CIRP Journal

Featuring interviews with
Alonzo Fulgham
Paul Wolfowitz
Robert Zoellick

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In honor of Jared and Maureen Cohon and in recognition of their 16 years of exceptional stewardship of Carnegie Mellon University.
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Letter from the Publisher

Dear Reader,

In 2010, Yong-Gyun Choi, Amanda Kennard, Inyoung Song, and Audrey Williams had numerous discussions about the theoretical and policy-relevant implications of the work they were doing as researchers in the Research Lab of the Center for International Relations and Politics (CIRP). I suggested that we create a scholarly journal to which Carnegie Mellon undergraduates and graduate students could submit essays and CIRP affiliates would serve as guest editors. They embraced the idea and I agreed to serve as the journal’s publisher and editor-in-chief.

I have long felt that the conversation about world affairs is dominated far too often by statesmen, senior scholars, journalists, and pundits. The inaugural issue of CIRP Journal offers scholarly analysis of challenges facing the international system from the fresh perspectives of the emerging generation of thought leaders. From American exceptionalism, decline, and participation in the 2011 intervention in Libya to understanding genocide, rape as a weapon of war, US drug policy in the era of globalization, empowerment of women through political leadership, and the perils of food aid, the essays reflect the diverse concerns of their authors as well as the growing interest in world affairs among Carnegie Mellon students.

The essays also demonstrate Carnegie Mellon University’s commitment to academic excellence. Guided by research methods from the social sciences and humanities, the essays and interviews have undergone rigorous peer review.

I would like to thank the original members of CIRP Journal, inaugural issue editors Emily Baddock and Audrey Williams, as well as these CMU colleagues: Silvia Borzutzky, Jared Cohn, Gerald Costanzo, Joseph Devine, Emily Half, Mark Kamlet, Robbee Kosak, John Lehoczky, and John Miller. Their energy and insights are reflected in the pages that follow.

Kiron K. Skinner
Publisher and Editor-in-Chief
Dear Reader,

The Center for International Relations and Politics, a research center at Carnegie Mellon University, places a high value on in-depth analysis of diverse and rapidly changing issues across the globe. Students who work in the center’s Research Lab in International Relations and Politics come from many different positions on the academic trajectory and have a wide variety of scholarly interests and career goals. As guest editors of the inaugural issue of *CIRP Journal*, and as long-time members of the lab, we are proud that this first edition of the Journal is being published as we complete our academic careers at CMU.

While the articles in this edition cover a wide range of subjects, we see them as existing within two broad frameworks: academic analysis of systemic international relations questions and study of current events from a policy perspective. These two categories of analysis exemplify the work done by CIRP researchers and reflect more broadly the diversity within the global affairs discipline. These distinctions aside, all essays employ intellectual integrity and creative analysis to bring new insights and valuable solutions to the table. Whether this journal falls into the hands of a novice in the field of international relations or an expert in global affairs, our goal is to appeal to all readers by presenting thoughtful, articulate, and compelling essays that make substantive contributions to the current body of international relations work. We hope this publication will encourage students who are curious about international affairs to participate in the global debate and, in doing so, contribute new perspectives to the myriad issues affecting our world.

As with any labor of love, we are gratified to see this inaugural edition finally polished and published. We would like to thank everyone who made this issue possible, including Professor Kiron Skinner, Katie Stoebe, our student authors, Professor Gerald Costanzo and other colleagues at the Carnegie Mellon University Press, and the board members of the Center for International Relations and Politics. We look forward to seeing *CIRP Journal* flourish for many editions to come.

Emily Baddock and Audrey Williams
Guest Editors
The Dangers of Food Aid

As of October 2012, the United Nations estimated that there are approximately 870 million hungry people worldwide. The United States, among other nations, has been working for decades to alleviate hunger across the globe, frequently doing so through the donation of US crops. Too often, however, US food aid policies have been designed to benefit domestic industry rather than the global poor, and have had disastrous consequences for the very communities they ostensibly aim to help. Although alternative modes of food aid exist, they must be investigated and expanded in order to sustainably benefit those in need.

Created by President Eisenhower in 1954, the Food for Peace program was established to help dispose of excess food produced by US farmers. During the 1950s and 1960s, a time of great surplus, massive wheat donations from the US disrupted Indian agricultural markets and contributed to the bankruptcy of thousands of Indian farmers. As early as the 1970s, George Dunlop, chief of staff of the Senate Agriculture Committee, and other government officials conceded that food aid to Indonesia, Pakistan, and India in the 1960s hindered agricultural growth and may have led to the starvation of millions. Food for Peace allowed the governments of these countries to put off important agricultural reforms and investment and failed to help establish a pricing system that would have given farmers incentives to increase production and innovation. Despite these devastating effects, not much has changed. These early policies introduced the US agriculture industry to the advantages of alternative markets, and the practice of exploiting them for export opportunities continues.

Today, the expansion and contraction of food aid depends on aggregate crop yields and the success of agricultural products in the US rather than on the needs and conditions of recipient economies. In 2003 when California raisins encountered marketing difficulties in the West, the US government launched an initiative to include raisins in food aid. The Food, Conservation, and Energy Act, passed in 2008, was the first bill concerning food donation in which

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3 Ibid.
4 Bovard, “The Continuing Failure.”
6 Bovard, “The Continuing Failure.”
developing new markets for US agriculture was an explicit objective of food aid policy.7

As was discovered in the early stages of the Food for Peace program, dumping food into recipient markets can have devastating consequences for local economies. According to Professor William Easterly of New York University, “It is axiomatic that flooding the market with food drives down the price for local farmers.”8 Huge amounts of food aid lead to artificially low prices, which hurt the market and people of a nation in the long run.

In 2003, experts predicted a 600,000-metric-ton food deficit in Malawi.9 Foreign donations poured in despite the fact that commercial and informal importers brought an additional 350,000-500,000 tons of food.10 Malawian markets were flooded, and maize prices dropped from $250 per ton to $100 per ton in one year.11 Food production was no longer profitable; consequently, local production of maize, cassava, and rice fell considerably. Estimated losses to the Malawian economy were approximately $15 million.12

Subsequent dramatic increases in price can occur when food aid is interrupted, and these can be equally devastating. Volatile fluctuations in the amount of food aid provided by the international community prevent nations from finding their own stable equilibrium prices. From 2007-2008, inconsistent weather conditions and rising oil and fertilizer prices led to a 56 percent increase in food import bills. Many countries put export bans on their agricultural sectors, driving up prices even further.13

In addition to the disruptive economic consequences of large-scale food donation, US food aid policies are grossly inefficient. Following the 2004 tsunami in Southeast Asia, the US pledged to send 30,000 tons of food to victims in Sri Lanka and Indonesia despite the availability of plenty of food within the region. Even if these regional sources had not been available, food could have been easily purchased from nearby Thailand or India.14 Shipping food from donor countries is estimated to be 46 percent more expensive than buying locally.15 It would have been cheaper and more effective simply to have sent money.

When the US does try to provide cash to nations in crisis, it often does so through inefficient attempts at monetization such as the sale of food aid within the recipient country to obtain

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9 Bovard, “The Continuing Failure.”
10 Ibid.
11 Bovard, “The Continuing Failure.”
12 Ibid.
14 Bovard, “The Continuing Failure.”
15 Bailey, “Growing a Better Future.”
cash. This cash is then often used for local assistance. In some cases, these sales have the potential to stabilize local food prices, but they often threaten local livelihoods. In Ethiopia, imported vegetable oil competed with regional production to the detriment of local merchants. Cash is often better than monetized food for it is quicker, cheaper, more efficient, and has fewer dangerous consequences.

A better approach to food aid entails purchasing food for areas in need locally or regionally. Not only is it often much cheaper and faster than comparable overseas donations but it can also benefit local economies. When the World Food Programme commissioned studies of local and regional food purchases in several countries, it found that in Ethiopia, Nepal, and Uganda, local economies benefited. In all countries, storage and transport infrastructure improved; in Nepal, improved milling and processing developed, and in Ethiopia, competition increased. Additionally, increased demand from the local and regional procurement of food aid encourages traders to improve grain quality and invest in production equipment and, overall, expands competition and selling capacity.

This method of procurement is not foolproof, however. It is imperative that the season of the sale of local and regional procurement be appropriate, as purchases made in Ethiopia several months after harvest benefited traders who had access to storage facilities but not the vast majority of farmers who sell their crops directly after harvest. Other obstacles include a dearth of reliable sellers, poor infrastructure for the transport and storage of food aid, and weak or nonexistent local laws that make it difficult to enforce contracts between aid organizations and local sellers. Moreover, the implementation of local regional procurement of food aid must be incrementally expanded due to many countries’ limited market capacity.

Additionally, if not timed appropriately, the local and regional procurement of food aid can have an adverse effect on local economies. Local and regional procurement can drive the price of food up by increasing demand and consequently hurting consumers, as occurred in Ethiopia in 2003. In order to ensure that this method of procuring food benefits all parties involved, purchases must be made when a surplus is present in local markets. This can create a problem for donor organizations that may not have an adequate amount of cash on hand at the optimal time for food purchases, but a possible solution used by the World Food Programme is the borrowing of funds against donor commitments.

The warehouse receipt system is another viable alternative to traditional forms of in-kind food

17 Bovard, “The Continuing Failure.”
18 Hansch, Food Aid.
19 Bovard, “The Continuing Failure.”
23 Coulter, “Local And Regional Procurement.”
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 Coulter, “Local And Regional Procurement.”
aid. In this system, aid organizations can license or certify private companies to store grain on behalf of other merchants. The food in question must be standardized in quality, thus encouraging a higher grade of produce. For a nominal fee, the warehouse will store and maintain the grain while the depositor waits for a suitable price. In the meantime, the depositor will receive a receipt verifying the quantity and quality of the deposited grain, which can be used to obtain a loan to further invest in his or her farm or other needs. This system helps to support local merchants and acts as a stimulus to developing economies. The World Food Programme acknowledges that the warehouse receipt system has great potential but has not implemented it widely because it can be difficult to find trustworthy people or companies to run the warehouses.

These alternative forms of food aid must be explored and expanded, as in-kind food aid and monetization have the potential to perpetuate the very market conditions they seek to alleviate. It is imperative that all help given also benefits both the long-term and short-term prospects of the poor in developing countries. Unfortunately, common modes of food aid often fail in this respect. Ultimately, food aid should focus on the chronic problems of the global poor rather than on short-term crises such as famines or droughts. Sustainable and constructive food aid that benefits local infrastructure and businesses is a more prudent way of assuaging global poverty and, subsequently, global hunger.

29 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
33 Astier, “Can aid do more harm?”
Using Prospect Theory to Understand Genocide

SOHAM SENGUPTA

THE QUESTION OF GENOCIDE

As time moves forward, it is likely to assume that humanity is converging towards a more civilized way of life. Progress in health, infrastructure, economic planning, efficient governance, education, nutrition, and more suggest that mankind should also be making strides in our treatment of one another. Defying this notion are the 262 million nonmilitary combatants that have been killed by genocide in the twentieth century.¹

This begs the question: How can these killings happen on such a massive scale and so frequently? One might draw the conclusion that genocides are simply the doings of callous characters who by some coincidence have found themselves in a position of power: Hitler, Pol Pot, Hussein, Milosevic, Al-Bashiri, etc. But this top-down approach to explaining genocide ignores the critical fact that these leaders would never be able to do these things without thousands, if not millions, of followers. This disturbing reality, illustrated by the deeds of regular Hutu banana farmers in Rwanda or Serbian citizens in former Yugoslavia, must be acknowledged. Nearly all genocides see many peaceful, ordinary people brutally killing innocent citizens.²

Sociologists have tried to explain genocide through macroanalysis, citing lapses in various institutions or mechanisms of society.³ However, when we assume that genocide is an action committed by many types of people, not only the mentally ravaged, we can begin to understand genocide at the micro-level, further allowing us to engage disciplines that study people at the individual decision-making level. Psychologists such as Steven K. Baum have applied their field in an effort to explain what types of individuals participate in genocide. Results indicate that we can predict how a person will act when the killing begins based on the traits they show in regular life. However, few theories have been presented that directly attempt to explain why exactly an individual decides to start mercilessly killing people. Many cite abnormally strong feelings of hatred and fury, but these explanations alone are not enough.⁴ Many observers have pointed out that genocide is more likely to occur in times of economic devastation, but they make no suggestion as to why an individual decides to engage in vicious behav-

² Ibid.

Soham Sengupta

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Economics is a field that has been largely untapped in trying to understand what fuels this vital aspect of genocide.

Genocide, as disgusting and awful as it may be, is an attempt by many individuals to improve their lives and the lives of those they care about. Economics is a field that is designed to study such actions; however, the explanatory power of *homo-economicus* – the notion that people only do things for monetary gain – falls short here. Political, social, and legal ideas need to be included in the analysis as well. Therefore, I believe the best way to understand why genocide occurs is through a combination of economics and psychology called behavioral economics. Further concepts of behavioral economics and how they relate to genocide will be discussed.

**THE PROSPECT FAMILY**

In 1979, Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky published a paper describing Prospect Theory, which is now one of the most widely used theories in the social sciences. The theory itself has various tenets and points, two of which help us to better understand what leads to genocide:

1) Individuals do not value things in absolute terms. They value things in relative gains and relative losses comparable to their personal neutral reference point. This means that different individuals can perceive the same thing in different ways. For example, a third-world farmer could revel at the opportunity to have one meal a day while a typical American could be frightened by the idea. This helps explain why certain types of events might rile mobs in one part of the world while hardly upsetting people in another.

2) Individuals are less likely to engage in risky behavior when they are in a state of gain. In other words, they are risk averse. On the other hand, individuals who are in a state of loss are more likely to engage in risky behavior, also known as risk seeking. This can help explain why individuals will engage in radical antisocial behavior when they have been hit by a loss-inducing shock as opposed to engaging in that same type of behavior when they are living their regular lives in a neutral or gaining state.

These tenets of Prospect Theory vary from traditional economic thinking but will be very helpful in a behavioral economic analysis. The point involving being risk averse in gains and risk seeking in losses can be modeled in the following scenario.

**MAIN SCENARIO**

An individual has X less utility than his reference point, or the point where he is neutral. He has the option where he can make gains Y with a probability of π or make losses Z with a probability of (1-π). The likelihood of him deciding to utilize the option will be represented with the probability of α. As stated in the second Prospect Theory point, individuals are more risk seeking in a state of loss, so we can expect α to be higher in a state of loss.

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6 Kahneman and Tversky, "Prospect Theory."

7 Kahneman and Tversky, "Prospect Theory."

8 Ibid.

9 Ibid.
Now I will describe four variables related to an individual that can be used to understand genocide when directly linked to the scenario I previously described. The first variable is the level of pessimism an individual in a state of loss feels towards the idea that he will be able to return to his neutral reference point. Pessimism directly relates to the X value seen before, as a person’s pessimism relates to how close he feels to his reference point. The second variable is an individual’s perception of how the existence of a certain group of people negatively affects the area of his utility, or subjective well-being. This variable directly relates to the Y or gains value seen in the previous scenario. The third variable that must be analyzed is the individual’s confidence in the idea that his participation in genocide will be successful in removing the threatening group. This variable relates to the π value described earlier. The fourth and final variable to analyze is the marginal cost of participation in genocide for the individual. This variable relates to the Z value seen in the above scenario.

I will explain assumptions and these four variables in more depth in order to give a greater understanding of what mechanisms motivate an individual to participate in the act of genocide. The likelihood of the individual participating in or orchestrating genocide can be seen in the value α.

FALLING BELOW THE REFERENCE POINT

As discussed before, using the Prospect Theory model, we can see that genocide starts to be a possibility when individuals feel that they are below their utility reference point. This idea can be applied when looking at genocide from both the bottom-up approach, involving the regular people who participate in genocide, and the top-down approach, involving the leaders that orchestrate such genocides. From the bottom-up approach, utility categories such as economics and security can often be areas where individuals feel below their reference point. For example, the genocide in Rwanda occurred after the country was in economic ruin and many individuals were worried they would be at a loss of employment.\(^\text{10}\) Many accusations towards Jews involving controlling the world’s economy began in Germany after the Great Depression ravaged the country.\(^\text{11}\) With respect to security, the Rwanda example can be used again. Much of the hatred the Hutus had against the Tutsis began to surface after Tutsis slaughtered Hutus in the Burundi genocide.\(^\text{12}\) Ethnic Georgians were brutally mass-murdered in the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the early 1990s after the Georgian military launched a large military offensive in both regions, which resulted in both Abkhaz and Ossetian civilian deaths.\(^\text{13}\)

In reference to the top-down approach where leaders make the decision to try to institute genocide, we focus on ideology and beliefs as opposed to more real and present concerns such as economics and security. Again we see that genocide becomes a possibility in a state of loss. Adolf Hitler wanted a society where only the Aryan master race was present; therefore, a land filled with Jews, Polacks, Slavs, Gypsies, etc. simply would not do.\(^\text{14}\) Pol Pot envisioned a society that returned Cambodia to the days of the Khmer Empire when the country was an agricultural powerhouse.\(^\text{15}\) The intellectuals and aristocrats present in his society did not fill

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\(^\text{10}\) Baum, *The Psychology of Genocide*, 118.  
\(^\text{11}\) Ibid.  
\(^\text{12}\) Ibid.  
\(^\text{13}\) Ibid., 13.  
\(^\text{15}\) Morrock, *The Psychology of Genocide and Violent Oppression*.  

Soham Sengupta
this vision. Genocide can also be used as a strategic tool for leaders. When the Kurds support-
ed enemy Iran during an eight-year border war, Saddam Hussein believed the Kurdish people
prevented him from having a secure, Baathist state. These examples show us that in both the
top-down approach and bottom-up approach, individuals need to be in a state of loss before
genocidal activity begins.

PESSIMISM

Once an individual is in a state of loss, the pessimism he feels towards getting back to his refer-
ence point is a very important variable to analyze. It relates to the X value I previously de-
scribed. The less likely an individual feels that he can attain his reference point, the more likely
it is that he could resort to drastic antisocial behavior. One of the most important factors of
peessimism is the time that the individual spends below his reference point. The more time that
passes, the less optimistic the individual is about re-attaining his reference point. For example,
if an individual has a reference point of three meals a day, each day that he lives with fewer or
no meals, the more pessimistic he becomes about regaining his three-meals-a-day regimen.

Another important factor that we should take note of is how far away from his reference point
the individual feels. The farther away the individual feels from the reference point, the more
pessimistic he feels that he will ever get back there. Thus, an individual’s level of pessimism
directly affects the degree of loss felt by that individual.

HOW A GROUP’S EXISTENCE INFLUENCES UTILITY

Once an individual is in a state of loss and has a high level of pessimism, he will search for
ways in which he can return to his reference point. I assert that the principal piece of analy-
sis that determines what action the individual will perform is how the individual believes
his utility might be improved. If the individual believes that the existence of a certain group
is negatively affecting his utility, then he could surmise that
removing the group could help him out. This directly relates to
the gains value Y discussed in the main scenario. For example,
if an individual feels that the existence of a certain ethnic group
is the reason he is unemployed or living a suboptimal life, then
he perceives that removing that group will bring him back to his
reference point. This matches up with the gains value from the
Prospect Theory model in that the individual will perceive eliminating the group as a gain if he
believes that group is hampering his utility.

Historically, government propaganda can play a major role in determining how citizens will
interpret the effects of a certain group on their utility. The Nazis spread propaganda stating
Jews were trying to take over the world’s money (Baum 2008). Various Hutu publications
spread propaganda that Tutsis were attempting to subvert Rwandan society (Baum 2008).
Many anticommunist governments during the Cold War spread propaganda stating that Com-


Historically, government propa-
ganda can play a major role
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certain group on their utility.
THE CONFIDENCE OF SUCCESS

The third variable that must be analyzed is how confident the individual feels that his participation in genocide will result in successfully removing the group. This directly relates to the $\pi$ value seen in the Prospect Theory scenario. There are two factors in the confidence area: the amount of power he perceives will support him and the amount of power he perceives will oppose him. These two factors will help the individual to identify his potential chances of success.

The confidence variable can help explain why genocides from the bottom-up approach can erupt and spiral out of control, as seen in Rwanda. If individuals suddenly see many other individuals taking part in genocide, they might become more confident in their overall possibility of success.

THE MARGINAL COST OF PARTICIPATION

The fourth variable to analyze is the perceived cost that the individual will incur by participating, which directly relates to the $Z$ value seen in the Prospect Theory scenario. Any monetary cost, physical cost, emotional cost, or the like will be taken into account for this variable. With genocide, the emotional cost could possibly be the biggest cost for a participant. The idea of killing an innocent person is sickening for the average human being; however, the way leaders who orchestrate genocide have addressed this is through propaganda. In studying multiple genocides, you will see that the target group is labeled as less than human. The Nazis labeled the Jews as rats, and Hutus labeled the Tutsis as cockroaches. When Europeans killed millions of indigenous people, they labeled them as godless, soulless creatures. This mechanism seems to be a strategy by leaders to make participants feel they are not doing something awful by killing people, but instead they are doing a service by killing a pest. With respect to the model, this is a method to lower emotional costs of participants. This is the last of the four variables I propose should be observed.

CONCLUSION

These four variables related to the Prospect Theory framework provide an approach to understanding why people rationalize and participate in the awful act of genocide. Obviously, this model of genocide is not all-inclusive, and several questions related to the phenomenon remain. Why are some genocides so gruesome, using torture instead of instant killing? Why is there no free-rider problem in genocides? These questions do not have concrete answers from the Prospect Theory approach. However, the application of the framework I propose can possibly shed light on potential policy approaches from the international community to prevent genocides. These suggestions include creating norms that prevent irrationally blaming a certain group for suboptimal conditions, creating a rapid-action force that pledges to intervene in societies experiencing mass killing, lowering the confidence of genocide participants in their expected success, and sanctioning governments that engage in dehumanizing a target group. All in all, I believe that the Prospect Theory, when applied selectively, can provide many answers in the field of genocide.

17 Baum, The Psychology of Genocide.
Crisis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo:  
The Persistence of Rape as a Weapon of War, 1994-Present

NEHA MITTAL

The brutalities committed against women of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) by soldiers of varying ethnic groups during the civil unrest of 1994-2012 illustrate the vicious connections that exist amongst war, poverty, and violence. Since the Rwandan genocide in 1994, complex regional conflicts involving several different African nations have stifled the social and economic growth of the DRC. In this context, many heinous acts go unpunished. In the DRC, women routinely suffer from extreme sexual violence at the hands of soldiers who act with impunity. This paper will show that Congolese women continue to suffer from these violent sexual crimes primarily because of their exclusion from political and social institutions, the negative stigma attached to raped women, and the military promotion of rape as a weapon of war.

OVERVIEW

Since 1994 armed conflict has devastated the structure of the DRC, resulting in corruption and a lack of security for its citizens. Quarreling armies have targeted women as an ethnic war rages within the country. Ethnic conflicts between the Congolese Tutsis and the Rwandan Hutus spilled over into the Congo, creating the need for each group to have its own territory. However, armies have engaged in conflicts over territory for decades, exhibiting ruthless violence against anyone not of their own ethnic group. This has transformed the DRC into a war zone in which there is no central power to stop the violence.\(^1\) While on a mission to understand female security in the southeast DRC, military-civil liaison officer Nadine Puechguirbal noted that the "population [has been] taken hostage" by several different armed groups, which have gained control over the people unprotected by a central authority.\(^2\) Vulnerable citizens find themselves constantly displaced, further weakening the internal structures of communities and families. As a result, a string of corrupt leaders have created a broken country where "there's little evidence Congolese officials take the [rape] problem seriously."\(^3\) Women are particularly at risk in this climate due to their exclusion from political participation and structures.

\(^2\) Ibid.
The DRC’s fragile social institutions do not provide for the needs of women, a large segment of its society. The constitution of the DRC holds that all Congolese people “shall enjoy equal rights and protection in terms of the law as citizens.” However, Congolese law imposes limitations on married women by regarding them as the property of their husbands. Once a woman gets married, she falls under the power of her husband and his control over her takes precedence over any laws regarding equality. Article 448 of the Congolese Family Code illustrates the repression of married women when it declares that “the wife must obtain the permission of her husband on all legal documents which require her to provide a service that must be given in person.” Further, family law defines “the husband [as] the head of the household and [he] must provide protection for his wife and … she must obey her husband,” demonstrating the established rule of female subservience to men.

The status of women in the DRC makes it difficult for them to get involved in political affairs. Puchuguirbal observed on her fact-finding mission that “it is apparent that if women are not included at the beginning of the peace process, it is more difficult to insert them at a later stage.” The result is an overall lack of female representation in DRC politics. In return, the political system does not take into account necessities specific to women. Without state representation or concern for their issues, women are unable to design policies that benefit them specifically. Moreover, it is dangerous for women to seek participation in the political realm. For example, a group of women founded the Women’s Network for the Defense of Rights and Peace and attempted to integrate themselves into the DRC peace processes. However, they “received many threats from the rebel [groups], which accused them of destabilizing the town. Their office was ransacked many times, and peaceful demonstrations were systematically interrupted … ‘for security reasons.’” This type of violence reflects Congolese society’s refusal to integrate females into the construction of peace policies, resulting in a male-dominated political establishment that is not representative of its population.

Because females are excluded from the political framework of society, there are no effective public platforms by which they can voice their opinions. DRC specialist Victoria Brittain notes that without a voice, women lack status. This in turn “makes them very easy victims.” The vulnerable position of women forces them to rely on their husbands for physical protection. Brittain connects these ideas of female vulnerability and increasing reliance on males, further noting that “there is the growing absence of men in the villages, which has left women unprotected.” Not only does society ignore the specific needs of women, but it also leaves

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4 Article 14, Constitution of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
5 Women’s Voices and African Theatre, 38.
7 Ibid., 1277.
8 Ibid., 1275.
10 Ibid.
them especially vulnerable when the men in their lives whom they trust are not there to protect them. This exclusion and disempowerment leaves women particularly susceptible to the atrocities and violence of war.

**STIGMATIZATION OF RAPE SURVIVORS**

Another outgrowth of women’s disempowerment within traditional Congolese culture is the stigmatization of rape survivors. Female rape survivors are typically rejected by their own communities because Congolese culture considers them undesirable and unworthy. Women who have been the victims of sexual assault are frequently rejected or ostracized and left helpless, as “husbands and families would reject the wife and she’d be stigmatized as a prostitute.”  Rather than seeing raped women as survivors in need, tradition labels them as less worthy, more shameful, and often ruined. As a result, rape survivors often endure the aftermath of their attacks alone.

As perpetrators deprive victims of their dignity, the effects of the abuse are extended to the family members of the victim as well. Some torture mechanisms are particularly aimed at destroying the morale not only of the woman but also of her family and community. Examples include making the victim “sing and dance naked, [and] family members [are] sometimes forced to hold down their sisters and mothers while they [are] being raped.” The frequent “casting out” of survivors by their husbands and families serves to further shame these women. Soldiers effectively terrorize these families as well as their rape survivors, which often results in the alienation of targeted women from their communities.

Because of these dynamics, rape is a particularly powerful method of terror and destruction towards the once cohesive communities. As Nicholas D. Kristof and Sheryl WuDunn describe in *Half the Sky*, soldiers quickly “discovered that the most cost-effective way to terrorize populations [was] to conduct rapes of stunning brutality.”

**RAPE AS A WEAPON OF WAR**

Rape has become a common weapon of war within the Congolese military for the reasons described above. Although soldiers also make individual decisions to rape, much of the sexual violence in the Congo takes place at the express order of military commanders. This “strategy of warfare” is used to “intimidate, threaten, and terrorize populations.” Soldiers heighten their efforts to demoralize their enemies by victimizing women and children. The tactic of public humiliation of women effectively undermines enemy populations. The demoralization of women is clear where “women are not only raped, they are publicly … undressed in front of their children, they are abused with rifles forced into their vaginas, tortured with peppers in their genitals, while pregnant women are beaten on the stomach to promote a miscarriage.” Public violence and humiliation alienates survivors from their families and society, effectively

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11 Ibid., 595
12 Ibid., 596.
13 Ibid.
15 Ibid., 40.
18 Brittain, “Calvary on the Women,” 596.
Neha Mittal

fulfilling the army’s strategy of breaking down entire communities.

Tribal culture and superstitions also contribute to the military promotion of sexual violence. Many culturally contrived beliefs enforce the rape of women for the sake of success in war. For example, “There are widespread beliefs … that raping virgins or pregnant women will give [soldiers] invincibility on the battlefield. Also elderly women are regularly targeted as they are sometimes seen as ‘witches’ and supposedly have magical powers that may be neutralized by rape.”¹⁹ These beliefs contribute to the danger posed to the already vulnerable women in the DRC, as sexually based offenses are an effective way of achieving military success.

CONCLUSION

The political, cultural, and military traditions of the DRC effectively allow sexual violence against women to continue and to go unpunished. The resulting trauma and alienation that women experience fulfills the military goal of terrorizing communities, leading to segmentation and disintegration. War among the varying tribes in the DRC has increasingly incorporated females as victims, as “Women’s bodies [are] used as weapons of ethnic destruction.”²⁰ The idea of rape “reflects relations of domination and subordination. Often men consider it their right to have sexual access to a woman’s body.”²¹ This gender imbalance places females at the mercy of males, resulting in power struggles in which the men always prevail. Until women have a voice in the politics of the DRC, society will not serve their needs. In addition, the negative cultural stigma attached to rape survivors will prevail until women gain respected positions in politics and society. Finally, more female power in politics will create respect for women and combat the military culture of raping females to display power. Without a political voice, women of the DRC will remain vulnerable to acts of violence that further strip them of power and dignity.

¹⁹ De Vries, Sexual Violence against Women in Congo, 37.
²¹ De Vries, Sexual Violence against Women in Congo, 31.
Plan Colombia and Afghanistan’s Poppy Fields: Drug Supply Control Strategies and Dilemmas in an Era of Globalization

ANTHONY KUHN

INTRODUCTION

Over the course of the twentieth century, the United States government became increasingly involved in regulating and prohibiting drug markets. Authorities traditionally enforced prohibition by making certain crops illegal to possess, sell, consume, and grow. As with other markets, the international drug trade increased over the century, and governments that had been relatively successful in controlling domestic production struggled to cope with massive imports of illegal narcotics. Policy makers responded with supply control and focused their efforts on eradicating illegal crops, with interdiction and seizures constituting secondary options for authorities.

While combating drugs in their country of origin may seem to be an appealing drug policy option, it is an option that inevitably becomes entangled with American foreign policy and national security interests. Reducing the foreign supply of narcotics, therefore, may clash with other vital interests of the United States. Two recent cases, Plan Colombia and the war in Afghanistan, highlight the problems associated with focusing on eradication and demonstrate why it may not be a sustainable drug policy option.

Plan Colombia and the war in Afghanistan show the consequences of supply control strategies that do not adequately address the security and socioeconomic issues at stake.

Colombia has been the principal supplier of cocaine to the US since the 1980s. Afghanistan became the world’s leading producer of illicit opium, the key base for heroin, during the same period. Although eradication may not be sustainable, that is not to say it does not have a place, or that supply control is doomed to failure. Eradication is simply a poor policy tool without equally aggressive social and economic programs to counteract the damage done to impoverished farmers. Plan Colombia and the war in Afghanistan show the consequences of supply control strategies that do not adequately address the security and socioeconomic issues at stake, and shine light on what government officials should do to meet the challenges of drug policy in an era of globalization.

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HISTORY OF PLAN COLOMBIA

Colombia has not always been the foremost supplier of cocaine and heroin to US markets. The supply of drugs coming from Colombia paled in comparison to other suppliers of the international drug market until the early 1980s.1 Around that time, the first Colombian drug lords appeared and began exporting marijuana and cocaine to the United States. The Medellin Cartel dominated the drug trafficking business within a few years, and cocaine production within Colombian borders increased from 25 tons to a whopping 125 tons.2 This drastic increase in supply came with a similarly drastic decrease in price; between 1978 and 1984, the Drug Enforcement Agency reported that cocaine prices had plummeted from $800,000/kilo of 12 percent purity cocaine to $30,000/kilo in New York City and $16,000/kilo in Miami.3

As the Medellin and other drug cartels increased their wealth, they also increased their power inside the borders of Colombia and beyond. Over the course of the 1980s, the cartels would often form a loose alliance with government forces to attack insurgent groups such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN). The cartels would then use the captured lands to expand their drug production operations under the protection of corrupt Colombian government officials. During this time, US drug control officers focused the majority of their efforts on intercepting drug shipments from Colombia while stepping up pressure on the Colombian government to arrest and extradite cartel leaders to the US. After nearly a decade of resistance, the Colombian government finally bowed to US pressure and agreed to pursue drug cartel leaders. Many cartel leaders agreed to surrender and accept house arrest rather than face extradition charges, and the drug organizations they had created fell apart by the early 1990s.4

The collapse of the major Colombian drug cartels in the early 1990s left a large power vacuum in the Colombian drug trade. Insurgent groups such as the FARC rebounded from their defeats at the hands of cartel militias and government troops and began to actively engage in the production of cocaine and heroin. In October 2000, the Government Accounting Office’s International Affairs and Trade Director Jess T. Ford stood before the US House of Representatives and testified, “The two largest insurgent groups … have expanded their involvement in drug-trafficking. The insurgents exercise some degree of control over 40 percent of Colombia’s territory east and south of the Andes.”5 Additionally, the US Department of Defense estimated that two-thirds of FARC units and one-third of ELN units engaged in some level of drug trafficking to fund their operations.6

The FARC and the National Liberation Army are organizations dedicated to ousting the internationally recognized government in Bogota, and they regained a substantial amount of power and influence towards the end of the millennium. The new Colombian drug suppliers were also committed enemies of a regime friendly to the United States, demanding a new policy towards Colombia that could reduce the drug trade while garnering support for the

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2 Ibid.
4 Zambrana, “America, Counter-Insurgency,” 7.
6 Ford, “Challenges in Implementing.”
central government in its struggle against insurgent groups. In 1999, the Bogota government approached the United States and the rest of the international community with a plan that sought to tackle both problems.

**PLAN COLOMBIA**

Colombian President Andres Pastrana initially announced a plan that would reduce Colombian drug crop production in October 1999. Comparing it to the Marshall Plan, Pastrana planned to solicit international support to revitalize the social and economic health of his country and to decrease its reliance on the cultivation of drug crops. To do so, Pastrana called for a $7.5 billion plan, with Colombia pledging to contribute $4 billion. He hoped to secure the remaining funds from the international community as part of a relief effort, and he found a receptive audience in Washington. The Colombian government began to work with American policy makers to finalize the specific details of what was now being called “Plan Colombia,” but the US was insistence that Colombia take a hard-line stance on drug trafficking in order to receive greater American assistance. As a result, the reworked plan sought to reduce “the cultivation, processing, and distribution of narcotics by 50 percent over 6 years.”

On July 13, 2000, President Bill Clinton signed off on an aid package to Colombia for $1.3 billion to assist Colombian counternarcotics efforts and build up Colombian military and police forces. Plan Colombia had found a place in the US War on Drugs, and Colombia was to become a key battlefield in controlling the supply of cocaine and heroin reaching the United States.

President Pastrana and President Clinton had different policy goals for Plan Colombia, but these goals overlapped sufficiently for the Colombian and American governments to agree on an overall framework for improving conditions in Colombia. The rhetoric of Pastrana’s initial proposal called for providing alternatives to drug crop production to farmers, whereas the US contribution focused heavily on military and police aid under the framework of the War on Drugs. The four main goals of the Colombian government were to “regain control of the drug-producing regions of the country from insurgent and paramilitary groups, increase drug interdiction efforts, provide coca farmers an alternative way of living, and enhance the protection of human rights.” On the American side, the funding categories reflected similar goals: “support to the Colombian Military, support to the Colombian National Police, promote social and economic progress, promote the rule of law, and logistical support.” To accomplish these goals, US leaders collaborated closely with the Colombian government on a plan to reduce the flow of narcotics to the US, eliminate drug production fields, recapture land held by insurgent groups and drug producers, and help farmers produce legal crops at an acceptable standard of living. Aerial pesticide spraying of coca fields, conducted by the US or US-trained Colombian pilots, became the main means for eradication.

As noted, the United States Congress adopted legislation related to Plan Colombia in 1999. Originally a six-year plan, the joint US-Colombian effort has been heavily reviewed in the United States by politicians, defense and intelligence officials, and a host of nongovernmental organizations. US government officials have largely portrayed the drug supply eradication...
strategy as a success of American international drug policy. Former Assistant Secretary of State Robert B. Charles claimed before Congress that many of the plan's initial goals had been met. When discussing the rationale behind Plan Colombia in April 2007, Charles stated that success "required a full commitment to deter industrial-sized drug trafficking organizations, apprehend their leadership, [and] institutionalize non-existent extradition protocols … by the numbers, the stated counter-narcotics aim of Plan Colombia was to deter cultivation by 50 percent within five years."\(^{13}\) Given that US agencies spent $4.5 billion to aid the Colombian government between 2000 and 2005, and given the growing interest among military officials to eradicate heroin poppy fields in the struggle to secure Afghanistan, it is important to have an honest evaluation of Plan Colombia's results.\(^{14}\)

Results can be based on actions taken by the US and Colombian governments and the current state of the drug supply in the US, although it would be wise to incorporate both sets of data in order to evaluate the plan's success. On the action side, efforts made by both governments to curb the supply of cocaine and heroin coming from Colombia seem impressive. According to Charles, Plan Colombia “has produced a reduction of 58 percent in heroin poppy cultivation and more than 50 percent in coca cultivation during its first five years.”\(^{15}\) He also applauds the extradition of 180 drug traffickers to the US between 2003 and 2005 and the 145 who were extradited in 2006 alone as evidence of Colombia's commitment to its partnership with the US.\(^{16}\) The largest reason for the drop in narcotic cultivation in Colombia was due to crop eradication policies. In 2006, authorities destroyed 320 metric tons of cocaine production, and another 178 metric tons were stopped in transit.\(^{17}\)

As for the impact of these policies on the supply of cocaine and heroin in the US, the evidence is more difficult to read. Veillette notes that the prices and availability of cocaine and heroin remained largely stable in the US until 2005, despite the fact that Plan Colombia was well under way by 2000. However, the Office of National Drug Control Policy announced that prices for cocaine increased 19 percent while purity decreased 11 percent by late 2005.\(^{18}\) Proponents of Plan Colombia argue that this data validates American supply control policies, claiming that price increases and purity decreases normally result from scarcity of supply. Additionally, Veillette gives several reasons why it takes time for these indicators to change, including high margins for drug traffickers and the fact that traffickers face greater costs from the interdiction of the final product rather than of the crops themselves.\(^{19}\) Thus, it appears that the goal of reducing the exportation of drugs from Colombia as a means for reducing the supply and use of cocaine and heroin among US citizens has had modest success.

While US claims of achievement on the drug front are certainly not uncontested, the effect of the supply control policies outlined in Plan Colombia on Colombian society is much more hotly debated. In a 2005 progress report commissioned by the Congressional Research Service, Veillette points to several indicators that show overall violence levels have dropped since government forces launched their offensives against coca growers and their insurgent protectors.

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16 Ibid.
17 Ibid., 7.
19 Ibid
The Colombian National Police deployed over 9,617 additional officers to rural areas and 8,166 to major highways after the passage of Plan Colombia.\textsuperscript{20} From 2003 to 2004, homicides fell 15 percent, massacre events dropped 52 percent and their victims by 48 percent, kidnappings declined 34 percent and illegal roadblocks by 62 percent.\textsuperscript{21} The Colombian government claims that internally displaced persons fell 37 percent between 2003 and 2004.\textsuperscript{22}

However, Veillette acknowledges contentions made by human rights organizations that internally displaced persons increased 39 percent in that same time frame, from 208,000 to 289,000.\textsuperscript{23} Similarly, Noam Chomsky estimates 300,000 Colombians flee their homes yearly due to violence between the government and insurgent groups.\textsuperscript{24} Moreover, Veillette cites a State Department report that between 3,000 and 4,000 innocent civilians were killed during fighting in 2004.\textsuperscript{25} Veillette does not apportion blame for these deaths, but Chomsky argues that these deaths are almost entirely the fault of the Colombian military and its paramilitary partners. In Columbia, he says, “The military, armed and trained by the United States…continues to produce its regular annual toll of atrocities … with a death toll of about 3,000 and many horrible massacres…. The great majority of atrocities are attributable to paramilitary forces.”\textsuperscript{26} Meanwhile, for the 122,000 hectares of coca plants destroyed in 2002 by a US aerial fumigation campaign, only 11,800 hectares of aid was given to farmers.\textsuperscript{27} As Zambrana states, “Simple eradication will not work, as more peasant families will end up dispossessed…. This makes them prime recruits for the different rebel groups in the area, or they just move their farm into a place where the FARC has the ability to protect them and their coca crops.”\textsuperscript{28}

Defenders of Plan Colombia point out that the government negotiated a deal for the main pro-government paramilitary group, the United-Self Defense Forces of Colombia, to demobilize by the end of 2005. This would eliminate up to 18,000 nongovernment combatants. As for combatants against the Colombian government, the military claims that the ranks of FARC have decreased to 12,000 since the implementation of Plan Colombia, after reaching a maximum of about 20,000 fighters.\textsuperscript{29} Moreover, half a ton of cocaine base was confiscated from the FARC in 2004.\textsuperscript{30} The drops in violence, kidnappings, and blows dealt to the FARC seem to be the easiest points of success to identify with Plan Colombia, but it will still require a substantial government investment to turn these short-term successes into lasting gains that can protect peasants from poverty and insurgents and reduce the cultivation of coca crops.

**POPPY FIELDS IN THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN**

The current problems plaguing Afghanistan resemble the situation in Colombia in two important aspects. First, Afghanistan is also a major drug production center, with over 90 percent of the world’s opium emanating from the country. Second, the Afghan government is engaged in a civil war with the Taliban. US policy towards opium production in Afghanistan, therefore,
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must address issues similar to those it encountered in Colombia. Although Russia, Iran, and Europe suffer the most from Afghanistan's opium exports, international pressure and opinion have made it impossible for the US to simply ignore the issue. Opium eradication seems to be an attractive option for achieving stability in Afghanistan because a significant portion of the Taliban's funding comes from the opium trade. However, American officials have to consider the effects that supply control would have on the populace; fueling popular resistance to Afghanistan's central government and coalition forces by destroying opium crops could yield disastrous results for the security of the nation.

Afghanistan emerged as a leading producer of opium after the Soviet invasion of 1979. In 1980, Afghan producers cultivated only 200 metric tons of opium, or 19 percent of the world's total amount of opium. By 1999, four years after the Taliban had seized power, opium production in Afghanistan had reached 4,500 metric tons and 79 percent of the world total; this figure increased to 6,100 metric tons in 2006, or 92 percent of the world total. At the beginning of 2001, the Taliban implemented a ban on opium in the areas under its control, but the US-led invasion at the end of the year made it impossible to judge whether it was successful or sustainable. Today, the Taliban controls wide swaths of land in eastern and southern Afghanistan and receives roughly 30 percent to 50 percent of its revenue from the opium trade. Taliban involvement ranges from direct participation in the drug trade to taxing peasants and traffickers. Finding a way to cut down on Afghanistan's opium production without alienating the populace and driving them to the Taliban has thus become a key goal of the US mission.

Immediately after the invasion, US and Afghan officials were not concerned with poppy fields in Afghanistan. Indeed, the normal chaos of war had restricted supply and caused the price of opium to skyrocket in 2001 and 2002. When prices began to fall and international pressure to act increased, the United States began a modest uncompensated crop eradication program. From 2004 to 2006, US and Afghan forces destroyed roughly 8 percent of all opium crops in the country, and Afghanistan's share of world opiate seizures increased from 2 percent to 15 percent. Even these relatively modest efforts elicited negative consequences that could have been predicted from the US effort in Colombia. Peasant families targeted for opium cultivation could not pay their debts, many fell into surf labor or had to sell young daughters, some fled to Pakistan, and others violently resisted the destruction of their opium crops. These consequences, as well as the fact that opium accounts for about one-third of Afghanistan's economic activity, have caused the US to change its approach on the opium issue.

Indeed, the Taliban's resurgence over the decade has made helping Afghanistan's central government reestablish control over the country America's top priority. In 2009, President Obama ordered a surge of US troops in Afghanistan, and US military commanders began launching offensives to retake territory from the Taliban. These offensives were accompanied by a new American policy towards poppy fields. After driving the Taliban from the Afghan town of Marja in early 2010, New York Times correspondent Rod Nordland claimed, “American Marines occupying the area are under orders to leave the farmers’ fields alone.”

32 Ibid., 129.
33 Ibid., 73.
34 Ibid., 127.
35 Ibid.
opium remains illegal, retired General Stanley McChrystal, who was the leading American commander in Afghanistan from June 2009 to June 2010, announced it is no longer part of the US mission to carry out eradication. Instead, the goal is for the Afghan government to offer services in exchange for the voluntary switch from illegal to legal crops. Critics contend that the Taliban will continue to reap money from the trade by taxing traffickers, and that the image of US soldiers walking past poppy fields hurts America's global standing. Defenders say it is only a temporary measure designed to gain the trust of Afghan farmers while establishing the central government's presence throughout the country; once the government can provide needed services and security, it can then start enforcing its own anti-narcotics laws.

The complexity of the issue makes it difficult to confidently adopt a specific drug policy in Afghanistan. Despite the numerous similarities between the situations in Colombia and Afghanistan, the FARC simply does not pose the same dire threat to Bogota that the Taliban poses to Kabul. Bogota can afford to drive some farmers to support the FARC without losing its civil war; Kabul does not enjoy that luxury, especially considering that it governs a country historically opposed to a strong central government. The current strategy that was adopted by General McChrystal is sensible from a national security standpoint. However, reducing the opium supply stemming from Afghanistan remains a desired goal for both the US and Afghan governments and is being sought by Tehran, Moscow, and the capitals of Europe.

Apart from providing services to farmers, the US and Afghan governments must consider two other issues if they truly hope to cut down on the illegal opium market. First, the Afghan government must tackle corruption within its ranks. Colombian cartel leaders fought off US extradition requests and efforts to reduce cocaine production for years because of corruption within the Colombian government. While corruption still exists, the ultimate decision to side with the US in the War on Drugs hastened the downfall of the cartels and led to some of the successes of Plan Colombia. Second, households with “small or no landholdings, and few other assets, and located in areas with poor irrigation and infrastructure, and distant from commodity and labor markets” were much more likely to engage in opium production. Land reform and infrastructure building, particularly new irrigation systems, roads, and railways, would provide the necessary elements for peasants to become independent from opium production.

CONCLUSION

With the growth of the international drug trade over the last several decades, it comes as no surprise that the US and international community have attempted to disrupt the supply of narcotics by attacking their production in the countries of origin. To the hawkish opponents of narcotics, giving police and military forces more power to deal with the issue fits their conception of the War on Drugs. Supply control strategies such as eradication, interdiction, and seizure have been championed by American political leaders as a way to keep the struggle off American streets. Of course, US drug policies undertaken in foreign nations such as Afghanistan and Colombia invariably affect America's national security interests as well.

37 Nordland, "US Turns a Blind Eye."
When drug policy and traditional national security issues contradict each other, the cases of Colombia and Afghanistan have shown that national security concerns regularly trump drug policy. Most American aid to Colombia goes to fighting narco-terrorists rather than creating alternatives for farmers, and US Marines in Afghanistan have halted eradication efforts in order to avoid alienating the populace. Yet the exploding demand for illicit drugs and the corresponding call for governments to squash this demand have made ignoring illegal drug production centers impossible. Fortunately, the choice does not have to be between national security and drug policy. Supply control policies other than eradication exist and can result in improved security and increased stability. Providing essential services and infrastructure for small farmers to produce legal crops can reduce supply and give them a vested interest in their country and the global economy.

Such a policy will undoubtedly run into problems and, as with any drug policy, will not be perfect. No strategy can completely stop the illicit drug market. Some farmers and traffickers who cultivate and deal drugs out of greed instead of need will continue their trade. Still, the ethics of prosecuting such groups over desperate farmers is a policy that better resonates with the American concepts of justice and fairness than the status quo. If supply control is a drug policy option that governments feel they must pursue, the incorporation of more social and economic strategies to combat the trade will yield greater benefits in the long run. Moreover, such strategies can help meet the challenges similar to those faced by the US in Colombia and Afghanistan.
Global women's issues have been historically seen as “soft” topics without proper resources or interest in what is still considered to be a male-dominated international system. This view has changed however, due in large part to the female leadership of the United States. Madeleine Albright, Condoleezza Rice, and Hillary Clinton represent groundbreaking leadership, where each coupled a passion for gender issues with their ability to influence the international community. These three women each came to power through a variety of means and political philosophies, but their gender united them in the effort to turn women's empowerment into a permanent, necessary item on the international agenda. The US and its leadership are able to give legitimacy and weight to the international institutions with which it chooses to engage. The participation of US female leaders in the United Nations (UN), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and several smaller development groups has given these institutions the agency necessary to further the women's empowerment movement, specifically among developing countries. In this manner, the United States has played a major role in driving the global progress of women, by women.

SECRETARY ALBRIGHT LEADS THE WAY

The shift in US-led female empowerment began with Secretary Madeleine Albright, whose monumental appointment as the second female US ambassador to the UN and first female US secretary of state broke diplomatic and gender barriers within the United States. Those who opposed her nomination as secretary argued that a high-level female diplomat would not be granted the respect necessary to carry out diplomatic negotiations and interactions with male leaders around the world. However, studies measuring the impact of gender on diplomatic effectiveness found that women ambassadors “have been afforded the deference and respect appropriate to their position.” Albright's time in these appointments defied several other stereotypes tied to women in foreign policy, including the idea that women who earn a position

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of power within a male-dominated system cannot afford to deviate from existing expectations. Due to this system, women in leadership have to overcompensate for their gender by reinforcing masculine attitudes and systematic norms. In theory, the combination of these assumptions would ultimately keep powerful women from advocating on behalf of other women worldwide; however, Albright’s outspoken and passionate leadership operated outside of these confines and allowed her to bring a feminine perspective and renewed awareness to international gender issues. As the global community recognized the new norm of strong female leadership in the United States, Albright was able to advocate aggressively for updated gender norms at all levels of development. In the words of Secretary Albright, “Women’s issues are the hardest issues, because they are the ones that have to do with life and death in so many aspects … and [they are] really central to how we think about things.”

BUILDING MOMENTUM: THE BEIJING PLATFORM FOR ACTION

To jump-start this change in global action, Secretary Albright (then ambassador to the UN) partnered with First Lady Hillary Clinton to lead the delegation of the United States at the historic United Nation’s Fourth Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995. This international gathering resulted in the Beijing Platform for Action (BPFA), which laid out a systematic framework for global development for women in the following categories: health, education, work, power and decision making, violence against women, environment, and poverty. The progress of these goals is collected and analyzed by the UN every five years, granting an overall picture of the strides that women have made over the last two decades. As the reports are presented to the international community, supporting governments and international organizations are prompted to reaffirm their commitment to the development program and to recommend improvements that will bring the world several steps closer to reaching the BPFA’s ultimate goal of worldwide gender equality. The BPFA was heralded by more than 150 representative nations and 30 international organizations at its inception, and the most recent UN report (2010) indicates that the importance granted to women in developing societies has grown immensely over the last fifteen years. While the international cooperation towards this effort is widespread, it is important to recognize the US and its female leadership as key stakeholders and advocates in this empowerment project.

During her speech before the UN Conference in 1995, Clinton stated that “Women’s rights are human rights,” a tagline that has been championed by the international development community ever since. In 2000, at the five-year benchmark, Clinton and Albright restated the commitment of the United States in furthering the BFPA goals, including a strategic plan for several US government agencies to implement female-gereared empowerment programs both within their departments as well as within their international outreach projects. In 2005, Condoleeza Rice represented the US delegation to reaffirm the nation’s commitment to the stated goals, and the most recent visitation to the BFPA in 2010 allowed Secretary Clinton to once again proclaim the support and ambition of the United States in taking part in the United Nations initiative. By reinforcing the nation’s commitment to the UN initiative, US female leaders have continued to keep the issue of women’s empowerment in the international spotlight. By framing this issue as a mainstay in its foreign policy objectives, the United States has granted legitimacy to both worldwide gender issues and the institutions that are working to facilitate global gender equality.

SECRETARY RICE EXPANDS THE EMPOWERMENT MOVEMENT

Under the leadership of Secretary Condoleeza Rice, the United States made significant contributions to the global advancement of women that were independent yet complementary to the BPFA. Rice also played an active role in reframing women’s issues as human rights issues in relevant international institutions. Before the UN Security Council in 2008, Secretary Rice demanded an end to sexual violence in conflict zones, raising awareness of the escalation and extreme brutality surrounding the issue. This resulted in Resolution 1820, which reclassified the status of rape as a weapon of war, and was adopted unanimously by the council members. This push for the protection of human rights reinforced the partnership between the United States government and institutions capable of championing global female empowerment abroad.

In 2008, Secretary Rice also launched a variety of empowerment programs through the Department of State such as the One Woman Initiative, which fostered economic development for women in Middle Eastern countries. Working with several smaller regional development and human rights agencies, this program empowered women to gain independence and participation in societies that had traditionally allowed gender to determine their financial fate. By using her position of power to support development institutions at both the international and local level, Secretary Rice insured that the women’s empowerment movement would have a secure place in US foreign policy objectives.

SECRETARY CLINTON RAISES THE BAR

As a longtime powerhouse on the US leadership stage, Hillary Clinton has used her international agency to attain an unprecedented level of success in global female advocacy. Over the course of her four years as secretary, Clinton oversaw the creation of dozens of new offices and programs within the Department of State focused on or related to the development and empowerment of women and girls. In an effort to magnify the momentum of the US-led empowerment movement, Clinton redefined the way that the United States looked at female empowerment, calling “the subjugation of women a threat to US national security, elevating women’s rights to the forefront of the national and international policy dialogue.”

By incorporating female empowerment objectives and US development assistance capabilities, Secretary Clinton has essentially changed the makeup of international development. Clinton is credited with the creation of the US ambassadorship on behalf of the newly established Global Women’s Issues Office within State, currently held by Ambassador-at-Large Melanne S. Verveer. Clinton has also made a pointed effort to get other US agencies such as USAID working directly with the empowerment movement. In 2011, USAID announced a new gender equality and female empowerment policy. This formally institutionalized the idea that female empowerment will no longer be an additional, optional component of a development program, but an essential part of the US development strategic planning and project design.

The major changes in attitude that have occurred within the US agencies in the past decade have placed the issue of women’s empowerment on the international stage. As a result, several international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the European Union (EU), and the World Bank have adopted policies and programs geared towards female empowerment. For example, the World Bank recently adjusted its operational policies in terms of female empowerment goals in the 2009 “Update to the Gender Plan of Action.” The report lays out the responsibilities and commitments of the institution to support the global female empowerment movement and makes a pointed effort to reclassify gender-based initiatives and their budget allocations as requirements to successful development rather than through the lens of the “add-on approach to gender empowerment.” This widespread trend of female-directed development policies indicates that women’s issues have finally become key operational objectives among international institutions and development organizations.

14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
For Women, By Women

It is obvious that the female empowerment issue has gained considerable traction over the last few decades. While there are a variety of leaders and important international organizations that have contributed to the progress of the international movement, the United States has played an essential role in establishing it as more than just a secondary objective. Strong female leadership in the US has championed gender equality and empowerment from the leadership to the grassroots level, resulting in the most female-oriented international system yet. With the 2013 appointment of Senator John Kerry as the newest secretary of state, the norm of female leadership in the realm of US foreign policy will be challenged. This may seem to pose a potential threat to the progress that the United States has made in promoting gender equality worldwide; however the recent institutionalization of the female empowerment movement suggests that our strong female leaders have successfully laid the groundwork that will keep the momentum of gender equality moving forward.
INTRODUCTION

Due to rising nation-states that are vying for power in unique ways, the future composition of the international system remains unclear. Middle-income countries with the potential for expansive economic growth represent a challenge to the structure of the international system. The concept of “the rise of the rest,” that is, the likely future development of major state actors in the world economy such as Brazil, Russia, India, and China (BRIC), is one of the most talked-about global economic trends. It is unknown if this rise truly constitutes a transition from a unipolarity circumscribed by United States hegemony to a multipolarity of regional powers. The future development of each of the BRIC nations poses a unique challenge to the entirety of the system. Furthermore, US hegemony currently remains intact in terms of both economic power and military strength.

While the BRICs may have the ability to compete with the US in terms of population and their potential for long-term growth, they have not as yet matured within the confines of an international order that has been shaped by the US since the end of the Cold War. The income gap between developed and developing nations remains what it was in 1950 and economic growth in emerging markets has stagnated during the most recent global economic crisis.¹ Despite this, United States hegemony is in no way destined to remain stable. The evolving nature of international institutions is such that states no longer seek security by aligning themselves with either a hegemon or a rising competitor. Instead, regional economic and security arrangements with international importance are being configured. Therefore, it appears that the BRICs will be able to influence the shape of the international order through these international realignments within a precedent set by the United States.

THE QUESTION OF UNITED STATES HEGEMONY

United States hegemony exists beyond just the static moment in which it is currently being

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assessed. The US began its legacy of supremacy immediately following WWII through asymmetric alliances that increased US autonomy and, subsequently, its power. As a superpower today, the US is more interested in forming symmetric alliances “where each party gains the same type of benefit.” These types of relationships include the North American Free Trade Agreement and other free trade agreements in which all countries retain autonomy and security but increase their power. Alliances of this nature are based on compatible preferences and are subsequently usually entered into with similar powers. For example, more than 75 percent of all US alliances are with Japan, the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, or China. Power Transition Theory claims that the alliance structure of the US is motivated in order to satisfy a large coalition of actors, but instead it appears that the US is focused on generating wealth along with key allies rather than increasing the size of its international coalition. Furthermore, according to James Morrow, the costs of satisfying asymmetric alliances tend to have a negative impact on the length of time a hegemon is able to stay in power. This could explain a US transition from policy focused on seeking alliances that increase autonomy to more symmetric alliances.

The concept of US decline is misplaced in that an end to the age of US supremacy does not necessarily conclude the liberal order maintained by the US since 1945. The US has historically utilized international organizations to create a large constellation of satisfied states, and it has developed rules and norms that rule out the likelihood of major conflict from rising powers. While the US has engaged in many international organizations and alignments, it maintains autonomy by retaining veto power or some other level of legitimised independent authority. When this is not negotiated, the US will avoid the institutional arrangement, as was the case with the International Criminal Court. As the US steps back in its role as military arbiter and economic distributor of public goods, its institutionalized norms can continue to govern the international system. These norms provide a model and framework through which rising nations can acquire power peacefully rather than through military engagement.

Despite the shift in the type of alliance the US engages in currently, it has established an international order that makes compliance with the rules of its system in the best interest of the states within that system. This order has the potential for long-term sustainability. This is evidenced by the way middle and weak powers currently choose to comply with the norms projected by the US. The international system is currently experiencing an explosion in the number of international organizations and alliances that have been formed and legitimised since 1990. A shift in the type of regional alliances and international organizations that are currently being formed could possibly signal a fundamental shift in the international system. However, while the rise of middle powers may be likely in the long run, it is unclear if a shift in the power structure of the system will have a significant impact on the rules that currently govern the system. While the rise of middle powers may be likely in the long run, it is unclear if a shift in the power structure of the system will have a significant impact on the rules that currently govern the system. Although the rise of BRICs into dominant countries may not seem imminent, they have already started to exert some influence over the international system through regional institutions.

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4 Kang and Sakai, “International Strategic Alliances.”
THE RISE OF BRIC

The rise-of-the-rest phenomenon does not fundamentally alter what drives states in the international system, but rather the way in which they achieve their ends. States are continuing to seek security and power, yet view enduring multilateral institutions as the means with which to achieve their goals. An interesting question, then, is whether the norms that govern state interactions are distinctly those projected by the US or if these norms are undergoing a reformulation within the vision of the BRIC nations. Security is not achieved through alignment with either a hegemon or a rising competitor. Rather, alliances have become a signal of regional strength and a mechanism through which to “take advantage of economies of scale in the provision of defense.”

According to Kenneth Abbott and Duncan Snidal, despite the ability of formal organizations to reduce transaction costs and increase negation ability, the US generally resists the creation and support of international organizations (IOs). Instead, IOs have become a mechanism through which weak or middle powers gain agency and a voice in the international system. Yet this power is limited in contrast to that of the United States in several ways.

If US hegemony were to be challenged by an alliance of rising powers such as the BRICs, it would signal that the BRIC nations were dissatisfied, and that they had reached a period where it was in their mutual interest to usurp the power of the US. According to Ruchir Sharma, “Other than being the largest economies in their respective regions, the big four emerging markets never had much in common. They generate growth in different and often competing ways.” Consequently, the BRIC countries often represent their own greatest threat, making the possibility of formal alliances even more unlikely. For example, the relationship between Brazil and China could have a detrimental impact on the Brazilian economy as it becomes more deeply tied to the Chinese economy.

China has surpassed the US as Brazil’s largest trading power and its demand for certain resources has caused significant asymmetry in the Brazilian market. Furthermore, the global economic crisis has slowed the purchase of Brazilian exports by China with adverse results for the Brazilian economy. At the same time, Russia and Brazil compete for the same energy market, which drives up prices and causes India, a high-energy consumer, to suffer. Fundamentally, the misaligned trading preferences of the BRIC countries preclude an alliance structure save one based around a shared external threat.

Sharma goes on to predict that growth in the coming decades will be lopsided among emerging markets, not only reinvigorating the hegemony of the West but also preserving the top and middle sectors of the economic order. If states remain stagnant in their positions, it is unlikely that their drive for power will fundamentally change. Taking these factors into account, the emergence of a powerful BRIC alliance seems unlikely because the markets they have developed within will remain virtually unchanged. Furthermore, according to Morrow, alliances between weaker powers can emerge to “increase a stronger ally’s freedom of action while increasing their protection from external threats.” This reasoning implies that any formal alliances among the BRICs would be threatened as the power asymmetry increases among these nations. As evidenced by the relationship between Brazil and China, because of the size and

8 Sharma, “Broken BRICs.”
A Reformulation of the International System

industrial capacity of the country, it appears that China will emerge as the lasting legacy of the concept of the BRIC nations.

It is likely that China will pursue alliances for economic power rather than military superiority and will do so within a precedent set by the US. Evidence of this is seen in the relationship between China and African nations. These types of regional alliances also represent a need for US evolution with respect to certain international norms and the influence that middle powers are able to have over those norms. The modern rate of trade between China and certain African nations has increased exponentially since a more economically pragmatic relationship was established among these nation-states immediately following the Cold War. Under Deng Xiaoping, the Chinese economy was opened up and the Chinese government implemented a policy of aid to assist in the self-development of resource-rich African countries while still receiving certain benefits. This aid came in the form of resource trade packages with attached infrastructure projects to be financed by Chinese banks and executed by Chinese companies. The stated relationship between China and various African nations has evolved into an emphasis on south-south cooperation, mutual respect for state sovereignty, and noninterference in government, something of paramount importance to China’s current “peaceful rise” foreign policy plan.

While it may seem that these alliances are a departure from those of the past, they simply emphasize the legacy of decades of US hegemony. However, these relationships could have negative consequences for the United States. The difference between the relationship of the African nations with the United States and their relationship with China lies in both the US’s inability to separate political gain from economic gain and in the historically ingrained resistance of African nations towards perceived colonial powers. Chinese companies can compete and win against American companies because of their development model of infrastructure projects and their emphasis on solidarity among developing nations.11 This solidarity is exemplified by the language employed by the Forum of China-Africa Cooperation on the general accord of the relationship between China and Africa, which is sold with rhetoric of an equal and strategic partnership. The United States has yet to develop a major change in economic policy towards nations of the African continent beyond humanitarian pursuit, leaving a large amount of potential economic growth untapped for both the US and Africa. The implications of this for the United States are not only in the realm of international control, but also affect the pursuit of norms important to the US.12

Despite this defiance of US-held regimes, the US has done little to mitigate the circumstances under which China and African nations operate. Critics of the relationship claim that China’s presence in Africa may be “meant to build goodwill for later investment opportunities or stockpile international support for contentious political issues.”13 This, however, is no different from historical relationships held by the United States during the Cold War. It is unrealistic to claim that China has a plan greater than the simple need to fuel its expanding economy with resources; African nations rich in natural resources present a convenient and somewhat unexplored environment in which to do this.

13 Stephanie Hanson, China, Africa, and Oil (Council on Foreign Relations, 2008).
CONCLUSION

The international order is undoubtedly undergoing a reformulation, but complete multipolarity does not appear to be on the horizon in the near future. International organizations are the mechanism through which rising powers have been able to gain agency and international attention. Despite the US's rejection of many IOs, those it deems legitimate receive international attention and deference. For example, the US will choose to veil its unilateral actions within the guise of formal organizations such as the UN, as it did with the Gulf War and again with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. This attention to IOs signals deference on the part of the US to the importance of multilateral support even if the US has the strength to act unilaterally. Therefore, middle powers have not only been able to gain regional strength but also have an impact on US behavior. US hegemony remains intact in terms of economic power, military strength, and a legacy of its liberal institutions. These factors have allowed the US to remain in power for a prolonged period of time without a significant threat from a balancing nation. Therefore it appears that even if all BRICs are able to become regional hegemons, the future of the international order will not include a great powers war.

In his 1941 article in Life Magazine, TIME editor and renowned journalist Henry Luce described the twentieth century as the American Century. Luce argued that the twentieth century would be about pervasive American policy, culture, and ideas; Americans have great leadership qualities including prestige, a characteristic that Luce viewed as an “indefinable, unmistakable sign of leadership.” He called on Americans, saying it is their job to feed the hungry, pave the way for democracy, and promote free markets. He also encouraged them to see the world beyond Europe, including Asia, and to take control into their own hands. The term “American Century” was quickly adopted by many and has been the subject of debate ever since.

Many of Luce’s contemporaries, including former Vice President Henry A. Wallace, expanded on the American Century paradigm. Wallace explicitly referred to the term in his famous speech of 1942, “The Century of the Common Man”:

Some have spoken of the “American Century.” I say that the century on which we are entering … must be the century of the common man. Perhaps it will be America’s opportunity to suggest that Freedoms and duties by which the common man must live. Everywhere the common man must learn … to increase his productivity so that he and his children can eventually pay to the world community all that they have received.

Wallace went on to say:

Peace must mean a better standard of living for the common man, not merely in the United States and England, but also in India, Russia, China and Latin America – not merely in the United Nations [as the western alliance then called itself], but also in Germany and Italy and Japan.

Though Wallace’s speech emphasized the global application of democratic principles, his reference to America suggesting the world’s freedoms and duties reveals the leadership role that he and many others envisioned for the country.

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2 Luce, "The American Century."
4 Wallace, "The Century of the Common Man."
However; this narrative of global leadership and influence soon led to a parallel narrative that predicted the decline of the United States from its central position within the international system. “Declinism” argues that America has passed its economic and political peak and is now declining in both influence and prosperity. There are three parts to this argument. First, there is an overall decline in the American economy. This segues into the second belief that poor economic performance leads to dwindling national power. The final component states that, in taking on the responsibilities of being the world’s policeman, the United States has bitten off more than it can chew. For years Americans believed that Japan was poised to overtake the US due to its staggering growth rate, efficient work ethic, and booming economic system. The Soviet Union was believed to have a similarly strong standing during the Cold War. Though neither of these nations ever succeeded in overtaking the US in either economic or political influence, the possibility of serious American decline now seems imminent once again. The US faces increasing competition from developing nations including China, India, Brazil, and Turkey. These nations have exceeded all expectations in terms of population, manufacturing, and efficiency and are expected to continue thriving. This leaves the US surrounded by several very capable and productive competitors.

In his book *The End of the American Century*, author David Mason argues along these lines, saying that the US cannot make the twenty-first century another American Century for several reasons: “The EU, China, India, Russia, and growing regional powers all over the world have already begun to step into the vacuum created by the end of the American Century.” These nations are competition for the next century primarily because the US had little competition for dominance in the twentieth century. While the US toyed with its prosperity during the twentieth century, these nations were busy broadening their economic and political endeavors and leaping forward. Mason goes on to point out several challenges to US global standing including the national debt, the global financial crisis, and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Ending the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan would clear up enough capital to lower the national debt and refocus on the US economy, education, and local politics. He says the US needs to learn to cooperate with the rest of the world, sign and comply with treaties, and embrace humility. The excessive exceptionalism has been morphing into individualism over the past 50 years as the US has let its guard down and taken to boasting about its achievements rather than concentrating on furthering them. According to Mason, Americans, including the president,

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8 Mason, *The End of the American Century*.
assumed a kind of divine mission for the United States to lead, guide, and even govern the world. American exceptionalism morphed into excess of individualism, ethnocentrism, arrogance, and a sense of entitlement.9

This all contributes to America losing the battle for dominance in the twenty-first century.

Fareed Zakaria, the editor-at-large of TIME and host of the CNN news show GPS, addresses a similar issue in a recent TIME article in which he argues that America’s success has made it “sclerotic”; that it has become arrogant and lackadaisical in the wake of its twentieth-century victories. Zakaria acknowledges the $15 trillion US economy and vast military as crucial advantages but says that its status as global leader is ending because Americans have failed to recognize and learn from other nations and are close-minded to foreign suggestions, examples, and leadership. The road to success involves looking forward, not back:

We spend vast amounts of money on subsidies for housing, agriculture and health, many of which distort the economy and do little for long-term growth. We spend too little on science, technology, innovation and infrastructure, which will produce growth and jobs in the future.10

Changes in government efficiency as well as economic and political policy are indeed essential. Zakaria adds that one particular trait helped to keep the US on top in the previous century:

For most of our history, we have become rich while remaining restless. Rather than resting on our laurels, we have feared getting fat and lazy. And that has been our greatest strength. In the past, worrying about decline has helped us avert that very condition.11

In summary, Zakaria is trying to convey that the US needs to wake up and shed its veil of naiveté. It should acknowledge that it is slipping from its position of primacy and open itself to learning from the rest of the world. Once it does so, the fear of losing its dominance to someone else will become a motivator for change.

Despite the increasingly pervasive arguments about American decline, the late Henry Grunwald, writer and former editor-in-chief of Time, Inc., believed the twenty-first century could still belong to America. He wrote that although the US no longer retains the margin of superiority it once enjoyed, it still has unique characteristics that make revitalization possible. Paramount among these qualities is America’s capacity for renewal, as demonstrated after the Civil War, the Great Depression, and the Civil Rights era.12 He wrote, “America assimilates radical changes that in most other countries could cause revolution. In America revolution is permanent but piecemeal.” Its other unique qualities include flexibility and reform. The US has no ruling class and is extremely open to immigrants and newcomers. As Grunwald said, “[It has] an ability to combine self-interest with compromise.” The ability to reform, a “civic-crusade” trademarked by grassroots movements, and the ability to change habits and ideas have now become a trademark of the American lifestyle.13

9 Mason, *The End of the American Century.*
11 Zakaria, “Are America’s Best Days Behind Us?”
Kavita Varadarajan

The twentieth century is aptly and widely described as an American century due to its dominance in technology, science, war, peace, exploration, economics, and politics. Recent events, however, have raised doubts about the US trajectory for the next century. Nonetheless, many argue that in spite of the challenges facing the nation, the US has the potential to maintain its prestige and global influence.

In a recent statement, President Obama acknowledged these concerns but called on the American people to rally in the face of uncertainty: “I am confident that if we stay on a course that gets us back to old-fashioned values of hard work and responsibility and looking out for one another, that America will thrive; that the twenty-first century will be an American Century again.”

Despite the terrain of the international system, the US has great potential to remain at the top. Decline is not a foregone conclusion, but the decline or prosperity of the nation will depend on what comes next, and what the US does with its potential. Reform action will take both physical and mental reform and will not come easily, but America has proven its excellence before and can do it again. It remains to be seen whether the rest of the century will again be centered on American dominance or if it will become infamous for American decline.

Theoretical Perspectives on NATO’s Libya Intervention

AMANDA KENNARD

INTRODUCTION

On March 20, 2011, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces established a no-fly zone over Libya, attacking pro-Qaddafi forces in an effort to protect civilians threatened by an increasingly violent civil war.¹ NATO’s intervention in the Libyan civil war is remarkable for its departure from traditional realist narratives of power politics, self-help, and power maximization. Instead, the NATO intervention was rooted in normative concerns: a shared sense of outrage and commitment to human rights and self-determination. While these norms are firmly rooted in the liberal tradition, the implication of their use in not only justifying but also necessitating force highlights the role of intersubjective meaning within international affairs. At the same time, the mechanisms through which military action were legitimized and carried out demonstrate how international or multilateral institutions can facilitate cooperation among states. Thus, both Constructivism and Liberalism can provide insight into the nature and course of the conflict.

I present an analysis of the Libyan intervention first from the Constructivist perspective and then from the Liberal perspective, emphasizing what each school of thought can contribute to our understanding. Next, I evaluate whether Realism contributes to this analysis. Ultimately, I argue that though it is possible to discern the role of Realist power politics in understanding NATO’s intervention, Constructivism and Liberalism respectively are more useful in explaining the causes and process of the conflict.

SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF LIBERAL NORMS AND THE INTERVENTION IMPERATIVE

In a March 28, 2011, speech outlining the actions of the United States in Libya, President Obama described the deteriorating political situation in Libya, saying:

For more than four decades, the Libyan people have been ruled by a tyrant – Muammar Qaddafi. He has denied his people freedom, exploited their wealth, murdered opponents at home and abroad, and terrorized innocent people around the world….²

Obama cited Qaddafi’s “brutal repression” of the Libyan people as justification for NATO military action. This commitment to the principles of self-determination and democracy demonstrates the continuing influence of the Kantian liberal tradition in political thought. As Michael W. Doyle emphasizes, “Liberalism is not inherently ‘peace-loving’; nor is it consistently restrained or peaceful in intent.” However, though these principles are liberal in nature, their role in both justifying and, to a degree, necessitating military intervention can best be explained through a Constructivist analysis.

Constructivism argues that in the international system states act and react to events based upon intersubjectively defined preferences and identities. These mutually understood meanings arise out of prior interactions and processes. At a fundamental level, norms of human rights and self-determination are socially constructed; the US and its allies view oppression and violence as morally unacceptable. To other political regimes at other points in time, these actions might have been understood to be simply necessary or even taken for granted. The taboo surrounding oppression and violence (at least, domestic violence) has evolved out of the dissemination, discussion, and digestion of the Western liberal tradition as well as its infusion into contemporary political debates to the point of being taken for granted as objective or natural law.

Norms of human rights and self-determination help to explain why NATO intervention was desirable for the US and its allies. However, a Constructivist analysis can be taken a step further in order to explain why intervention was not only desirable, but also necessary. Within the Constructivist paradigm, state behavior is determined not only by the preferences of actors, but also by the socially constructed identities and understanding of their proper role in various situations. US intervention in Libya can be partially understood as an attempt to fulfill the responsibilities of America’s self-defined role of moral authority and leader. The question of America’s role in promoting liberal values has been problematic over time as successive administrations have often prioritized realpolitik concerns regarding security over values-based objectives in the foreign policy arena. However; the past decade of US foreign policy has been particularly marked by rhetoric of moral leadership, especially with regard to the concepts of freedom and democracy. While the direction of moral leadership during the Bush presidency may have been contested, both the rhetoric and policy of this period firmly located notions of moral leadership and its relation to US identity at the center of policy debates. The influence of this centrality is clear within the same speech given by President Obama in March 2011:

To brush aside America’s responsibility as a leader and -- more profoundly -- our responsibilities to our fellow human beings under such circumstances would have been a betrayal of who we are. Some nations may be able to turn a blind eye to atrocities in other countries. The United States of America is different.

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3 Obama, “President Obama’s Speech on Libya.”
7 Obama, “President Obama’s Speech on Libya.”
The normative paradigm of self-determination and human rights and concerns about the centrality of moral leadership identity explain both the motivation and the necessity of the US/NATO intervention.

While Constructivism provides a useful framework for understanding the causes of the Libya intervention, Liberal theory helps to analyze and explain the processes through which the intervention was carried out. In particular, Liberal theory provides insight into how cooperation on military action was facilitated and how the intervention was legitimized within the international system through NATO and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), respectively.

In contrast to Realism’s assertion of the inevitability of power politics and competition, Liberalism argues that it is possible to ameliorate the worst tendencies of states in anarchy in order to produce better outcomes over time. Liberal theory pays particular attention to international institutions or regimes, arguing that these can reduce both transaction costs and uncertainty.8 This is important for understanding the role of NATO in the Libya intervention. NATO lowers transaction costs for cooperative military action by providing an established set of procedures, partnerships, and arrangements. Therefore, when called upon to take action, NATO members conserve time and resources and achieve better coordination and outcomes through the institutional channels and procedures that have been in place since the middle of the twentieth century. The cooperative relationship institutionalized in NATO reduces uncertainty by signaling credible commitments between its various members. The same relationship also reduces the risks of either defection or cheating.9 Though it may at times complain that the level of European commitments to NATO are insufficient, the US can feel safe in the assurance that its European partners will follow through on these commitments since defection from any particular mission would carry the risk of endangering the entire alliance and any future benefits. Thus, Liberal theory helps us to understand how NATO was able to quickly mobilize and coordinate the resources of its various members in order to help the Libyan rebels.

Liberal theory also highlights the way in which international organizations can play an important role in the legitimization of certain actions over others. Following the outbreak of violence in Libya, the UN Security Council authorized first economic sanctions and later the initiation of a no-fly zone to be enforced by NATO troops. The authorization of the UNSC is important in that UNSC authorization can be a particularly powerful source of legitimacy within the international system: the opinions of the UNSC, “form widely accepted political judgments on whether uses of force transgress a limit that should be defended.”10 Whereas coordination

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9 Ibid.
of action through NATO facilitated cooperation and compliance amongst the participating states, obtaining UNSC approval helped smooth the way for the intervention by expressing a common, international consensus regarding its justification and necessity.

REALIST CONTRIBUTION?

In contrast to the majority of conflicts within the international system, the role of power politics, and thus Realism's ability to explain the conflict, is not immediately obvious. However; rhetoric surrounding the Libyan intervention does invoke the concept of national interest:

Moreover, America has an important strategic interest in preventing Qaddafi from overrunning those who oppose him. A massacre would have driven thousands of additional refugees across Libya’s borders, putting enormous strains on the peaceful – yet fragile – transitions in Egypt and Tunisia. The democratic impulses that are dawning across the region would be eclipsed by the darkest form of dictatorship, as repressive leaders concluded that violence is the best strategy to cling to power. The writ of the United Nations Security Council would have been shown to be little more than empty words, crippling that institution’s future credibility to uphold global peace and security.\(^\text{11}\)

Following on the ideas of the Bush administration, President Obama views the spread of democracy and freedom as fundamental national security objectives and couches the possibility of political repression as dangerous to those same objectives. (It can be argued that the linkage between democracy and security is itself a construction, which, in the language of Constructivism, has taken on the status of social fact). Moreover, Obama warns that a failure to respond to Qaddafi’s actions would undermine the influence of the UN and therefore implicitly that of the US and its allies as well.

Though the security concerns described above are real, they do not provide as compelling or as comprehensive an account of the motivations behind intervention as does Constructivism. Additionally, in my reading, although Realist scholars such as Mearsheimer and Waltz concede that states may have interests outside of their own security imperatives (Mearsheimer speaks of a “hierarchy of interests”), they have little to say about the nature or importance of these interests or any actions which might result from them thus limiting its ability to speak to the normative elements of the Libyan intervention.\(^\text{12}\)

CONCLUSION

Realism’s contribution to our understanding of these events is limited to the imperatives of protecting US security and interests by ensuring the spread of democracy. However; the linkage between the spread of democracy and national security may be best understood through the Constructivist paradigm rather than that of Realism.

Ultimately, Constructivism and Liberalism are the most useful traditions in explaining NATO action in Libya, though they address different aspects of the intervention. Constructivism is

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\(^{11}\) Obama, "President Obama’s Speech on Libya."

useful for explaining the root causes and motivations of the conflict; both socially constructed norms of human rights and self-determination and US perceptions of its own identity and role in the international system necessitated military intervention. However; Liberalism provides the most appropriate paradigm for understanding the institutional mechanisms through which the action was coordinated and legitimized; the US and its allies were able to quickly and effectively coordinate their actions through the preexisting channels and procedures of NATO. Approval of the UN Security Council further facilitated these efforts by providing important international legitimacy.
On September 22, 2010, the Center for International Relations and Politics together with Heinz College sponsored a lecture with Alonzo Fulgham, then chief operating officer of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Three students associated with CIRP Journal sat down with him that morning and asked a range of questions on contemporary international issues. Mr. Fulgham shared his views on the international perception of the United States and how that perception informs international development.

CIRP JOURNAL: There's been a lot of discussion recently about the question of American decline. What do you think of the arguments that have been advanced?

ALONZO FULGHAM: I’ve given a great deal of thought to this and I while I think the claims are overblown, there is cause for concern. We’ve lived substantially off of the residual economic success of the past twenty or thirty years. We’ve lost much of our ability in the manufacturing industry. The conversation around fuel cell technology is a great example. America should be leading that charge and capturing what's going to be a huge production market. Instead, we’re trailing the Japanese and the Europeans.

We need to mobilize. We have the capability, but it’s a policy problem. We’ve been asleep and we need to wake up, before global innovation and entrepreneurship outstrips what has mostly been an American trademark. In the next generation, how many more Steve Jobs will there be? How many Bill Gates are out there? And where will the Colin Powell’s and Condi Rice’s come from as we attempt to redefine our place in foreign trade markets and become the global sales engine we need to be.

Of course it’s a domestic policy problem. What are we doing from an educational perspective to ensure that the youth of our urban centers are being educated to truly compete? We are the nation we’ve become because of our historical competitiveness and because of our free markets. But that leading position has been steadily eroding and this is very troubling.

In my travels around the world, I see that everybody is looking for dominance. They look to the U.S. for “how-to” examples to take home. I know this is loaded terminology, but everybody comes here to “steal” our secrets: economic secrets, production secrets, technology secrets. The other key global players want to be like us economically, academically and militarily. What China is doing hasn’t been done through sharing but through sheer internal competitiveness and liberally populating our leading academic centers with their best and brightest minds.

We know the answer; there are no hard questions here. To borrow a well-worn phrase, we need to make up our minds to “just do it.” Once we do, it's done. That's always been the character of this country and it needs to be today.
CIRP: Over the past ten years or so, the US has come under a lot of criticism for its foreign policy. Given this criticism, and in light of the challenges you just mentioned, what are the implications for US global leadership?

AF: The BRIC nations (Brazil, Russia, India and China) are now exerting their own considerable influence in the world economy. This means that we'll have to work more with these governments to do things we once might have been able to do by ourselves. I don't think we have the same ability we had ten years ago to get things done unilaterally. And this has ramifications across all aspects of our economic, political, environmental and diplomatic spheres of influence.

We've got some baggage. In many ways, the US has a checkered past. Overall, people have a positive view of Americans, but in places like the Middle East and South Asia, it's a different situation. Global leadership presents a lot of opportunities, but there are also profound challenges and you make a lot of enemies. Leadership at all levels is hard. When you’re acting in your own national interest, there will be times when you anger people. This anger is even more complex and entrenched when it's born of fundamental extremism and other forms of prejudice.

CIRP: Finally, what are the implications of all of this for development? In particular, emerging economies have come under a lot of criticism for their approach to development. What's the appropriate policy for the US to adopt in response?

AF: Despite the fact that I’ve joined the private sector, I still feel that USAID represents the best model of what the US has to offer. We look at foreign investment, trade, infrastructure, and sustainability, while we provide humanitarian assistance wherever it is needed. The simple truth is that it's difficult to improve the fortunes of a nation if we don’t look first to improve the lives of its people. Looking at it from a development perspective, nobody does it better than we do.

Still, we can't sit up on Capitol Hill and complain about Chinese, Russian or Indian foreign policy. I think we have to work with these significant economic players to provide guidance on what works and what doesn’t. Ultimately, these governments will do what is in their own national interests, just as we do. Our goal is to get to a point where they will do no harm and operate with an appreciation for environmental sustainability, global trade equity, and human rights improvement.
At a Center for International Relations and Politics Policy event, Paul Wolfowitz, former president of the World Bank, had dinner with students in the CMU Washington Semester Program. Following dinner, Mr. Wolfowitz sat down with several students from CIRP Journal to discuss issues of development and American grand strategy more broadly. Mr. Wolfowitz has served as deputy secretary of defense in the George W. Bush administration.

CIRP JOURNAL: During the G-20 Summit in Seoul, South Korea, the United States repeatedly raised concerns about currency undervaluation and global trade imbalances. What do you think is the impact of China’s currency policy with respect to its relationship with the US?

PAUL WOLFOWITZ: I think it is exaggerated. I think we have some serious economic problems, but I don’t think a 10 percent change in the Chinese exchange rate is going to make a big impact on those problems. It’s true that it contributes to a trade imbalance and it’s interesting to hear the Chinese admit that if they were to allow their currency to appreciate significantly there would be big economic problems in China. It is recognition that they are very dependent on the US market, and not just that we are dependent on them buying our bonds.

But I think the real question is not the short-term, what is the exchange rate going to be, but how are we going to get this massive debt of ours under control? How are we going to get all this liquidity out of our economy and avoid inflation? And, most of all, over ten or twenty or thirty years, how do we remain competitive?

CIRP: There’s been a lot of debate over the past few years about the prospect of waning US influence in the international system. What’s your take on this question?

PW: This isn’t the first time in my lifetime where I’ve heard people talk about American decline. You know, the Soviet Union was the first to put a satellite in orbit. I’m thinking of Sputnik in 1957. There was all kinds of talk then about a missile gap, and John Kennedy ran for president on the idea that we were falling behind the Soviets. Well, that turned out not to be. Then after [that], partly because of the defeat in Vietnam, we were in terrible trouble in the late 1970s: double-digit inflation, which we haven’t had for years; high unemployment, but not as high as it is right now. The two things weren’t supposed to go together; it was called stagflation. But then there were some changes in economic policy in the 1980s and we were off to the races again. In the 1990s people were saying, “Oh well, the United States has seen its better days. The future belongs to Japan and Germany.” I’ve heard that one before. I think there is a dynamism in this country and this economy that shouldn’t be underestimated, though it also shouldn’t be taken for granted. I am a little worried that we’re tilting much
too much in the direction of looking to the government sector for employment and for solutions. Economic success and economic competitiveness have historically come from the private sector.

**CIRP:** With the knowledge that you’ve accumulated throughout your career of working with developing countries, what, in your opinion, is the most successful method, be it political or economic, of approaching a failing state?

**PW:** At the risk of sounding harsh, I think the first thing to say is we should be paying more attention to helping the countries that are succeeding because that is where we can really have an impact. If you look at the history of US foreign aid and the World Bank, it clearly did a lot of good in Korea and in China. The US clearly did no good whatsoever in what used to be called Zaire and is now called the Congo. [The money] just disappeared.

There has to be some government structure that is reasonably effective, which usually means not corrupt. Corruption is always going to be part of it. If there’s corruption, then all the aid in the world is not likely to go very far, except into Swiss bank accounts. But at the slightly other extreme, Liberia is an example of a clearly failed state that now may have a chance of getting its act together. But that’s because the US went in first with Marines, and then that was followed by African peacekeepers. Now numbers may have come down, but when I visited there a few years ago there were 15,000 UN peacekeepers in a country of 5 million people. That’s just a huge ratio. They did elect a very impressive woman. She is the first woman president of an African country. She is still struggling. I mean, when I was there, there was almost no one below the ministry that could actually get a job done because it was a devastated country.

But I think for a country like Liberia, the first thing is to bring peace. Without peace, nothing will happen. And sometimes you can do that and sometimes you can’t. The second thing is to then help them with the most basic aspects of public administration, and then, if you have some of that structure in place, money. Money just thrown at a situation like Somalia where there is no peace doesn’t work. It is a sad thing to say, but part of the reason I say we should influence the countries that are working is that it tends to have a positive influence. There was a time thirty, forty years ago when many of the strongest countries in Asia were considered failed states. In a way, it started with the success of the Japanese and spread to South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore and, eventually, China. It really makes a difference when people see that people who are near them, like them, who had some of the same problems, have found solutions.

In Africa, take Rwanda, for example. I don’t know if “failed state” is the right phrase, but when a million people are murdered in genocide, I’d call it a failure. But the government was overthrown by an invading rebel force, and the new president who led that army is very competent. I think he’s very honest. Some people would say that he’s kind of ruthless; I think you’d have to be in that situation. Rwanda has been growing at 7 or
8 percent per year since the genocide. It’s astonishing economically, and that is good for the people of Rwanda. I think it’s starting to be good for the rest of Africa. There are a dozen African countries that are on the edge of success, and if they could make it over the edge and really become success stories, they could have a positive influence on the failing ones.

Not that you turn your back on people. I mean, I was a big supporter in 1992 when there was a famine in Somalia that threatened. There were 200,000 people on the edge of starvation and, using the US military, we were able to end the famine and keep people alive. That was a good thing to do, but we weren’t able to do much beyond that. I think that is part of what got us in trouble. The famine didn’t come back, but we couldn’t go in and create a viable government and they weren’t about to do it themselves.

**CIRP:** Speaking either thematically or in terms of regions, what do you see as being the most important thrust of American strategy at the moment, either politically or economically?

**PW:** I think [its] our ability both to take care of ourselves here at home and provide the leadership the world needs from us; it really depends on the dynamism of our economy.

I would somewhat agree with the idea that some have suggested that education is the most important thing, but I’m not sure that throwing money at education is the solution. Educational reform is important. There is something very troubling about the stranglehold that the educational bureaucracy seems to have on public schools, like in the District of Colombia where they are just really failing their students. But also, there is only so much the schools can do if the families aren’t supportive, if the society as a whole isn’t supportive. I don’t think there is a magic answer, but I think it is partly a kind of question of what leadership you have and what that leadership is focused on. To emphasize that idea: I think we have an incredible ability to innovate and come up with new ideas and new ways of doing things.

But one last comment: there is sometimes a tendency to say, “If our economy, our competitiveness, is so important, we shouldn’t be spending money on defense and foreign policy.” I think that’s getting it backwards. Our economy is stronger when we are also playing a leadership role in the world. It’s not an either-or question; they have to go together.
On February 9, 2012, Robert Zoellick, then president of the World Bank, joined Dr. Kiron Skinner for a conversation at Carnegie Mellon University about global economic issues. Over lunch, Mr. Zoellick sat down with students associated with CIRP to talk about the World Bank and its policies, including food aid, open data, and the ongoing global economic crisis. Mr. Zoellick served as US trade representative and deputy secretary of state in the George W. Bush administration.

CIRP JOURNAL: One of the critiques that the World Bank sometimes receives is that it has created a dependency between developing countries and developed countries and also that this has induced the economic slowdown in the first place. How do you respond to those criticisms?

ROBERT ZOELLICK: The economic slowdown was created by the financial crisis in the United States, but then there have been new global challenges because of the responses to that crisis. For example, as countries backed their banking systems, they had to borrow money to put capital into banks, so the banking crisis became a sovereign debt crisis. This downturn has hit the developed world—the US, Europe, and Japan—more than it has hit the developing world. We've had a multi-speed recovery. Up until 2011, the developing countries had recovered well. Our forecasts for growth for Sub-Saharan Africa this year are a little over 5 percent, which is the growth rate before the crisis.

I don't think that this crisis was driven by aid. However, I think your first point is a very good one, which is one reason that I've pointed to the need to move “beyond aid”. Dependency is not good for people or countries. So how do you move beyond dependency? Countries need a series of interconnected policies that build sustainability. One requirement is to create the right business and investment environment. There are ways aid can assist. For example, it's hard to grow if people don't have basic health and nutrition. At early stages, dealing with disease and health issues can be very, very important. Post-conflict and fragile states need special support. Liberia is not going to be able to make it on its own. But I think the notion of looking “beyond aid” is important. We shouldn't see dependency as the perpetual state. We need to create the conditions—for trade, investment, and human investment—so that people can build their own futures.

CIRP: How does the World Bank deal with countries that are in conflict in general, such as the DRC or Syria? What kinds of programs can you run in those types of countries?

RZ: It's a very good question, and it's one of the areas that I've focused on in my time at the World Bank. Now let me share with you the origin of this interest. In my experience in diplomacy, I often saw that in post-conflict or fragile states that the security, development, and governance experts would operate separately; they didn't integrate their activities. A classic example: If you talk to the militaries that provide security in places such as Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire, Afghanistan, or Iraq, one of the first things they say is, “For goodness sake, let's get some jobs for young people because otherwise they may join gangs or plant bombs or be a disruptive force.” But the traditional economist's response is, “We don't want government to create make-work jobs because they're not sustainable.” You have this difference in outlook. One of the World Bank's recent World Development Re-
ports focused on the integration of policies to address conflict, security, and development. We looked at examples from around the world of what works. Very basically, the key in such situations is to build legitimacy; you’re trying to build legitimate institutions for the future. What the public wants most often is three things: citizen security, justice, and jobs. When I refer to citizen security, I’m not just referring to warfare. I’m referring to policing systems. In some places, such as Afghanistan, the police forces were more predators than protectors. They made conditions worse. The justice may or may not be our Western concept of justice. In other words, under their culture one needs a sense of fairness and the rule of law. Then they want jobs.

Based on that perspective, the World Bank looked at examples of programs to deal with these issues. Returning to my example about security—with a need for jobs for young people—we have seen that if one designs a project that offers, for example, food to a family in exchange for work on roads or irrigation, one can help get people to work without disrupting market economy incentives. If you’re going to pay people for such public works, the rate should not disrupt the possibility of a private sector investment. So there are ways you can integrate the multiple interests.

The other thing to remember: since the goal is creating legitimate institutions, as governments address issues of citizen security, justice, and jobs, they need to do so in ways that creates “inclusive-enough” coalitions. If outsiders just say, “We’re the experts,” or if you work with just one group and, it leaves others out—the government will not build inclusive legitimate institutions. It won’t be sustained. On the other hand, if one waits to get 100 percent of the people involved in a post-conflict situation, delays will hurt. So it’s a judgment call about creating “inclusive-enough” coalitions.

Liberia went through twenty years of terrible civil strife and internal conflict. I went with President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf to a village, where she sought to build a sense of community and cohesion. She’d brought a number of ministers. She’d draw people together and would talk to them about how the country was doing. Part of overcoming conflict is acting in ways that unite the country. At the same time, showing progress is also important. Sometimes progress can be reflected through rather simple things—like picking up the garbage—to make sure that people see that their situation has improved. Having said all this, the lesson of experience is that recovery from conflict can take a long time. It isn’t done overnight. So if outsiders want to help, they need to sustain their effort over time. If they leave too early, there might be a recurrence of violence.

There’s a very good book by Paul Collier, an Oxford professor, called The Bottom Billion. It discusses the real dangers to these states. There are actually about a billion and a half people who live in post-conflict or fragile countries. They live amidst downward cycles, not upward cycles of recovery: They can’t grow because they can’t deal with the insecurity, and because they don’t have security they can’t get investment and can’t create a legal order. So how do you break that spiral? It’s not only bad for the people in
those countries. It overflows to their neighbors, and it has a negative effect on their neighbors’ growth.

All these problems come down to having local leadership that is willing to take charge. I was also involved with the reconstruction of Aceh, which is an island in Indonesia that also gained its political autonomy. The Indonesian official who guided recovery did a superb job after the terrible tsunami in late 2004. So local leadership is critical, but international partners can increase the probabilities of success.

CIRP: The World Bank recently issued a warning to the developing world to prepare for a major shock due to rising food prices and a slowdown of economic growth. Would you say that developing countries are in a position to withstand this shock on their own? (The Bank indicated that these countries are actually in better shape than the richer countries, but what does this mean?)

RZ: The food price surge started in 2007. At that time, the World Bank responded with support for safety nets and also by increasing the productivity of agriculture, so as to create an opportunity out of a problem. In many countries, if one increases the productivity of agriculture, combined with higher prices, one will increase incomes for farmers. Since 2007-2008, prices have been volatile. They’re much more correlated with energy prices now. We have seen three price spikes in five years and the overall level of prices remains high. We face the demand for more food because of population growth, higher incomes, changing diets, and urbanization. As incomes increase from low levels, people can have more meals. They may eat more meat. To increase production given the limits of arable land, water and the environment, the agriculture sector needs to boost productivity. The Bank’s approach has been two-fold. One, what can we do to help strengthen the safety nets? That varies by country. If prices go up or people’s income falls, you have to increase protection for those at the bottom. Second, we look at this as an opportunity for private sector investment and public policies all across the value chain. That means everything starting with property rights and research. We invest in seed and crop research, irrigation, fertilizers, and storage, because a lot of produce is lost on the way to market. Over the past five years, Rwanda has moved from an emergency in terms of needing seeds and food, to increasing terracing to improve productivity, to now seeking private investment for storage facilities.

You asked about different markets. Some agriculture markets in Sub-Saharan Africa have been less connected with international commodity prices, in part, because they’re not an active part of the international trade system. It also depends on exchange rates, but I wouldn’t overemphasize that. From a development perspective, over time one needs to focus on these two ideas: safety nets for those most in need, but also productivity and investment in agriculture. The third aspect is to implement international policies that would also alleviate some stress. For example, when prices went up in 2007 and 2008, some countries instituted export bans. They refused to export their food. That just added to the volatility of prices. Working with the G-20, the World Bank secured an exception of export bans for purchases by the World Food Program, which provides the humanitarian supplies. Some volatility in prices is due to shocks in markets. Many emerging market countries provide less information about stocks and production, particularly China and India. Better information on market conditions is also important.

In any problem as big as agriculture, there is no one silver bullet solution. You have to focus on the different elements. One challenge of development is: how can you make
a problem into an opportunity? Much of Sub-Saharan Africa could expand agricultural production. The majority of farmers in Africa are women. So when you deal with property rights, it’s not only men but women who need to have the opportunity to own land. Land titling can help women gain access to credit and other inputs.

CIRP: You talked about how you’ve released a lot of data sets in the last few years. How have these and other openness initiatives that you’ve led changed the projects that you do or the way that you do development?

RZ: That’s a really good question. I think this will be one of the most important aspects of my time at the Bank. First to democratize development, countries need to engage local publics. Second, the Bank can work with countries to build the data sets that will lead to more informed decision making. If you’re trying to think about policies that are related to gender, you have to keep the data on men and women, which a lot of countries don’t have. Or the liberalization of trade beyond the traditional agenda, for example, to include the services sector, or to make it easier to bring goods in and out, or express delivery requires clarity about rules.

Open information offers insights and learning, as well as improves fiduciary performance. I’ve also found that it has helped open the institution. People sometimes feel either frightened of or threatened by large, hierarchical institutions like banks or development institutions. The best antidote we have to conspiracy theories is to be open – open to criticism, open to comment. That doesn’t mean we agree with every criticism. We also need to transform our work force so that people recognize that part of their job is to engage people of different views.

CIRP: Given the 2008 financial crisis and the stalled negotiations over Doha, how much enthusiasm do you think there is, particularly amongst developing nations, for increasing free trade as a strategy for growth? How have your different experiences, first as US Trade Representative and now as President of the World Bank, shaped your own views on the subject?

RZ: On the first question, I think globally, because of the political fatigue of the economic crisis, we have to be careful to resist protectionism and isolationism for all countries, developed and developing. We’re in the fourth year of a crisis. We’ve been able to resist protectionism that we saw in the 1930s, but we still see flickers of dangers, so one shouldn’t take open trade for granted.

Second, the developing countries’ barriers tend to be higher than those of developed countries. But some developed countries have had barriers to developing countries’ exports. Because of the expanding competition in the south–south trade, some developing countries are worried about competition from other developing countries, for example, from China. So Brazil is more worried about its trade with China than with the United States.

In general, countries that have developed over the past thirty or forty years have been
open to the international economy. That's what allows them to face competition, innovate, and bring in technology. It is now important to get into global supply and logistics chains. The Bank not only supports the general negotiations for trade liberalization, but also works on a series of related issues—for example, trade facilitation: how do you make custom systems work more effectively? I stopped at a border post between Kenya and Uganda that we helped design with simple software innovations. It used to take two to three days for trucks to cross the border; the improvements cut the time to two to three hours.

I believe that openness and competition and free trade is a good thing, so I haven't changed my fundamental views. I believe it's a good thing for my country as well as for others. The way trade negotiations work, people often think that it's just about exports. But, in reality, imports also make a country more competitive. If you think of the things you buy and you ask where they're made, they'd cost a lot more if made only in the United States. A mercantilist attitude only looks at exports. So one of the interesting things about being a trade negotiator, unlike some other negotiations, is that what you're "giving away" are barriers that would actually make your country more efficient. But the reality is that all governments face political constraints. Under the United States Constitution, authority over trade belongs to the Congress. So when I was the U.S. Trade Representative, I had to get agreements approved by the Congress. In many trade negotiations, governments seek to open markets but they have to work with their political constraints. Contrary to most people's idea that trade negotiations are like a poker game where one person wins, the negotiations are really a joint problem-solving exercise to liberalize while working with political constraints.