of Sikh ideals. In late 1983, Bhindranwale and his followers occupied the Darbar Sahib complex with weaponry, where he continued to deliver his sermons to his supporters.

In June of 1984, the central government initiated Operation Blue Star (OBS), a military mission to flush out Bhindranwale and his followers from the Darbar Sahib complex. British Foreign Secretary William Hague estimated that as many as three thousand people were killed in the battle, including many pilgrims who were visiting the complex to celebrate the anniversary of the martyrdom of Guru Arjan, the fifth of the human guru lineage. The government’s effort to remove Bhindranwale and his supporters manifested in the deployment of five infantry battalions, two companies of paramilitary police, and six tanks to carry out the operation. In the midst of the conflict, the face of the Akal Takht, or holy seat of Sikh political authority directly across from the main temple structure, was destroyed. The conflict also resulted in the destruction and looting of the Sikh Reference Library, which held

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4 Jakobsh, 46.
original manuscripts of the Guru Granth Sahib and other rare texts. Bhindranwale was killed during the battle along with many of his supporters. The destruction and loss of life was so catastrophic that the trauma continues to scar the Sikh community, debilitating its relationship with the Indian central government.

Tensions were further inflamed when Prime Minister Gandhi’s Sikh bodyguards assassinated her outside of her home in Delhi on the morning of October 31 in response to the military operation. As early as that evening, mobs began looting, raping, and killing Sikhs in an “incipient genocidal campaign,” leading to the deaths of roughly three thousand Sikhs in Delhi alone.

**Design**

To measure the Sikh diaspora’s perception of Bhindranwale, this study analyzes personal, semi-structured interviews conducted by the author with a diverse convenience sample of thirty-seven Sikh Americans throughout the Midwest and East Coast of the United States. Interviews were conducted inside gurdwaras, over the phone, and via email. Participants were recruited through visits to gurdwaras, university Sikh Student Association (SSA) events, and email distribution lists.

*Dependent Variable: Support for Bhindranwale*

To gauge Sikh Americans’ willingness to support Bhindranwale, participants were asked to describe their opinion of him. Responses were coded on a one-to-five scale, one representing unqualified non-support (UNS), two representing qualified non-support (QNS), three representing a neutral or mixed view of Bhindranwale (N/M), four representing qualified support (QS), and five representing unqualified support (US).

*Independent Variable: Proximity to Operation Blue Star and Anti-Sikh Pogroms*

In order to test the primary hypothesis, participants were asked where they were when Operation Blue Star occurred in 1984 as a means of gauging physical proximity to Bhindranwale. If participants were not yet born, they were asked about their parents’ physical location. Responses were coded as local if they were in Punjab, national if they were in India, and abroad if they were not in India at the time of the event.

Similarly, most participants were asked if their families were directly impacted by the anti-Sikh pogroms of October and November of 1984. Participants who responded “Yes” may have a more favorable opinion towards Bhindranwale.

*Independent Variable: Demographics*

Participants were also coded and tested based on demographic information. Age, place of birth, time of immigration, and reason for immigration can serve as predictors for one’s proximity to Bhindranwale. Age was used to test for proximity to historical events. Reason for immigration is an important factor in the case that the participant was facing discrimination in India.

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8 Tully.

Education level, topic of study, career, and parents’ career were used to measure socio-economic status. This measure may also predict one’s willingness to analyze Bhindranwale from a historical perspective. Education level was coded as high school, Bachelor’s, Master’s, and Doctorate.

Participants’ maintenance of kesh, or uncut hair, was also measured. A common theme of many of Bhindranwale’s sermons was the need for Sikhs to keep their hair uncut, a standard demonstration of respect for God. As a result, it may be the case that Sikh Americans who do not keep their kesh are more likely to critique Bhindranwale.

**Independent Variable: External Factors**
External views of Bhindranwale may also influence an individual’s opinion of him. Participants were asked if their sangat or family discusses Bhindranwale. Further, they were asked what their sangat or family’s opinion was of him. Strong Bhindranwale supporters may instill favorable opinions into the subject. Sangat and family opinions were coded as one if they held a negative view, two if they held a mixed or neutral view, and three if they held a positive view of Bhindranwale.

**Results**

**Primary Hypothesis: Proximity**
Of the variables pertinent to proximity: age, proximity to Operation Blue Star (OBS), parents’ proximity to OBS, and anti-Sikh pogroms, parent proximity to OBS was the only variable that yielded statistically significant results.

Proximity to OBS may not have yielded statistically significant results because participants trended younger. As a result, we might expect that parent proximity to OBS, which was statistically significant, was more impactful on their perceptions. This finding tells us that the closer participants’ parents were to Operation Blue Star, the more likely their son or daughter

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10 Mahmood, 77.
is to be a supporter of Bhindranwale. Inheritance of positive attitudes towards resistance leaders is thus more likely when a subject's parents had close proximity.

Alternative Explanations: Individual Characteristics and Demographics

Individual characteristics and demographics also influenced participants' willingness to support Bhindranwale. Of all of the alternative variables measured, gender, kesh, and family opinion were the only variables that yielded statistically significant results. Female participants were far more likely to hold negative, neutral, or mixed views of Bhindranwale compared to men. Approximately one-third of female Sikh Americans were supportive of Bhindranwale while two-thirds had qualified unsupportive or neutral views. In contrast, 81.8 percent of men held supportive views while 18.2 percent held qualified unsupportive or neutral views. One may infer that Bhindranwale's role and presence in the Sikh community is associated more with a masculine Sikh ideology.

Kesh resulted in the strongest statistical significance out of all of the variables measured. A main emphasis of many of Bhindranwale's sermons was the need for Sikh men and women to keep their hair uncut, a fundamental demonstration of respect for God. As a result, it may be the case that Sikh Americans who do not keep their kesh are more likely to critique Bhindranwale. 80 percent of participants who keep kesh were supporters, a far larger proportion compared to 22.2 percent of participants who had previously cut their hair. Thus, Sikhs who keep their kesh may hold more strictly orthodox perceptions of Sikhism and therefore be more sympathetic towards Bhindranwale's doctrine.

11 Mahmood, 77.
Reflections of Resistance: A Generational Comparison of Sikh Diaspora

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Family opinion also proved to be a predictor of participants’ willingness to support Bhindranwale. Similar to parent proximity to OBS, Sikh Americans rarely stray from the views of their families. Participants whose families are ardent supporters of Bhindranwale are much more likely to support him while those from families that did not support Bhindranwale (only representing 11.5 percent of cases) were exclusively qualified non-supporters.

**Conclusion**

These findings suggest that propensity for support is not solely based upon individual or external factors. Instead, a combination of demographics and surrounding perceptions, which may or may not be inherited from an individual’s parents, shapes one’s willingness to support resistance leaders. This suggests that the best method to understanding diaspora perceptions of resistance or political leaders would be at the family level. By examining the influence of the family unit, local and national government leaders can better understand the social structure and diversity of unique ethnic and religious diaspora communities in their constituencies. They may also be able to gauge the political preferences of these populations, enabling them to understand and serve the needs of these groups. Political leaders may also be able to acknowledge more painful or traumatic events of diasporas’ histories, such as the anti-Sikh pogroms or Operation Blue Star, strengthening the relationship between the modern political establishment and the diaspora.
Diversionary War by Tweet? An Analysis of Domestic Pressure and Foreign Policy Belligerence in the Trump Era

RAAGA KALVA

Introduction
Diversionary war theory suggests leaders use foreign conflict to divert domestic attention away from domestic problems. The logic of this theory appears valid at first glance, and scholars have discussed many historically prominent cases of its use. For example, the authorization of cruise missile strikes by President Bill Clinton days after news breaking on the Monica Lewinsky scandal has been regarded by many as a very prominent instance of attempted diversion, or as it had been termed at the time, “wagging the dog.”1 Other presidents in US history may have also used this strategy of support consolidation. President George H. W. Bush’s decision to send troops to Kuwait to expel Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi soldiers in 1990 occurred in the wake of America’s savings and loans crisis.2 The successful military campaign resulted in a high approval rating of 89 percent, despite the worsening economic recession that eventually led to his loss of the 1992 election.

In these instances, it may appear as though there is a positive correlation between foreign kinetic movements and an increase in executive approval. However, there has yet to be a definitive study published on whether or not diversionary tactics can be conclusively causally linked to increasing the approval rating of an executive.

I propose that diversionary war scholars have focused on the wrong dependent variable, and thus have not been able to come to conclusive results. The cost to the leader of a full kinetic movement is too high to justify its use unless a nation is in dire straits or the executive is at the risk of being deposed. However, this is not to invalidate the use of diversion as a tactic to pull negative attention away from the executive in general. Leaders are more likely to use this mechanism without incurring such a high cost, and to examine this would mean also including belligerent speech and aggressive foreign signaling as a means to divert domestic attention and consolidate domestic support.

The inclusion of these variables in the investigation of diversionary war would widen the scope of research greatly; however, it provides a more rationalist approach that balances cost with potential benefit. It is unlikely that a leader would go to war with another nation without a high chance of success of attention diversion. However, the cost incurred by aggressive foreign signaling is much lower and could provide the same outcome in terms of domestic attention. The specific case that I examine focuses on President Donald Trump and his use of Twitter as

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a method of foreign signaling. Though this may not be the only avenue of foreign signaling, it is a means of communication that President Trump uses frequently and touts as a way to fight against a “very dishonest and fake press,” and to thus distribute truth to the global audience.\(^3\) This also most accurately accesses the intention of the leader, without dilution from other sources. By corroborating the instances of foreign belligerence from Twitter with domestic scandal occurrence, I examine how much of a motivator diversion is for foreign belligerence.

**Theory**

This form of conflict instigation, while lowering the cost of diversion, also works more immediately in terms of media awareness. With the advent of social media, specifically Twitter, as a form of communication, the executive is able to rapidly shift attention away from incidents that may cause domestic unrest, for example domestic scandal, and route it towards the chosen target – whether that be a foreign nation, leader, or international organization. Because of this acceleration of the news and media cycle, belligerent speech is also a more pragmatic method of diversion in comparison to kinetic movement, which may take a much longer period of days rather than minutes. This protracted time period would undermine the potential benefits of using diversion in the first place, and so focusing on speech rather than kinetic movement is a more apt approach to evaluating diversion in the modern era.

The argument presented in this paper also focuses specifically on the intention of the potential executive when acting in a belligerent manner. The methodology outlined below does not intend to test the effect of foreign aggression, as measured by approval rating as was the standard method of measurement in the aforementioned studies. Rather, it is to specifically understand whether the actions of the executive can be perceived as diversionary based off of a repeated pattern of action, that is, the issuance of a belligerent tweet in temporal proximity to a domestic scandal.

In order to address these questions, this paper will focus on one hypothesis and test for the null:

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\begin{align*}
H1 & = \text{The presence of a domestic scandal about the incumbent leader increases the likelihood of a belligerent tweet occurring.} \\
H0 & = \text{There is no correlation between belligerent foreign action and the breaking of a domestic scandal about the incumbent leader.}
\end{align*}
\]

Should there be empirical evidence confirming the hypothesis, as has followed from the theoretical approach outlined in this article, we will be able to see whether populace diversion away from domestic scandal is a motivator for the executive to act in a belligerent manner.

**Methodology**

The approaches of other studies have not tied the motivations of conflict instigation to the leader in a way that entirely eliminates the external factor influence. By correlating domestic scandal to foreign belligerence, I’m able to isolate the relationship of potential cause of action to outcome, thus focusing on the pure diversionary motivation of the leader.

In order to determine instances of belligerence, I conducted a close analysis of President Trump’s Twitter rhetoric. Using text scraping scripts and methods, I was able to access the content of his tweets. The dataset begins on January 20, 2017, which was the inauguration of Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), “I use Social Media not because I like to, but because it is the only way to fight a VERY dishonest and unfair "press," now often referred to as Fake News Media. Phony and non-existent "sources" are being used….,” Twitter, December 30th, 2017, https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/947235015343202304?lang=en.
date of President Trump and the start to his presidency, which could also be considered as
the beginning of the time that his foreign policy could be perceived as a legitimate influencer,
as well as the time from which his position as an influencer over domestic politics was solely
his own. The end date was selected to accommodate the scope of this project, and could be
extended further in future endeavors to examine a larger sample. Overall, 6,030 tweets were
captured, and after filtering for foreign belligerence, the data set was honed down to 612
individual tweets.

To investigate whether scandal could be a motivator for foreign belligerence, I developed a
timeline of Trump scandals based on Associated Press News alerts. This approach eliminates
political and personal biases and provides an objective way to determine whether a certain
event could be considered ‘scandalous’ by the public, since those definitions vary. These news
alerts from Lexis Nexis were then corrected for repeat instances and other irregularities. This
resulted in a list of 661 instances of scandal reporting, over the same aforementioned span of
711 days.

Some controls were also included to increase the robustness of the model and help account
for instances that may have instigated the use of inflammatory speech by the executive. These
variables include foreign instigative actions as well as domestic indicators. Nuclear missile tests
by North Korea were included, given its high geopolitical prominence in the past few years.
There were no missile tests conducted in 2018.

Terrorist attacks were also included as a control, but pared down to those that made global
news. Specifically, only attacks that occurred in Western Europe, North America, or Australia/
New Zealand were included, or if the attacks resulted in fifty or more casualties if they
occurred in other parts of the world. The attack information was downloaded from the Global
Terrorism Database, and only continued into 2017. Last, for one of the models, a DOW Jones
Composite Average was also included and lagged to see trends over time. This measure was
included because it is an indicator that President Trump uses frequently to measure success
and parlay into support.

In order to accurately determine the relationship between scandal reporting and foreign
belligerence, I ran an OLS regression with control variables to determine whether there was
causality between the independent and dependent variables. From this OLS regression, it
appears as though there is no correlation between scandal and belligerence, nor does the
coefficient indicate the expected direction – the negative coefficient suggests there is less likely

4 Kate Keib, Itai Himelboim, and Jeong-Yeob Han, “Important Tweets Matter: Predicting Retweets in the #BlackLivesMatter Talk on Twitter,”
6 This methodology for scandal analysis is drawn from the working paper of Brendan Nyhan, “Media Scandals Are Political Events: How
Contextual factors affect Public Controversies over Alleged misconduct by U.S. Governors.” In his analysis, he focuses upon governors and
media scandals as political events. Though this scope is different, the analysis of scandals in this case is one that can be altered to fit the
purposes of this investigation.
7 Alexander Smith, “North Korea launched no missiles in 2018. But that isn't necessarily due to Trump,” NBC News, December 27, 2018,
8 This threshold for determining relevant terrorist attacks was created after an examination of western news headlines that generally tended
to focus on and call attention towards western facing nations or particularly deadly attacks. See Kalev Leetaru, "Do Americans Care about the
news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/06/27/do-americans-care-about-the-rest-of-the-world-these-two-google-maps-give-you-the-answer/?utm_
term=bt1a2254ad6b.
9 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), (2018), Global Terrorism Database
[gtd_14017_0718dist], Retrieved from https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd.
DJIA.
Table 1: OLS Regression Table

| Variable  | Coef.    | Std. Err. | t     | P>|t| | [95% Conf. Interval] |
|-----------|----------|-----------|-------|------|----------------------|
| scandal   | -0.0616735 | 0.1225418 | -0.50 | 0.616 | -0.3056854 .1823385 |
| DOW_4_wk_ave | 0.0022815 | 0.0041765 | 0.55  | 0.586 | -.006035 .0105981 |
| Nkmissile | 0.3198641  | 0.6544672 | 0.49  | 0.626 | -.9833465 1.623075 |
| isterror  | -0.7933112 | .3500577  | -2.27 | 0.026 | -1.490365 -.0962572 |
| _cons     | 1.038997   | 0.1854034 | 5.60  | 0.000 | .6698112 .1408182  |

Table 2: Vector Autoregression (VAR)

| Variable  | Coef.    | Std. Err. | z     | P>|z| | [95% Conf. Interval] |
|-----------|----------|-----------|-------|------|----------------------|
| belligerence | .1033467 | 0.0372454 | 2.77  | 0.006 | .0303471 1.1763463 |
| belligerence | .0335077 | .0370401  | 0.90  | 0.366 | -0.090896 .106105  |
| L2.        | .1259691 | .0370703  | 3.40  | 0.001 | .0533127 1.986255 |
| L3.        | .1556069 | .0371888  | 3.11  | 0.002 | .0427182 1.884956 |
| L4.        | -.0428044| .0333111  | 1.28  | 0.199 | -.0225233 1.081321 |
| scandal    | -.0241309| .0350294  | -0.69 | 0.491 | -.0927872 .0445255 |
| L2.        | .0098194 | .0349742  | 1.71  | 0.087 | -.0087287 1.283675 |
| L3.        | .023219  | .03329    | -0.70 | 0.466 | -.0884661 .0420282 |
| L4.        | -.0215889| .2911225  | -0.07 | 0.941 | -.5921785 0.5490097 |
| Nkmissile  | -.1349624| .2895407  | -0.47 | 0.641 | -.7024518 .432527 |
| L2.        | -.5866222| .2895283  | -2.03 | 0.043 | -.1154087 -.0191572 |
| L3.        | -.4878712| .2907934  | -1.68 | 0.093 | -.1057816 .0820733 |
| L4.        | -.2832722| .1287098  | -2.20 | 0.028 | -.5355387 -.031057 |
| isterror   | -.1061262| .129075   | -0.82 | 0.411 | -.359145 1.468198 |
| L2.        | -.0884108| .1287905  | -0.69 | 0.492 | -.3480355 1.640138 |
| L3.        | -.2184362| .1283662  | -1.70 | 0.089 | -.4700293 .0331569 |
| _cons      | .6060836 | .0905491  | 6.69  | 0.000 | .4286106 .7835565 |
I also ran a vector autoregression (VAR) framework to account for lags and potential empirical reaction functions from both sides of the scandal variable.\textsuperscript{11} Thus, this model allows for the accommodation of time variations between scandal occurrence and an instance of foreign belligerence. This VAR test is done with four lags, as determined by a varsoc analysis, available in the appendix. I also conducted a Granger causality test as an additional measure to determine causality.

### Table 3: Granger Causality Wald Test Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equation</th>
<th>Excluded</th>
<th>$\text{chi}^2$</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Prob &gt; $\text{chi}^2$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>belligerence</td>
<td>scandal</td>
<td>5.0685</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>belligerence</td>
<td>Nkmissile</td>
<td>6.8596</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>belligerence</td>
<td>isterror</td>
<td>11.971</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>belligerence</td>
<td>ALL</td>
<td>25.894</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0.011</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This VAR model with the lags included also does not show any significant correlation between the dependent variable of belligerence with the independent variable of scandal reporting. The Granger test also does not indicate any Granger causality, also confirming the p-values of the OLS and the VAR models.

Thus, the model shows little evidence and fails to reject the null hypothesis, indicating that there is no correlation between belligerent foreign action and the breaking of a domestic scandal about the incumbent leader.

### Conclusions and Further Research

Though the results of this paper fail to reject the null hypothesis, they show that there is much to be investigated in both this specific case as well as into the phenomena of diversionary war as a whole.

Regarding this specific case, President Donald Trump does make a notable percentage of his overall Twitter communication about foreign entities, with 15 percent of his overall tweets in the designated time period being instances of foreign belligerence. In some cases, these instances do not appear to be tied to any specific foreign policy agenda, nor do they follow previously set precedents for the public interactions of heads of state. While the occurrence of such speech may be indicative of personality traits of the leader, it may also have strong ties to nationalist movements that are growing in popularity across the globe.\textsuperscript{12} Some nationalism may be benign or even beneficial. Yet nationalism may present potential instability from erroneous signaling by leaders that instigate without repercussion.

Second, the absence of a foreign diversion during outbreak of scandal, especially when the occurrence of such is so frequent, may also indicate that President Trump is choosing to accept the reputation costs of these scandals without counteracting them, or that he is diverting media attention elsewhere. This specific case may indicate that alternative methods of diversion are being used, with the executive choosing to rally around the base rather than


With this approach, we see an escalation of party conflict and domestic divide, with a head of state that further capitalizes on this divide rather than working against it. This approach may be unique to the current state of global democratic politicization, one that has resulted in a rising influence of populism and internal rifts. This approach may also be a driving factor behind the lack of significance behind the foreign belligerence hypothesis – when the executive is choosing to capitalize upon domestic conflict, it behooves them to not divert attention away from personal flaws, but rather change the narrative to implicate the opposition party and reinforce internal cohesion within their own party.

Diversionary war, while innately simple, still proves an enigma without conclusive empirical evidence. Inclinations of leaders to go to war and instigate conflict are numerous. The multifaceted nature of international conflict makes it extremely difficult to isolate the motivations of the leader to enter conflict in order to preserve their reputation, especially because this would be an intention the leader would deliberately veil. Further investigation and highly tailored and expansive models must be used to examine the use of diversion and determine whether it is a seemingly sound theory without any repeated pattern of use and exists only in isolated cases, or whether it is founded in empirical evidence and rooted in executive behavior.
Introduction

The constitutional theory of originalism begins with the basic foundations of American government. Two factors integral to the operation of the theory must be established: the Constitution which the theory interprets and the Supreme Court which does the interpretation. The Constitution consists of a preamble, seven articles, signatures, and twenty-seven amendments. Through this text, the US federal government is established.

But the text does not exist by itself, it exists in tandem with the unwritten elements of the document, such as the organization of its structure, silences that speak of policy by omission, and the principles and values borne from the explicit text. These factors and more comprise the implicit constitution, with which jurists and citizens alike must grapple to fully understand the scope of constitutional meaning. The Constitution divides analysts over its interpretation, highlighting the depths of division that characterizes constitutional scholarship.

The Supreme Court operates within an inherited system of customs and norms that define it much further than the terse Article III of the Constitution. These norms include the British common law, a system that crucially provides for judges to produce case law and for that case law to exist independently on par with statutory law. This empowers all federal courts as lawmakers as they share equivalent formal authority and normative recognition with the legislature.¹

The Supreme Court operates both as the overseer of the US judicial system and as an interlinked member of the federal government, alongside the legislative and executive branches. Through this membership, the Supreme Court upholds the balance of power by giving and receiving checks and balances to and from the other branches. The Court cannot derive all its functional instruction from the text of the Constitution. Instead, it develops doctrines to govern its internal processes, thus establishing the scope and consistency of the institution. These doctrines include judicial review (the sole binding power to determine constitutionality), stare decisis (the normative acceptance of Court precedent barring justifiable reason to overturn), justiciability (rules governing what cases the Court accepts), and interpretation and construction (the two main operations of jurisprudence).²

² See, e.g., U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.

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Interpretation versus construction

The major distinction between interpretation and construction are the very acts that each practice implies. Interpretation is a reading of a legal text. Lawyers and judges interpret legal texts to advance arguments in court. Specifically, Supreme Court lawyers and judges interpret the text of the Constitution. Interpretation in the legal context attempts to determine the linguistic meaning of a text without rendering a legal application.3

Legal application is what is captured through the second process, known as construction. Construction involves the implementation of the law as read into government and society. For instance, consider the First Amendment’s protection of the freedom of speech. To understand what would constitute the speech that the amendment protects is interpretation. Does it rely on the plainly understood definition of speech from the times of the Founding, only verbal communication?4 What about a litany of other practices that have developed following the ratification of the Bill of Rights that have come to be associated with speech, such as clothing or signs, physical art, or acts of protest?5 Construction would accommodate the agreed-upon interpretation of the statute or Constitutional text into rendering a functional ruling.

For example, in the case Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Supreme Court interpreted the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, which holds the federal government may not make any law “respecting an establishment of religion,” to prohibit public funding of private religious schools. To provide precedent for future Court cases, the majority constructed a test (known colloquially as “the Lemon test”) that holds a statute must have a “secular purpose,” that “its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion,” and that “the statute must not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion.”6 These are constructions since the Constitution does not explicate any of these qualifications, but the Court did judge them necessary to uphold their interpretation of the Establishment Clause.

Other examples of construction include the trimester system for abortion laws introduced in Roe v. Wade and the standards of strict and intermediate scrutiny for different forms of civil rights claims.7 The former of these constructions also highlights the temporal nature of construction, since Roe’s trimester system was effectively overturned in a subsequent abortion ruling, Planned Parenthood v. Casey.8 Though they may not always stand the test of time, constructions and interpretations serve as important facilitators of the legal process.

The Theory of Originalism

Originalism, while eluding any exact definition, can be understood as a series of elements: an obeisance to the Founding generation, a restrictionist view of stare decisis, and an assertion of judicial restraint. The most significant element of originalism is its “theoretical basis.” This concerns on what specific aspect of the Founding generation an interpretation of the Constitution should be predicated. There are three major bases in the legal literature: original intent, original public meaning, and original expected application.

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6 403 US 602, 603 (1971).
7 410 US 113 (1973).
Original intent, or intentionalism, seeks to discern how the Framers of the Constitution understood constitutional clauses to operate. Though formatively similar to “legislative intent,” the underlying designs of members of Congress that provide a means to interpret statutes, originalists disavow legislative intent given the distinctions of history and legitimacy between normal congressional statutes and the Constitution.

The second basis is original public meaning which considers the semantic definitions of constitutional texts as they would be understood by the public at the time of ratification. This method more directly upholds the democratic nature of the ratification as an act that endowed the Constitution power through the sovereign act of its creators, the people.

A third means is original expected application, through which a judge considers an intentionalist reading of an issue and pursues an actualized policy outcome in line with the intent. The similarity to intentionalism results from this basis largely serving as an academic theory. However, this does serve to raise the idea of post hoc results influencing Court behavior, since per this basis the personal politics of justices serve as a counterweight to objective historical and factual review.

Originalism connects to some leading canons of legal theory, including Natural Law and Legal Positivism. Natural Law’s connection to the philosophical foundations of the Founding generation raises questions over its appropriateness as a fundamental element of originalism. Yet the objectivity and resistance toward reform of Legal Positivism provides an analytical foil. Originalism interacts in unique ways with the aforementioned implicit and explicit constitutions, as it most effectively manages the strict rules and structural purposes of the Constitution. The interaction with the implicit constitution provides for greater debate, as the standards (e.g. due process) and principles (e.g. liberty) of the Constitution prove much more consequential for the variation in jurisprudence in the long run. Originalism also derives from certain historical Supreme Court practices, especially some decisions from the court of Chief Justice John Marshall.

Yet the modern practice of originalist interpretive theory only developed in the 1960s as a response to the selective incorporation doctrine of the Warren Court. Alexander Bickel and Robert Bork co-developed the theory, which soon found prominent supporters in Supreme Court Justices William Rehnquist and Antonin Scalia. From the Rehnquist Court onward, originalism has commanded a sizable bloc of Supreme Court supporters and remains a dominant interpretive ideology today.

The ideology faces criticism and competition from detractors that spur the debate over originalism and its propriety. Supporters of originalism argue the normative benefits of the ideology, specifically that it produces the most accurate rulings to the text and purpose of the Constitution, it restrains judges from overstepping their legitimate boundaries, and it promotes...
respect for democracy by upholding the contractual democratic compact in the Constitution that was forged through ratification.

The criticisms of originalism can be broadly categorized into theoretical, practical, and moral deficits. The theoretical flaws include the lack of clarity in defining who exactly are the “Founders,” since many include Antifederalist perspectives. Additionally, individual Founders changed their opinions over time. Last, the theory inconsistently manages the implicit factors of the Constitution. The practical flaws involve the infeasibility of implementing a completely originalist jurisprudence, and the inconsistent use of originalism such as their fallibility to contemporaneity, a lack of judicial restraint, and the inherent limits to intentionalism. Finally, the moral deficits are the righteousness of originalism as a binding constraint on modern democracy and its rejection of aspirational possibility.

Originalism, much like the Constitution that it interprets and the Supreme Court that it serves, does not operate in isolation. It exists alongside a spectrum of variants that from the legal and academic realms help to redefine originalism. Some of these alternatives purport themselves to be contrary to originalism, including Living Constitutionalism and Legal Realism. Living Constitutionalism perceives the Constitution as justifiably open to fundamental interpretation by each generation that could diverge from the findings of the last. Legal Realism concerns the absolutely subjective approach to jurisprudence through which interpretation solely exists as a means to produce whatever judges want.

Other alternatives present different versions of originalism. New Originalism presents a public meaning originalism designed to promote proactive adjudication rather than reactive, while Living Originalism combines the engagement of living constitutionalism with the deference to historicity of originalism. Finally, the modern debate of originalism concerns the internationality of the theory, with consequences for how interchangeable the legal practices of other legal systems may be with the American, as well as their respective practices of originalism.

Originalism is not only a tool for adjudication but also serves a purpose in politics. The political significance spans across the judiciary, legislative, and executive branches, and the politics of the general public. Originalism is characterized as an inherently conservative concept due to the combination of avowed Supreme Court originalists all being conservatives and the results of originalist jurisprudence leading to conservative policy outcomes.

While some of the normative associations of originalism (such as its net positive view of early America) may bias it toward acceptance by conservatives, there is nothing intrinsic to the theory that prevents liberal or moderate judges from employing the theory on their own. Furthermore, I assert that an examination of the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court may identify a more even split to the partisan usage of originalism.

Quantitative Analysis

The lack of a comprehensive definition for what constitutes an originalist argument hinders

any effort to measure it. Instead, I examine the usage of originalist rhetoric as seven terms associated with early America and/or the Constitution. Examining how often justices consider these hallmarks of early constitutional America in their decisions is one fair way to assess these originalist commitments.

My analysis found significant usage of the seven terms of interest. In total, 347 opinions written during the twenty-one-year timeframe included the terms. These 347 opinions were written as parts of 231 cases, meaning that out of the total 1,837 cases decided during the timeframe, 12.6 percent of all cases employed originalist rhetoric. These cases in total used the select terms 2,644 times.

Table 1:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Convention</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federalist</td>
<td>392</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Founder/ing</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Framer</td>
<td>986</td>
<td>37.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamilton</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madison</td>
<td>522</td>
<td>19.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The key statistic of the analysis, however, is this: of the 347 opinions containing the select terms, 199 were written by a conservative justice — meaning that the originalist rhetoric was employed by conservatives 57.4 percent of the time. While this does suggest a slight bias toward conservative usage, one additional statistic may further contextualize this finding. Throughout this analysis, the Supreme Court maintained a five to four ideological split in favor of the conservatives. Conservatives composed 55.6 percent of all justices during the timeframe. Reconsider the aforementioned statistic that conservatives wrote 57.4 percent of the terms of interest in the timeframe. That finding is less than two percent greater than the likelihood of any random opinion of the Court being written by a conservative.

My findings support the notion that originalist rhetoric is utilized irrespective to partisanship, suggesting that this academic notion of an originalism suited to all partisan proclivities may, in fact, already be reality.

**Conclusion**

“We are all originalists now.” While this perspective is not unique to Justice Elena Kagan, she is perhaps the highest-ranking liberal judicial official to voice such an opinion. Proclaiming a universal originalism in some circles may be akin to heresy. In others, it may be considered pejorative, to label oneself with such a sullied legal term. Such a reactionary state of discourse on originalism only disservies the theoretical and philosophical value that originalism provides once abstracted from the modern debate. To operate one’s jurisprudence with consideration for the Founding generation does not necessarily entail regression or stasis, but rather an appreciation for the values and heritage of America. Adjudicating with respect to tradition should not be viewed as a pragmatic or forbidden exercise; it should be viewed as a right, a privilege of living in a time in a place that permits us, the people, to form our own government, nation, and identity. As demonstrated in this article, originalism varies greatly in its function, its purposes, and its contours, since preceding jurists brought their own conceptualizations of originalism into the literature. We are all originalists now because we have the mandate and motivation to each define what it means to maintain fidelity to our values.

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The Transnational Diffusion of Peace

COLIN TAIT

Introduction
Do historic peace agreements between insurgents and governments influence similar processes in other countries? The relevant literature on conflict resolution and peace agreements focuses primarily on formal peacebuilding and peacekeeping measures through international organizations and the importance of the characteristics of peace agreements. However, there is little understanding of the context of negotiations and how agreements are designed and drafted. I aim to address this gap in the literature by exploring the interactions of advisers from Northern Ireland in Colombia throughout Colombia’s peace negotiations. I argue that the Good Friday Agreement and Irish experience have significant links to the peace process in Colombia. This research can begin to bridge the gap between researchers of conflict resolution and practitioners of peace agreements. Additionally, this research aims to uncover different variables. These previously overlooked variables may increase the likelihood of success when a comprehensive exploration of micro-interactions is made.

Methodology
To assess this argument, I conducted a qualitative study that collected data from in-depth interviews with peace practitioners and experts involved in negotiations. I interviewed respondents over the phone in addition to conducting field work in Bogotá, Colombia.

The sample of respondents comprises negotiators and advisors advocating for the Colombian government and former negotiators and advisors from the Good Friday Agreement, who were present during the Colombian peace process. My sample is a diverse convenience sample that utilized snowball sampling to expand my network of potential respondents as I built my network throughout the population and identified important actors.¹

To interpret and code the interviews, I adopted a strategy derived from Joel Aberbach and Bert Rockman’s 2002 article, “Conducting and Coding Elite Interviews.” In my study, I defined manifest items consistent with Aberbach and Rockman by coding it as formally answers to specific questions. However, I altered the meaning of latent items to better fit my study. I redefine latent items as latent interpretation to include both the respondent’s overall response in addition to my own interpretation of the complete dataset. I did this to capture answers to my questions that were less complete, but still relevant and valuable to my hypothesis and to


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provide my own analysis of connections the interviews had with one another.² By framing my analysis this way, I show the formal and informal influences the Irish agreement had on the Colombian peace process.

**Formal Processes**

As shown in the broader academic literature, conflict resolution is particularly difficult in civil conflict because one group (almost always the insurgents) must completely give up their weapons to transition and reintegrate back into society. The Colombian and FARC negotiation parties both studied the peace process in Northern Ireland to establish their negotiations for demilitarization. This is because FARC in Colombia and the PIRA in Ireland both amassed large arsenals throughout decades of conflict and weaponry was spread throughout either country.

The Good Friday Agreement did not establish a detailed timetable to demilitarize weapons. The negotiation period was short, and ambiguity was agreed on to guarantee the violence would stop. The agreement states:

> Both Governments [the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom] will take all necessary steps to facilitate the decommissioning process to include bringing the relevant schemes into force by the end of June.³

The Colombian agreements reads:

> The National Government and the FARC-EP have agreed to establish a logical order for implementation of BDCCH [Bilateral and Definitive Ceasefire and Cessation of Hostilities] and LA [Laying Down of Arms] activities. To that end, they will implement that which is established in the annexed timeline, which takes as reference events or dates prior to or after day D and hour H.⁴

Jonathan Powell, the former chief negotiator in the Good Friday Agreement and personal adviser to President Santos, discussed how Colombia learned from the mistakes that were made in Good Friday Agreement, “If you leave the section on demilitarization vague, the process could go on forever.”⁵ Unlike in Northern Ireland, Colombia established clear missions and an agenda to demilitarize FARC, successfully disarming the group in only six months.

Similarly, Lieutenant Colonel Rodrigo Mezu stated that throughout his work in the negotiation process, he and his team studied dozens of peace agreements across the world, particularly focusing on demilitarization strategies.⁶ In regard to Northern Ireland and the PIRA, he argued that FARC wanted to replicate how the PIRA demilitarized, as it took eight years for them to completely demilitarize. To better understand the negotiation strategies of FARC throughout the peace process, Mezu and others studied the Good Friday Agreement. In Northern Ireland, he stated that only a small number of people knew where the weapon caches were. From the Good Friday Agreement experience, the importance of setting an agenda and transparent de-

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⁵ Interview with Jonathan Powell, March 8, 2019.
⁶ Interview with Rodrigo Mezu, March 13, 2019.
mobilization was reiterated to Colombian negotiators and advisers. This was key in the entire process as well as the preparation for the implementation phase, because every other part of the peace negotiations depended on rigorous demilitarization, according to Elena Ambrosio.

Although the section on demilitarization of the Good Friday Agreement was vague, it emphasized the importance of an independent verification body to oversee the decommissioning process. It states:

They note the progress made by the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning and the Governments in developing schemes which can represent a workable basis for achieving the decommissioning of illegally held arms in the possession of paramilitary groups. The Independent Commission will monitor, review and verify progress on decommissioning of illegal arms, and will report to both Governments at regular intervals.⁷

In the Colombian agreement, it states:

In all units, the international component leads the MVM [Monitoring and Verification Mechanisms] and is responsible for settling disputes, submitting recommendations and generating reports, in accordance with the guidelines given to it in order to guarantee and support the impartiality and transparency of the BDCCH and LA.⁸

Independent third parties are vital to overcome the credible commitment problem. Throughout the demilitarization process, insurgent groups fear that the government may not respect the negotiated political rights agreed on in a peace agreement after they lay down their weapons. Sergio Jaramillo, the Colombian Minister of Peace at the time, said the strongest technical influence from the Good Friday Agreement was the inclusion of independent bodies to monitor the demilitarization process. Both insurgent groups had weapon caches throughout their respective countries and the governments needed third party bodies to guarantee the weapons were collected and destroyed by monitoring and verifying the process. Without an independent third party, it would be unlikely that the demilitarization process would be implemented. Although it took many years, Northern Ireland serves as an example of both what to do and what not to do when demilitarizing an insurgent group.

Informal Processes

Overall the Good Friday Agreement provided an example that peace was possible. According to Monica McWilliams, a former negotiator for the Women’s Coalition in Northern Ireland, the Irish experience was a strong influence on the Havana negotiations because unlike many other peace processes around the world, the Good Friday Agreement had established a long-lasting peace.⁹ “Roughly half of the global peace agreements break down within two years. The Good Friday Agreement definitely provided a strong influence for Colombia.”¹⁰ The importance of the PIRA acting as an example of what is possible cannot be understated. Both McWilliams and Jaramillo, among others, emphasized the impact former PIRA members and the Irish demilitarization experience had on convincing FARC and the government that such a

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⁷ Good Friday Agreement, 22.
⁸ Colombian Agreement, 61.
⁹ Interview with Monica McWilliams, February 26, 2019.
¹⁰ Interview with Monica McWilliams, February 26, 2019.
process was possible in Colombia.

Following the failure of the Good Friday Agreement to fully demilitarize paramilitary groups, the British and Irish governments had two notable subsequent agreements that amended the 1998 peace agreement. In 2003, the Agreement Between the British and Irish Governments established stronger protocols for monitoring and complying with the Good Friday Agreement. In 2006, the St. Andrews Agreement established a clear timetable for compliance with the agreement before political institutions were devolved in Northern Ireland as a result of failed demilitarization. The Good Friday Agreement was too vague and ambiguous to establish an effective way to demilitarize the IRA. This allowed the IRA to keep their weapons eight years after the initial agreement was passed. President Santos and his team of peacemakers valued the entire demilitarization process in Northern Ireland and sought to learn how the country was able to overcome obstacles and finally disarm the IRA in 2006. The 2003 Agreement provided clear details on the demilitarization monitoring body comprised of a diverse selection of representatives.

Analyzing and understanding the mistakes throughout the early implementation stage of the Good Friday Agreement was important throughout the Colombian process. The 2003 Agreement provides a benchmark of the Irish peace process highlighting the lessons learned by the British and Irish governments throughout the early implementation of the Good Friday Agreement. The 2003 agreement and 2006 St. Andrews Agreement provided physical documents indicating the shortcomings of the 1998 agreement and offered concrete examples to future peace processes. Captain Omar Cortes noted that the “FARC wanted to model demilitarization off of the IRA. We looked towards historic processes while building our own [demilitarization] model.” The subsequent Irish agreements that amended the Good Friday Agreement allowed Colombia to learn from the shortcomings of the process.

Humberto de la Calle, the chief negotiator for the Colombian government, said that the lessons learned from the Irish peace process via Jonathan Powell had the most impact on the Colombian negotiations by helping set an agenda with FARC during the secret negotiation phase and establishing the rules of negotiation. Powell said that he and former Prime Minister Tony Blair had set up a secret backchannel in Northern Ireland almost identical to Santos’ in Colombia. During the secret talks, Powell worked with Santos on creating a framework agreement to bring to the negotiation table with FARC. “We focused on a framework agreement. This idea that we had in Northern Ireland where we negotiated the heads of agreement, which were the initial agreements that narrowed down what we were going to talk about.” In past negotiations with FARC, no work like this was done to prepare for the negotiation phase.

The peace achieved in Northern Ireland served as a constant reminder of what is possible for Colombia. Both conflicts are deeply rooted and intersected within their respective cultures and societies. Elena Ambrosio stated that an important lesson from Jonathan Powell and the Good Friday Agreement was “to give dignity to the counterparts. We needed an agreement that could be accepted by [both] of our constituencies.” The Colombian government analyzed the Good Friday Agreement specifically to understand FARC’s negotiating strategies and to use when developing their own tactics. FARC liked the Good Friday Agreement because a similar

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11 Interview with anonymous politician, March 15, 2019.
12 Interview with Elena Ambrosio, March 13, 2019.
13 Interview with Omar Cortes, March 14, 2019.
14 Interview with Humberto de la Calle, March 12, 2019.
ambiguous agreement in Colombia would give them the opportunity to interpret the accords to benefit their organization. A navy lieutenant discussed how FARC loved the Irish agreement and the government studied it to understand FARC's negotiation strategies.15

Conclusion
This extensive and original qualitative research demonstrates the relationship and influence from the Good Friday Agreement on the Colombian peace process and subsequent agreement. There are both formal and informal influences that impacted the process in Colombia. The Irish experience of demilitarization and the use of third-party guarantors formally impacted the 2016 Colombian Agreement by teaching peace practitioners important lessons derived from the Good Friday Agreement and the eight-year implementation period until the PIRA decommissioned in 2008. To support this, I compare the formal peace agreements and show the progression of demilitarization from the Good Friday Agreement to the St. Andrews Agreement. Informally, the Irish peace process shaped the methodological approach to negotiations with FARC. Establishing a backchannel negotiation was critical for the success of the Colombian peace agreement and intense interactions with former combatants and government negotiators acted as a powerful indicator of what is possible through a peace process.

15 Interview with anonymous, February 1, 2019.
Like Father, Unlike Son: The Effects of Political Dynasties on Governance

JACQUELINE PUSCHMANN

Introduction
Do political dynasties impact governance or cause democratic erosion? Furthermore, is there a difference in impact of political dynasties between authoritarian and democratic governments? Empirical evidence and historical analysis have begun to show the detrimental impacts of political dynasties on governance. Yet state-level political dynasties still remain an understudied phenomenon.

I define political dynasty as any two family members who were heads of government. The effects of this dynasty type is understudied. I make two distinctions within this definition. The first is a parent-child dynasty, in which a pairing of a parent and their child held the same office. An example would be George W. Bush and George H. W. Bush. The second is an extended dynasty, where any two family members have held the same political office. This definition includes spouses and in-laws. An example would be Fidel and Raúl Castro, who were brothers.

I seek to answer the following question: do political dynasties impact governance or lead to autocracy? I offer new empirical evidence on political dynasties, looking at all state leaders between 1945 and 2015 by conducting a time series cross-sectional analysis. I find that for democracies and semi-democracies, certain political dynasties can have a negative impact for democracy.

Effects of Political Dynasties
Political dynasties create feedback loops of power allowing the same group of elites to enter office in an unfair manner. There is a political advantage for candidates running for office who also have a family member in office.1 US Congress members who stay in Congress for a long time are likely to have more relatives also join Congress.2 This leads to the idea that power is self-perpetuating.

Having a relative in office may make a person's name more known or give them more access to resources.3 This results in an unfair electoral advantage, undermining elections. People

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running for office are also more likely to promise particularistic goods while campaigning if they belong to a political family because they may inherit personal support bases from their families.4

Dynastic candidates who have spent less time in political office benefit from family connections and their campaign strategies, compared to non-candidate leaders who have also had less time in political office.5 These dynastic candidates have had little time in a political office, but can reach office more easily.

Some dynastic leaders then are less experienced than their counterparts.6 This brand recognition of their family name allows for leaders to bypass requirements and training that their counterparts need in order to be elected to office. Additionally, dynastic candidates might be less educated compared to their counterparts. In Italy, certain dynastic candidates are less educated than non-dynastic candidates, due to family-based nepotism, yet also tend to be elected more.7 This advantage is strengthened when the electoral rules are less restrictive.8

The promising of certain goods to only certain constituents undermines good governance, which would dictate all are equally entitled to public goods.9 This also creates a feedback loop by keeping people in power who only represent a small group of the population and continuing to allow similar people into office. This is clientelism, a form of vote-buying.

Clientelism has been shown to have negative consequences for democracy. For transitioning democracies, clientelism can make it hard for those countries to establish strong democratic institutions.10 There is always the possibility the country will resort to a corporatist authoritarian structure.11 Even if countries benefit from clientelism, vote buying should still be questioned and regarded as undermining the democratic process of elections. These goods may also only be promised during election season, meaning these goods are selectively given, rather than to actually provide a service.12

Once in office, it is unclear if members of political dynasties make good leaders. Scholarly literature on political dynasties is still limited but business literature regarding family firms can provide insight as to how family dynamics may have negative consequences. In the business sector, family firms can hinder a company’s economic development.13 Firms that see a transition of management from a CEO to one of their descendants also see a decrease in performance.14 In firms managed by heirs, companies saw share prices decrease. Family firms would rather keep the power within their family than have the possibility of stronger management.

5 Ibid, 453–466.
8 Ibid, F476.
11 Ibid, 200.
Dynasties lead to low performance in governments as well. Dynastic leaders result in higher pork spending and as a result lead to bad governance in a variety of policies on issues like health care and infrastructure.\textsuperscript{15} Dynastic leaders only reward those who have voted for them. Therefore, they are unlikely to provide resources to build a bridge or a hospital that would benefit a larger population, rather than just those who voted for the dynastic leaders.\textsuperscript{16} Dynastic leaders care more about winning elections at any cost and punishing those who do not vote for them.

**Theory**

Political dynasties allow candidates to reach office in a less competitive manner than their peers. Elections, although not the only component of democracy, are a major component of all strong democracies. If these leaders reach office by less competitive means through buying votes, they promote autocratization. As these dynastic leaders take office, it is easier for other members of their family to take office, also through less democratic means and unfair competition.

While the literature shows this is true, there are still large gaps to uncover. The literature does not focus on the effects of state leaders; most of the literature only considers dynastic members of the legislature. If dynastic legislative leaders lead to destabilization of democratic practices, then state leaders should also have negative consequences. The corruption of a leader like President Maria Arroyo of the Philippines might make more national headlines than a regional congressman. So, state leaders and the effects they have on their countries should be considered.

*Hypothesis 1: Dynastic leaders are more likely than non-dynastic leaders to produce autocratization during their time in office.*

Dynasties are not equal across family relationships. George W. Bush stated that he did not want to be known for his father’s presidency yet was compared to his father many times through both his candidacy and presidency.\textsuperscript{17} A leader with a parent in office before them may feel more restricted to change their country’s image of them, leading to instability due to a more direct comparison. A leader with a relative in office may not experience the same type of direct comparison, and thus cause less instability than their other dynastic counterparts. Leaders with relatives other than parents in office may not get the same kind of name recognition either.

*Hypothesis 2: Dynastic leaders who have had a parent in office are more likely to produce autocratization during their time in office than dynastic leaders who had other types of family members in the same office.*

Another failure of the literature is to address the differences between dynastic leaders in differing types of regimes. Leaders in democratic regimes will have different experiences than leaders in authoritarian governments (experiences like education). Additionally, leaders in authoritarian regimes may have more autonomy over institutions. At the same time, authoritarian governments do not have strong – if any – democratic institutions. This means that au-

\textsuperscript{15} Tusalem and Pe-Aguirre, “The Effect of Political Dynasties on Effective Democratic Governance,” 368-371.

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid, 367.

Authoritarian regimes might not experience democratic erosion, but their authoritarian tendencies can become intensified. Dynastic leaders are already elected where the electoral rules are less restrictive and authoritarian governments cannot be expected to have the same number of electoral rules and fair elections as compared to dynasties.18

Hypothesis 3: Authoritarian dynastic leaders are more likely to produce instability in their countries than democratic and semi-democratic dynastic leaders, leading to further autocratization.

Design
In order to test my theory, I conduct a time-series cross sectional analysis, with the unit of analysis being leader-year. My independent variables are parent-child dynasty and extended dynasty. I consider all world leaders from 1945 to 2015, using Archigos. Archigos is a database of the primary leader from each country between 1875 and 2015. There are forty-four examples of parent-child dynasties and thirty examples of extended dynasties in this time frame out of more than two thousand world leaders. The dependent variable is the Polity IV score which is measured on a scale of -10 to 10, where -10 is the most autocratic and 10 is the most democratic.

The independent variables are coded 1 if they meet the definition requirements of parent-child and extended dynasties. Based on my hypotheses, I expect democracy to be negative for both parent-child dynasties and extended dynasties compared to non-dynastic regimes. Parent-child dynasties should have a more detrimental effect on democracy comparatively. Last, I expect authoritarian regimes to see greater negative impacts in their democracy scores compared to democratic and semi-democratic regimes.

I offer five control variables: GDP per capita, urbanization, years of education, income inequality, and world region. Empirical evidence suggests that countries with low-economic development have a hard time sustaining democracy.19 The evidence also shows that prosperous countries will lead to stronger democratic institutions like electoral rights and civil liberties. Another factor of economic development may be urbanization. While countries with higher GDP and other forms of development are associated with higher levels of urbanization, high levels of urbanization are associated with high levels of democratic instability.20 Scholars have argued that the biggest threat to democracy is its own redistributive properties.21 Thus, income inequality could be used as another explanation for level of democracy. Economic factors are not enough to explain what stimulates democracy. Education can check governments from becoming overly authoritarian.22

Results
Table 1 shows the results for three different models. Model 1 considers all regime types; Model 2 considers only authoritarian regimes; Model 3 considers only semi-democracies and democracies. The coefficients offer mixed support for the hypotheses. None of the models demonstrate parent-child dynasties as statistically significant. Model 1 shows that across all regime types, extended dynasties have a negative impact on democracy. However, Model 2 shows no

21 Ibid, 158-160.
statistical significance for dynasties’ impact on authoritarian regimes.

Model 3 shows that extended dynasties, have a negative impact on semi-democracies and democracies. Democracies and semi-democracies experience a 6 percent decline in democracy when there is a dynastic leader. The explanation here is that democracies and semi-democracies have room for their institutions to become weak.

Model 3 does not show statistical significance for dynasties affecting authoritarian regimes. An explanation for this is that authoritarian governments will not suffer from the weakening of democratic institutions, as these governments already suffer from weak (if any) democratic institutions. Their democracy scores would already be low, meaning there is little room for their scores to continue to decrease. It might be possible then, that dynastic authoritarian leaders allow authoritarian governments to survive.

Table 1:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All Regime Types</th>
<th>Authoritarian</th>
<th>Democracies/Semi-democracies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parent-Child</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dynasty</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extended Dynasty</td>
<td>-0.07***</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.06***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per Capita</td>
<td>0.00***</td>
<td>-0.00***</td>
<td>0.00**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (years)</td>
<td>0.02***</td>
<td>0.01***</td>
<td>0.03***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income Inequality</td>
<td>-0.00***</td>
<td>-0.00**</td>
<td>-0.00***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbanization</td>
<td>0.21***</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.26***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Region</td>
<td>0.02***</td>
<td>0.01***</td>
<td>0.01***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.22***</td>
<td>0.16***</td>
<td>0.25***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>4886</td>
<td>1490</td>
<td>3396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within R2</td>
<td>0.055</td>
<td>0.070</td>
<td>0.034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between R2</td>
<td>0.510</td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>0.521</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall R2</td>
<td>0.476</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.454</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

These results are preliminary and show some limitations. However, the results are important as they show the detrimental impact of political dynasties and that they can lead to autocratization.
Conclusion
Political dynasties, although a well-known phenomenon, remain understudied. We do know however, that political dynasties tend to undermine democracy and strong democratic institutions. The literature on political dynasties shows that political dynasties are bad for governance in some ways: they lead to less educated leaders who are selected through unfair competition and can also result in clientelism or poor spending.

However, the literature does not fully cover the effects of dynasties of state leaders, examine specific family relationships, or cover dynasties in different types of regimes. Further research could be expanded to consider leaders who had a relative in any elected office, rather than restricting it to leaders who had a relative in the same office. This would also expand the possible number of cases of dynasties and would help further prove the effects of dynasties on governance.

Despite its preliminary nature, the results from this study have notable implications. If dynasties lead to autocratization, it should be questioned why they have such an easier time being elected into office and what can be done to stop dynasties from having a negative impact.

Interview with Scott Sagan

On April 22, 2019, Scott Sagan visited Carnegie Mellon University to speak for the CIRP Policy Forum in a lecture titled “The North Korean Nuclear Crisis: Avoiding Cliffs on the Backside of the Summit.” Professor Sagan discussed the relationship between leadership in the United States and North Korea, and he presented arguments for why the United States should tailor its nuclear doctrine in order to better deter personalist dictatorships that possess, or could possess, nuclear weapons. Scott D. Sagan is the Caroline S.G. Munro Professor of Political Science, the Mimi and Peter Haas University Fellow in Undergraduate Education, and Senior Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation and the Freeman Spogli Institute at Stanford University.

Tanoff: In your 2010 article with Kenneth Waltz in The National Interest, “Is Nuclear Zero the Best Option?” you said that the most dangerous nuclear threats to the United States today and on the horizon are from terrorists and potential new nuclear powers, not from our traditional cold war adversaries in Russia or China. It’s been almost a decade since that article, do you still subscribe to that, especially given Chinese and Russian actions over the past few years?

Sagan: I do still think that the greatest risk of nuclear war is from new nuclear states. The terrorist threat of nuclear acquisition is a serious one but has been significantly reduced by the Obama administration’s Nuclear Security Summit policy. During the Obama administration there were four large-scale meetings of over forty heads of state, two in the United States in Washington, one in the Netherlands, and one in South Korea. At each of those summits the heads of state came and talked about their progress in reducing the risk of terrorism, for example, getting rid of highly enriched uranium in research reactors or creating a best practice training program for insider threats in their nuclear security establishment. They actually gave what they called “gift baskets” to one another, in the sense of a practical item that reduced overall risks to others. That’s what they were calling it. Leaders didn’t want to show up at that meeting and have not made any progress from the last two years. Some risk of terrorists getting a weapon or materials or someone stealing it because of a lack of cooperation among law enforcement individuals or individual governments, that will remain with us always, but I think it’s been significantly reduced.

You asked about other threats, from states. Unfortunately, because of the invasion of Crimea and the sanctions we put on Russia, Russia didn’t show up for the last security summit during the Obama administration. They may well, because of their own interest, want to reduce the likelihood, for example, that a Chechen terrorist group steals a nuclear weapon or gets material for a dirty bomb. But they’re not cooperating with the West because the United States has been putting on sanctions for other reasons. That’s one development that’s on the negative side.

The other development on the negative side, is linked to new states. North Korea has a
small nuclear arsenal. It's growing despite the summit meetings that President Trump has had with Kim Jong-un. The North Koreans have done little to slow down their acquisition of more weapons. The sanctions that we place on them are clearly having an economic, negative impact on North Korea. But there is still a growing risk of nuclear conflict on the Korean peninsula. And will the sanctions make it more likely or less likely that somebody in North Korea will sell a weapon to ISIS or al-Qaeda or some other terrorist group? I would argue it makes it more likely. To me, the sanctions that we're placing on them are not working and may potentially be counterproductive.

Tanoff: What do you think US policy should be if North Korea were to sell a nuclear weapon or if they sold the technology for it?

Sagan: First off, they already have at least once. We know that they were deeply involved in the building of a reactor in the Syrian desert in the 2005-2007 timeframe. The Israelis spotted it, the United States did not. According to George W. Bush's memoirs, the Israelis asked us to destroy it... The Bush administration said "no," but was very happy when Israel chose to destroy it themselves. I think that that was an illegal act, under the UN Charter, but I think it was a wise act. I think that that is an appropriate thing for Israel to do. And thank goodness that the Syrian government didn't have a nuclear weapon during the Syrian civil war, which has been raging since then.

So, we know that the North Koreans have done that in the past. Whether that attack makes them more reluctant or more willing to sell nuclear technology or materials in the future, I don't know. The CIA is obviously keeping an eye out for this type of covert arms sale and there is also what's called the Proliferation Security Initiative which monitors ships and would try to figure out if a North Korean vessel has radioactive materials on it. But North Korea might try to shield any nuclear material on a ship. What's the likelihood of detection? I have no idea; and I have no way of estimating the likelihood that North Korea would attempt to transfer nuclear technology again. I just think it's likely to go up when the sanctions are more biting. What should be the consequences? I think it would be a serious breach of international law and could be considered a casus belli that could cause the United States to decide to use military force against North Korea.

Tanoff: Returning to Russia, what are your thoughts on the US withdrawal from the INF treaty?

Sagan: I think that it was unfortunate. The Russians were cheating by all estimates of the US government. This was not a Trump administration position, this was pretty much unanimous within the Obama administration as well. That said, if a country is in breach of an agreement, there are a number of things that you can do. You can have equal breach, a proportionate breach, which is called a belligerent reprisal in international law. It would have been OK if we decided, for example, we are going to openly test a longer-range missile that will be in violation of the treaty. But then the purpose would have been to bring Russia back into compliance with the treaty. Instead we chose just to withdraw from the entire treaty which opens up lots of possibilities for us and lots of possibilities for the Russians. Moreover, we did so in a way without adequate consultation with our allies. So I think this was an unwise move to withdraw from the treaty.

Tanoff: Continuing on with the most dangerous nuclear threats, in another one of your articles you talked about personalist dictatorships as a nuclear threat. Can you explain why you think that is one of the biggest threats?

Sagan: This is a thorny problem. North Korea represents for the United States, a real sea change in the proliferation problem. It's the
first time a country as poor as North Korea has acquired this capability. I was going to say on its own, but it wasn't quite on its own. Just as Pakistan was helped by technology that they got from the Europeans, illegally, the North Koreans were helped by technology they got from the Pakistanis. But nonetheless it signals to other countries that you can be a poor, badly managed country, but if you really want to pursue nuclear weapons, you might be able to get them. That’s lesson number one.

Lesson number two is that a personalist dictator has a particular set of qualities that makes deterrence harder. First off, personalist dictators tend to have power all among themselves so that they don't have a set of checks and balances. It's often said in deterrence theory that you have to have a completely rational actor. You don't. If you don't have a rational actor, you have to have checks and balances. Unfortunately, personalist dictators tend to surround themselves with “yes” men who tell the dictator what he wants to know. Intelligence is particularly bad in those cases. If a dictator makes a really bad decision, he might not be restrained by people on the inside. I think that we should worry about Kim Jong-un in that respect. The polls that Benjamin Valentino and I have conducted show that the majority of the American public does not think that Kim Jong-un makes rational decisions with respect to the use of force. That's a big worry; I think that's fully justified. I should note, however, that only 45 percent of the American people think that Donald Trump makes rational decisions with regard to military force.

Tanoff: That's a good transition to my next question on your 2017 Foreign Affairs article, "The Korean Missile Crisis." You talked about Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis and other military advisors that need to serve as “voices of prudence.” But Mattis and National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster are now gone. What is your opinion on those surrounding Trump in that view of the need for constraining voices?

Sagan: I don't think Donald Trump is an irrational individual. I do think that he is a rash and pugnacious individual and is prone to make decisions on the fly based on his whims. He's rational enough that in the past when he has contemplated using military force, people have pushed against it, and he'll think about it and often relent. Although, he does have a contrarian streak to him that if people push back too far he likes to do it anyway. The American command and control system was created for a rapid response to a Soviet attack in Western Europe and elsewhere during the Cold War and it hasn't been changed. The president has the capability to order the use of nuclear weapons on his own. He is meant to go through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the Secretary of Defense, if the system works appropriately. But they're not authorized to veto an order. They can say “we disagree.” But they can't veto an order.

In 1974 during the heights of the Watergate crisis, Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger reportedly told the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, “If Richard Nixon gives you an order to use military force, don't honor it right away, but contact me. I’d like to find out what’s going on.” That act was extra-constitutional but it was strategic and wise in my view. I’m so worried about Trump's knee-jerk reactions to things that I think the Secretary of Defense, whoever he or she is, and the other members of the cabinet have to be prepared to invoke the twenty-fifth amendment if they feel that the president is making decisions in an irrational manner or a reckless manner. These are tricky questions because in most cases, a president's order to use nuclear weapons would probably be legal. There are only a few instances where it would be illegal.

The head of Strategic Command, General John Hyten has said that “If the president gave me an illegal order regarding nuclear weapons use, I wouldn't follow it. I would say Mr. President, that’s illegal. Tell me what your goals are and let me see if I can find a
legal way of doing that.” So, for example, if the President said “I want you to kill everybody in Pyongyang,” I firmly believe that General Hyten or his successor would say “that’s an illegal order” because it is against the laws of armed conflict to deliberately target civilians. If [Trump] said, however, “I want you to hit the headquarters of the Ministry of Defense in Pyongyang. Even though that would create lots of collateral damage, I want you to do that.” Then I think it would be a legal order and a senior commander would be reluctant but in a difficult situation. They could say, “Sir, that could be disproportionate.” But if the purpose is to stop an attack on the United States, proportionality won’t constrain it very much in an attack.

I think that there are really worrisome constitutional problems that the current crisis is raising for us… unless we change the laws to have others involved in the command and control system… But I think it’s very hard to do. For example, Matt Waxman and Richard Betts of Columbia University proposed adding the Secretary of Defense and the Attorney General into the chain of command. The idea here would be to have checks and balances built into the chain of command. The problem is that I don’t think Congress could do that without a constitutional amendment because that would make the president less than the commander in chief. What could happen is that a future president could tie his or her hands by doing that. Unfortunately, Barack Obama didn’t do that; Donald Trump would not do that. A future president might. It’d be a wise thing to do.

Tanoff: Are there any other suggestions that you have for procedures or structures that we could change?

Sagan: This is not a chain of command issue, but it would be helpful to have a new interpretation of the laws of armed conflict. Because I believe that proportionality can only get you so far in constraining your potential uses of nuclear weapons, I’ve proposed, along with Jeffrey Lewis, a different legal interpretation of one of the laws of armed conflict, which we’ve called the nuclear necessity principle. Under the additional protocols to the Geneva Conventions, not only is it illegal to deliberately target civilians but an extra requirement is that all states have to take “feasible precautions” in their targeting and military operations to reduce unnecessary collateral damage. The law doesn’t say that there can be no collateral damage, but collateral damage can’t be disproportionate. In addition to not being disproportionate, states must take feasible precautions; states are required to take active measures to reduce the likelihood and extent of collateral damage to civilians. Lewis and I argue that one way of doing that would be for the United States to declare that it will never use a nuclear weapon against any target that could otherwise be destroyed with reasonable probability by conventional weapons. When we published this essay in the scholarly journal Daedelus and a short version in the Washington Post, some people responded to that by saying “Oh, of course we should that.” Other people responded, saying that “That’s really a bad idea.” When I asked why, one individual said “Because it would reduce collateral damage.” I said “That’s the whole purpose, that’s why we want the US government to make that declaration.”
And this individual said “Well if you reduce collateral damage, you’re reducing deterrence, you’re weakening deterrence.” I think that’s actually a common criticism of this approach. My own view is that if you’re using collateral damage for the sake of deterrence, it’s no longer collateral, it’s deliberate, even though you have a military target attached to it.

Tanoff: You spoke in a *New York Times* article with Allen Weiner in early 2018 about the difference between preventive and preemptive wars and that people weren’t getting the distinction between the two correct. In that article, you talked about an example of this with Israel, where they launched airstrikes on two countries to prevent those countries from starting a nuclear program. You noted that it was unlikely that those two countries would retaliate. Why is that?

Sagan: Neither the Iraqis nor the Syrians had much of a capability to retaliate. Israel launched a preventive strike, which most people, most international lawyers, would call an act of aggression. It was not a preemptive war, not an attack because the other side was about to attack but a preventive attack because Israel saw that the two countries (Iraq and Syria) were getting closer to acquiring nuclear weapons. Those attacks would not pass the UN charter requirement for only fighting in self-defense, which is why the United States opposed the Israeli attack on Iraq in 1981. In 2007, when Israel destroyed a cover nuclear reactor in Syria, however, everyone just decided to stay silent. Even traditional critics of Israel in essence said “Ok, we understand this does not conform to the United Nations charter and yet the Syrians were doing this without telling anybody; why were they trying to build a nuclear reactor in the middle of the desert?” The Israelis attacked before it went critical, so there was no spreading of radioactivity of any sort. The attack did kill a small number of people; we don't know the actual numbers. But there was no collateral damage as this was out in the middle of nowhere. Weiner and I argue that this saved the Middle East from having a Syrian government with a nuclear weapon which could have been disastrous. It is illegal under international law but the fact that no one complained about it, or very few people complained about it other than the Syrians and a couple of their allies, shows that most people recognize that that was something that was worth doing.

We have that a lot in domestic politics sometimes. Sometimes people do something that is illegal but we don’t change the law because of that, we throw that person at the mercy of the court. They say “I had to kill this person because they were threatening...” or, “I had to drive way above the speed limit because of this emergency.” You don’t change the law because of one reasonable violation of it, you say that this was illegal and acknowledge that... I think that was the case with Israel in 1981 and 2007.

Tanoff: Returning to North Korea, can you discuss the importance of focusing on deterrence when US public officials are talking about North Korea?

Sagan: I believe that it is high time for the United States to stop treating North Korea as a nuclear non-proliferation problem and treat it as a deterrence problem. Unfortunately, the longer we treat it as a nuclear non-
proliferation problem, the longer we'll be making threats against them, which is exactly what you don't want to do if you're accepting them as a deterrent problem. You want to threaten that we will respond if they attack us or our allies. That's the essence of deterrence. But we don't want to say that we're going to launch a preventive war against North Korea if, as President Trump famously said, “they don't stop threatening us.” Those are the kind of threats that can backfire.

You had this recently in this past year when John Bolton said that he thought the right model for how to deal with North Korea was the Libya model I believe Bolton meant that… just as Qaddafi gave up all of his program and shipped it to the United States and then we agreed to have restoration of relations with him, Kim Jong-un should accept that model. But two other people didn’t see it that way. One was Donald Trump, who changed his rhetoric from the “Libya model” to the “Qaddafi model” without apparent awareness that Qaddafi had gotten murdered by his own people. The second person who didn't see the Libya model the way Bolton did was Kim Jong-un. Indeed, the North Korean government has often cited Libya as an example about why they don't want to disarm, because look what happened to [Libya].

When you start threatening North Korea not with retaliation but rather with preventive war, it just gives them extra incentives not to give up their weapons and I think that's the dilemma that we have. As long as they have those weapons we're going to have to work hard to deter them, but also to avoid provoking them because deterrence can break down. Deterrence can fail both because our threats of retaliation might not be credible, but also because our threats to start a preventive war might be too credible. That could lead North Korea to strike first if it believes a US strike is imminent.

Tanoff: What do you think the way forward with North Korea is?

Sagan: I think we should continue having summits… The position of Stephen Biegun, Special Envoy in charge of the talks with North Korea… was the right one, which is that we should have some step-by-step actions to reduce tensions and start the disarmament process. It would be very useful, for example, to have what is now an informal agreement that North Korea doesn't test nuclear weapons or long-range missiles turned into a formal legal treaty. What would we give up for that? We'd probably have to give up some element of either our exercise program with South Korea and let the North Koreans come and inspect our air bases in South Korea and in Japan to ensure that those our bases don't have nuclear weapons on them. That kind of step-by-step approach can build trust rather than insisting that you have to have everything done and given to us and shipped to the United States as did Libya, which I think was a non-starter and is not going to get us anywhere.

Tanoff: Do you think the rhetoric of Trump is getting in the way?

Sagan: Trump's rhetoric has sometimes been too hostile, but at other times, as when he talks about “love letters” from Kim, it has been too warm and coddling. The US military is trying to figure out how to maintain readiness without having exercises with the South Koreans. I think it's probably not a bad thing at all to review those exercises. But this is one of those incidents in which the President basically called an audible. He made up this idea that we'll stop our exercises because he doesn't like spending money on exercises, not because this was really the right thing to do for our relationships with our allies. I think it'd be much better to have a negotiation where we say, “We will have this kind of exercise but not that kind, and we're going to limit them in this way in exchange. In exchange, you have to agree to not test long-range missiles but you can test short-range missiles.”
That kind of agreement could still work. In addition to having that kind of bargaining on arms control at the highest level, one of the lessons from the Cold War was that lower-level arms control, often called operational arms control, mattered. There’s no hotline between Pyongyang and Washington, DC. There should be if both states have nuclear weapons and both states have potential crises. With the Russians during the Cold War, the United States negotiated dangerous military activities agreements where we agreed on the rules, for example, about what was permissible if two ships come close to one another. What happens if a plane accidentally flies into the other side’s air space? What other signals can be used, what other procedures can be used… so you don’t shoot down somebody right away? Those kinds of operational arms control agreements helped reduce tensions during the Cold War; but we have not even started to think about those kind of agreements with North Korea.

Tanoff: Do you think it’s because we viewed the Soviet Union as our equal? We thought that they were always spending more on military than we were, we were always trying to catch up to them during that time period, and North Korea is nowhere close.

Sagan: No, I think it’s because we haven’t accepted North Korea as a nuclear weapons state. Whether we like it or not, North Korea has nuclear weapons. And whether we like it or not, it’s unlikely to give them up. If you think that the best way to give them up is to maintain a threat against them, then you’re not going to want to start talking about operational arms control because it would reduce the danger of accidental war. Some people would argue that what we’re doing is what Tom Schelling called the “threat that leaves something to chance.” We’re going to continue making threats, not intending to go to war, but knowing that that puts extra risk of war on the table. The problem with threats that leave something to chance is that they leave something to chance. And if you’re worried that this risk is too high, and that North Korea is not going to give up its weapons because they view them as the only guarantee they have the United States won’t attack, then you need to add arms control to our policy. Why should North Korea give up their weapons to President Trump when he has said publicly that we will go along with the Qaddafi model, unless of course they don’t disarm? So I do think the president’s rhetoric has gotten in the way of making progress.

Tanoff: Do you have any advice for students who want to pursue academia or government consulting work, as someone who has done both?

Sagan: I got involved in national security work very young, publishing my first article about US troops in Europe when I was a junior in college. This convinced me that I both liked academic work, research and writing, but it also convinced me that there’s a role for outside scholars to play, not just to inform the public but also to inform the government. When you’re in the government, you don’t have time for research, you’ve just got to make your decisions and use up the intellectual capital that you have. But to get new intellectual capital, you have to read publications that other people are writing. So I think the life of a scholar in this area is particularly exciting and particularly demanding. It’s exciting because you can have an impact, directly or indirectly, on government decisions by writing about things that matter today and by bringing new evidence to bear on problems that the government is wrestling with. But policy-relevant research is challenging because it means that unlike other areas where you’re just writing for an academic journal or for improvement of the scientific knowledge, here you’re writing for also trying to apply that scientific knowledge in useful ways. And that requires that you also know a lot about how the government works and what problems it is facing today.
Interview with Victor Cha

Colin Tait, recent graduate of the Advanced Master’s Program in International Relations and Politics (IRP/AMP) and student guest editor of this edition of the CIRP Journal, interviewed Dr. Victor Cha to discuss US relations with North Korea. Dr. Cha is a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the inaugural holder of the Korea Chair at the organization. He is also a professor of government and holds the D.S. Song-KF Chair in the Department of Government and the School of Foreign Service (SFS) at Georgetown University. In July 2019, he was appointed vice dean for faculty and graduate affairs in SFS. From 2004-2007, Dr. Cha served as the director for Asian affairs at the National Security Council (NSC) under the George W. Bush administration.

Tait: Can you discuss your experience working as the Director for Asian Affairs in the National Security Council?

Cha: I started as the Director for Asian Affairs in the National Security Council in 2004. Working in the National Security Council is very small unlike other government entities, and at times the work was like drinking water from a firehose. It was my first time serving my country in public office and I was both happy and proud to do so. Although I was already an expert in my field, I learned an incredible amount about Asian affairs, and I was able to learn about many other countries through my interactions with government officials and experts worldwide.

Tait: How did your 2007 trip to North Korea impact your work? What are the most significant lasting impressions from personally experiencing the country?

Cha: I traveled to North Korea in 2007 to negotiate the return of POW/MIA remains of soldiers from the Korean War with then New Mexico governor Bill Richardson and former Veteran Affairs Secretary Anthony Principi. Doing so gave closure for families who did not know what happened to their loved ones for decades and I was fortunate to have taken part in such an experience. My colleagues and I were the first White House representatives to have visited North Korea since the Jimmy Carter administration and the North Korean officials treated us very professionally and as guests. I was happy to see Pyongyang as well as the countryside of North Korea, and like President Trump's trip to meet the leader of North Korea, I walked across the demilitarized zone to South Korea. My experience over there was a very memorable and impactful experience. Despite what many Americans think, North Koreans are not scary people and do not have horns on their heads.

Tait: You were nominated to be the US Ambassador to South Korea in 2017 but withdrew your nomination in 2018. What major barriers and disagreements with the Trump administration led you to not move forward with this potential appointment? How do you think Ambassador Harris has handled his own appointment?

Cha: I did not campaign to be the US Ambassador to South Korea and I did not
withdraw my nomination. I was asked to serve as an expert and I was willing to do so. Presidential administrations choose appointees based on their preferences and they have the right to change their minds. I published my geostrategic views on relations with the Korean peninsula, and these did not align with President Trump, but it was necessary that I publish these views. I know Harry Harris personally and he was originally supposed to be the Ambassador to Australia but ultimately ended up in South Korea. He is handling his appointment well and doing a very good job at his post.

**Tait:** South Korea and Japan are amidst a trade tiff and most recently, the possible degradation of the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA). How does this impact regional stability? In what ways does it threaten US national security interests?

**Cha:** The deterioration of bilateral treaties is dangerous. The crisis between Japan and South Korea is detrimental for the United States and the unified posture between the trilateral alliance of the United States, Japan, and South Korea against North Korea and China. The national security of interests of the trilateral alliance and overall regional security are damaged with the degradation of Japanese and South Korean relations. The Trump administration has focused on diplomacy with North Korea and paid less attention to its two key alliances, which may have contributed to the downturn. The United States needs to make a strong effort to preserve the current alliance structure to maintain desired levels of security for the Korean Peninsula.

**Tait:** Shifting to North Korea more specifically, in the final chapter of *The Impossible State: North Korea, Past and Future*, you argued that the end of the North Korean state is near. Do you still believe this to be true? What has changed and stayed the same since you published this book?

**Cha:** The North Korean regime as we know it could be gone tomorrow or could be gone in twenty years and we would not be surprised. That is how wide the range of probability is on the regime. We just do not know its future and we have few metrics to assess regime resiliency. Having said that, I believe that it is not possible to have a Stalinist regime in the current world order. If North Korea opened up their economy and society to the world, they could be a very successful and prosperous country, but this could come at the cost of an end to the family cult of personality regime. Since I published that book, the North Korean leader has survived long after my expectations of his sustainability. So, he's done something to defy expectations. Having said that, I think most would agree that North Korea is a failing state and its people will continue to suffer under the current regime.

**Tait:** What is your vision for responsible American policy towards the Korean Peninsula? Can you discuss the major priorities policymakers must focus on?

**Cha:** Counteracting North Korean nuclear capabilities has been at the forefront of discussions on the Korean Peninsula. Although a nuclear North Korea is frightening, maintaining the US–South Korean alliance must be focused on. This alliance is the key to regional stability and to address US national security interests in East Asia. The social, political, and economic development of South Korea throughout the twentieth century is a success story and needs to be preserved.

**Tait:** The CIRP Journal is circulated among alumni, students, and young professionals seeking to pursue political science. Do you have any advice for young, aspiring national security specialists?

**Cha:** The world seems like a chaotic place right now with countries like Iran, North Korea,
and Russia acting nefariously. However, this should not deter students from pursuing international relations, but instead inspire them to do so. Young minds must be trained to make the world a better place whereas my generation failed to do so and made it worse. Do not be afraid nor intimidated by the current state of world affairs. There is so much to learn and study as young, aspiring political scientists beginning to establish their careers. Now is a great and important time to pursue international relations whether this be in the private sector, academia, or public service.