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Joseph Bunyard  |  Diana Crookston  |  Jure Erlic  |  Antonio Freiría
Alina V. Guerra  |  Arianna Garcia Guerrero  |  Lauren James  |  Micah Rabin
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Editors

Editor-in-Chief: John J. Chin
Associate Editors: Bill Brink, Emily Half, Abby W. Schachter
Cover Artist: Yoshi Torralva
Dear Reader,

I am pleased to introduce the first issue of the Journal of Politics and Strategy, sponsored by Carnegie Mellon University’s Institute for Politics and Strategy (IPS). The journal has a new name and a new look, thanks in large part to our talented student graphic designer, Yoshi Torralva. But the journal will continue to publish the same great content and student research as the CIRP Journal, as the journal has been known since the first issue was published in 2013. To reflect this continuity, we have not restarted the counter for the journal’s volume or issue number.

Since 2013, each spring issue of the journal has featured undergraduate research submitted in response to a call for submissions. This issue is no different. In some years the journal asks for submissions on a specific theme, such as US-China relations (Spring 2020). This year, however, we invited submissions related to any aspect of politics or policy. As a result, the issue features articles across the spectrum of international politics and domestic policy issues, from sanctions on Iran to voter suppression in the United States to issues of measuring gross domestic product. The topics reflect the breadth of research interests of Carnegie Mellon’s diverse student body.

Since 2018, the journal has published a separate issue featuring shortened versions of master’s theses of students in IPS’ accelerated master’s program (AMP), typically in the fall following the graduation of each class. Rather than publishing graduate student articles separately, this issue instead features a section for such work, which we aptly call the “Master’s Thesis Corner.” The thesis corner in this issue features three articles from the MS IRP-AMP class of 2020.

I thank Dr. Margarita Konaev, an expert on military applications of artificial intelligence (AI), for agreeing to be interviewed by former IPS assistant teaching professor Colin Clarke and IPS graduate student Jure Erlic for this issue. I also thank Abby Schachter, Navy Federal Executive Fellow Clinton Christofk, and Army War College Fellow Michael Needham for their contribution of an important conversation on evolving civil-military relations in the United States.

As incoming editor-in-chief, I want to especially thank Kiron Skinner, the founding director of IPS and Taube Professor of International Relations and Politics, for founding the CIRP Journal and serving as its publisher and editor-in-chief for many years. I hope this and future issues of the Journal of Politics and Strategy carry on Dr. Skinner’s vision for an academic social science journal that enables members of the Carnegie Mellon community to contribute to important local, domestic, and international policy debates. At CMU and in IPS, our heart truly is in the work.

Sincerely,

John J. Chin
Editor-in-Chief
SPEND A SEMESTER WHERE IT ALL HAPPENS.

Apply now to the Carnegie Mellon University Washington Semester Program, open to CMU students from any course of study.

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Compromise and Sacrifice: Instrumental and Sacred Values in Lebanon’s Sectarian System

MARTINA RETHMAN

Lebanon has long been viewed as a stronghold of democracy in the Arab world. However, most scholars do not view Lebanon as a true liberal democracy, instead determining it to be partially free.¹ According to Freedom House, a leading tracker of democracy worldwide, Lebanon’s problems include a lack of political competition, pervasive corruption, and an inconsistent application of the rule of law, all of which can be traced back — at least partially — to the country’s unique semi-presidential sectarian system.² This system dictates the amount of power and the specific positions different religious sects are allowed to hold in government. The creation of a sect-based governing system in 1943, and its subsequent revision in 1989, has both solved and exacerbated many of the inter-communal conflicts that have plagued the nation since its founding. Considerable scholarship has been paid to this unique governing system from an anthropological, historical, and political perspective.³

No prior study has yet examined the Lebanese Constitution through a decision science lens. Some scholars have analyzed the values and beliefs that Lebanese people hold about their government and society.⁴ However, the literature on Lebanon’s sectarian system has been disconnected from the literature on sacred values. To fill this gap, I investigate how different iterations of the Lebanese Constitution and its sectarian system reflect (or not) the country’s values since the time it was drafted. To do this, I first briefly review Lebanon’s political system and the importance of sacred and instrumental values. Second, I describe and analyze the historical context and values that are reflected in (1) the National Pact at Lebanon’s independence, (2) the Ta’if Agreement after the Lebanese Civil War, and (3) post-Arab Spring Lebanon. I conclude with recommended government reforms that may better align with the values expressed in post-Arab Spring Lebanon.

A Brief Overview of Lebanon’s Political System

After the fall of the Ottoman Empire in the First World War, the area that is now modern Lebanon was placed under a French Mandate by the League of Nations in 1923. Issues arose when this mandate covering a wide swath of the northern Levant began to redefine the territory known as Mount Lebanon under the Ottomans into modern Lebanon. While historic Mount Lebanon was home to a majority of Maronite Christians, who were favorable to the

¹ Lebanon has never scored particularly high on any dimension of democracy, according to the Varieties of Democracy Project. See “Country Graph: Lebanon,” V-Dem, accessed February 8, 2021, https://www.v-dem.net/en/analysis/CountryGraph/.
³ Lebanon, is a paradigmatic case in the literature on “consociational democracy.” For the classic if dated view of Lebanon as a “success” case, see Arend Lijphart, “Consociational democracy,” World Politics 21, no. 2 (1969): 207-225.

Martina Rethman is a junior at Carnegie Mellon University majoring in creative writing with an additional major in international relations and politics and a minor in Arabic. She is particularly interested in how literature and politics influence one another, especially as it relates to US-Middle Eastern relations. She is currently working on her thesis considering so-called “Washington outsiders” in the US Congress and their legislative effectiveness. In her free time, she is an avid knitter and coffee connoisseur.
French, the new Lebanon introduced huge demographic changes. First, while Maronites were still the largest single sect, they no longer made up the majority of the population, given a large influx of Muslims from regions such as Beirut and Al-Biqa. Second, a substantial portion of the population, mainly made up of newly Lebanese Muslims, did not want to transition to an independent Lebanon, but to create a new state by merging with Syria.

In order to solve these demographic divisions, Lebanon instituted two constitutional structures that make its political system unique on the world stage. The first is their semi-presidential system established in 1943 with Lebanese independence. While they are not the only country to have such a system, it is a rarer form of democracy. Under a semi-presidential system, both the prime minister and the president hold genuine executive authority. In the case of Lebanon, the president is selected by the parliament for a non-renewable six-year term. The president, then in turn nominates the prime minister. The parliament, made up of 128 members, also selects its own speaker for a renewable four-year term.

The second constitutional oddity is Lebanon's sectarian system, under which the president must always be a Maronite Christian, the prime minister a Sunni Muslim, and the speaker a Shia Muslim. While this has been true since the founding of modern Lebanon, for reasons that will be discussed further below, the relative power of each of these positions, and therefore of each of these sects, has waxed and waned over time. Furthermore, the parliament is elected by geographic districts, but must also be split up along sectarian lines. Currently, half of all members of parliament must be Christian, and half Muslim, with greater divisions within these groups. This split is meant to reflect Lebanon's demographics, but due to the sensitivity of the issue, no census data has recorded religion since 1932.5

Instrumental and Sacred Values

In general, a value is any outcome that a decision maker would prefer. An instrumental value requires a decision maker to be willing to negotiate or make trade-offs for it. Whether or not someone is offered the correct incentive to make the trade-off or whether they do or do not make it does not matter for defining an instrumental value, so long as they would be willing to make a trade-off given the right theoretical incentive.6

Sacred values, on the other hand, resist any sort of trade-off. In 2015, world-renowned anthropologist Scott Atran stated that “It is the sacred values, immune to material tradeoffs, that bind us most. In any culture, an unwillingness to sell out one's kin or religious and political brotherhoods and motherlands is the line we usually will not cross.”7 Though sacred values may have religious underpinnings, they do not have to. For example, a mother might be unwilling to hurt her children, no matter how much she is threatened (adverse incentive) or how much she is bribed (positive incentive). Four indicators of sacred values include:

1. disregard for material incentives or disincentives,
2. blindness to exit strategies,
3. immunity to social pressure, and
4. insensitivity to discounting.8

5 While highly accurate measurements are not available due to the lack of census data, the current population is estimated by the CIA World Factbook to be approximately 65 percent Muslims (Sunni, Shia, and Druze) and 33 percent Christian (largely Maronite), not counting the sizable Palestinian and Syrian refugee populations. There are eighteen officially recognized religions, though there is a very small portion of the population that falls outside of these groups, and is therefore not entitled to government representation, even though they retain the right to vote. “Middle East: Lebanon – The World Factbook,” Central Intelligence Agency, September 29, 2020, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/le.html.
8 Ibid.
Lebanon’s Constitution and its Revisions

The National Pact

As war threatened with Maronites unhappy with their loss of majority and Muslims wanting to merge with Syria, Christian and Muslim leaders struck an unwritten gentlemen’s agreement, the National Pact, in 1943. Under it, first, Maronites would not seek Western (i.e. French) intervention, while Muslims would not look to unite with Syria. Second, the Pact split which government positions could be held by members of each sect. Most importantly, the president would always be Maronite, the prime minister a Sunni, the speaker of parliament a Shia, and other high-level government positions would be divvied up accordingly. The Pact set the ratio of members of parliament at six-to-five in favor of the Christians. Each of these provisions reflect certain instrumental values, as will be discussed below.

The compromise ruling out both foreign intervention and Syrian unity show how the framers were able to negotiate between two opposing instrumental values in the face of a larger looming threat, namely war. Recognizing that if either side pursued its own value, both would suffer great adverse consequences, à la the prisoner’s dilemma, Christians and Muslims navigated the conflicting values so both could enjoy a minimally tolerable outcome.

The way the framers negotiated the rationing of power shows a strong value for equality in government. Though such a strict quota system may seem inherently unequal to an outsider, this balance of power reflected the most accurate data available at the time, the 1932 census. While logically, each group should have tried to retain the most powerful positions for themselves, this did not occur. In fact, the value of equality was so precious, one might infer it was a sacred value (no trade offs were acceptable).

The Lebanese Civil War, 1975-1990

Scholars disagree about what exactly led to the start of the Lebanese Civil War. However, government gridlock due to the sectarian system arguably was a major factor. Demographic shifts due to differing birth and emigration rates meant that by 1975, Muslims had a clear majority over Christians in the country. However, no definitive numbers can say how large this majority was; due to the sensitivity of religion and religious issues in Lebanon, no census has been taken since 1932. Still, by 1975, the National Pact had gained the kind of rigidity that its framers had specifically tried to avoid, meaning that no changes could be peacefully made to the power divisions, leaving what was originally a fairly equal distribution of power incredibly unbalanced. This left Muslims, especially Sunnis and Druze, feeling underrepresented while Maronites feared a loss of power. Once the civil war began, with lines drawn largely on confessional lines, it raged on for fifteen years.

The Ta’if Agreement

Throughout the 1980s, several attempts to broker a peace were made, yet none succeeded until the 1989 Ta’if Agreement. Because the content of the Agreement did not differ greatly from previous attempts at peace, many scholars have attributed its success to mere

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10 Ibid.
12 Bogaards, “Formal and Informal Consociational Institutions.”
attrition. Different militia groups became more geographically entrenched as the war raged on, heightening the possibility of secessions and threatening an even greater escalation of the war. The population tired of the war, and leaders risked losing support if the conflict was not brought to an end.

As part of the peace agreement, Ta’if brought shifts in the sectarian power balance, reflecting a move towards equality. First, it decreased the ratio of Christians to Muslims in parliament to one-to-one. Second, it increased the power of the Muslim prime minister and speaker of parliament at the expense of the Maronite president. This new balance of power roughly reflected the demographic changes that had taken place since 1932. Of course, some Muslims argued that this shift was too little given the demographic changes, and some Christians argued that it was too much, given their large economic dominance. Still, as will be shown below, leaders had to sacrifice their instrumental values (i.e. power) in order to satisfy the population’s sacred value of a unitary Lebanon.

Leaders negotiating the Ta’if Agreement clearly demonstrate all four of Atran’s (2015) criteria to show sacred values. First, Maronite leaders showed a “disregard for material incentives or disincentives” by voluntarily accepting a major cut to their power when there was little evidence that they would in fact lose the war. Every militia leader demonstrated a “blindness to exit strategies” that might violate Lebanon’s unity. Given a battlefield stalemate with no evidence that any one group would soon win, any militia, of which there were nearly a dozen, conceivably had the opportunity to secede completely from Lebanon and the war, thereby keeping all its power (within a limited territory). Yet, according to eyewitness accounts of the Agreement, this option was never even discussed. Likewise, the delegates were insensitive to the “discounting of future goals” in the signing of the Ta’if Agreement. Throughout the civil war, militias endured huge financial, psychological, and physical harm for years, without even considering negotiating the value of Lebanon’s unity.

The last criteria to demonstrate a sacred value, “immunity to social pressure,” is harder to prove, given the widespread consensus on a unitary Lebanon within the country, but can be seen in the case of the Maronite Liberal Front (LF) and the Druze Progressive Socialist Party (PSP). Both of these militias were able to create fully functional, ethnically homogenous zones within Lebanon. On the surface then, both of these groups had met all of the goals they had set out to achieve: an end to government gridlock and more political power for their sect. Yet the social pressure that had originally led to these goals was not enough to disincentivize the LF or PSP from pursuing a unitary Lebanon.

Lebanese Values Post-Arab Spring

Today, the sacred value of a unitary Lebanon lives on. Double the number of Lebanese...
citizens see themselves as Lebanese above all else, compared to their religion above all else.\textsuperscript{25} Likewise, analysis of Moaddel, Kors, and Gärde’s (2012) data show that all three major sects, Maronites, Sunnis, and Shias, favor an end to sectarianism. This may be because the amount of trust Lebanese citizens have in their government and its institutions is directly correlated with the amount of power their sect has in a given area.\textsuperscript{26} Secularization would also likely address values about equality as there are legitimate concerns about the over-representation of Christians in government, and especially parliament.

Currently, the Lebanese people largely disapprove of the current sectarian system, as it remains the root of many of the most pervasive political problems in the country. According to Freedom House, the major challenges to democracy in Lebanon, including corruption, gridlock, gerrymandering, and the under- and over-representation of certain sects are all—at least in part—a result of the sectarian system.\textsuperscript{27}

\textbf{Intervention: Recommendations to Move Forward}

I conclude from the above analysis that the Lebanese people as a whole currently express values including Lebanese unity and an end to sectarianism, which—many hope—will help to solve some of the other pervasive and present problems. Due to the varied ways different citizens express these values, it is difficult to say whether these are sacred or instrumental values. Likely, they are sacred for some and instrumental for others.

The first value, Lebanese unity, is not currently at risk. There are no major calls or movements to split up the country, and a challenge to this value is unlikely to emerge soon. Social unity is altogether another matter. Measures like increasing the number of secular schools, creating a nationalized school curriculum, or inter-faith civil societies could help increase inter-sectarian trust, which in turn may help promote secularization.\textsuperscript{28}

To fulfill the second value of ending sectarianism, small gradual changes are the most practical. The first step would be to re-enlarge electoral districts. The large geographic districts established in section III.D of the Ta’if Agreement were meant to necessitate cross-sect coalition building, and largely did.\textsuperscript{29} However, districts were re-shrunk in 2008 as large districts were seen to benefit pro-Syrian candidates. By re-establishing large districts, current and future politicians would have to become more secularly oriented in order to appeal to a more diverse constituency. These more-secular politicians would then hopefully be open to establishing a bicameral Chamber of Deputies, as required by the Ta’if Agreement, because their positions would be less threatened by secularization.\textsuperscript{30} In contrast to the current unicameral system, the Chamber of Deputies would establish a bicameral system where sect leaders would have a nominal say in issues directly relating to their community in the less powerful Chamber, while major legislation could take place in a secular parliament.\textsuperscript{31}

While major reform will be difficult, a peaceful transition to a secular liberal democracy in Lebanon is not impossible. Further research on how recent conflicts in Lebanon, like the 2005 Cedar Revolution and the 2019-2021 protests, reflect the Lebanese people’s sacred and instrumental values will be critical to inform political change.

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{Vaughan, “Who Benefits from Consociationalism?.”}
\footnote{“Lebanon,” Freedom House.}
\footnote{Moaddel, Kors, Gärde, “Sectarianism and Counter-Sectarianism in Lebanon.”}
\footnote{“Taif Accords,” UN Peacemaker.}
\footnote{Ibid., II.A.7.}
\footnote{“Taif Accords,” UN Peacemaker.}
\end{footnotes}
American Soft Power and the Big Tech Breakup

JOSEPH BUNYARD

Antitrust action against tech giants Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and Google (collectively known as Big Tech) jeopardizes American soft power abroad. The United States Department of Justice (US DoJ) currently regulates the flow of electronic evidence (EE) from Big Tech to foreign governments conducting criminal investigations. Efforts in Washington to “breakup Big Tech” jeopardize the timely collection of EE and US DoJ’s jurisdiction over it. While Big Tech poses critical challenges to American values and norms, the antiquated antitrust action it faces neglects Big Tech’s role in US international relations.

Breaking Up Big Tech

With Amazon conducting nearly four times the e-commerce of its three largest competitors combined and Google controlling 92 percent of the global search market, has Big Tech become too big? Tech giants often acquire rivals or create conditions that restrict their market access. Facebook, for example, acquired rivals Instagram and WhatsApp to maximize its share of the social networking market (see Figure 1). Apple, for its part, deters App Store competitors by regulating the software that is compatible with iPhones.

Throughout the 20th century, the US government battled monopolies that exploited their market share to charge consumers excessive rates and stifle competition. Just as Standard Oil and AT&T were divided into smaller subsidiaries — such as Exxon and Verizon — Congress, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), and US DoJ are pursuing antitrust action that threaten to “breakup Big Tech” through the “structural division” of its services (see Figure 1).

In an October 2020 report, the majority staff of the US House of Representatives Subcommittee on Antitrust accused Big Tech of operating digital monopolies that exploit users and squash competitors. The report accuses Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and Google of using their respective monopolies in e-commerce, mobile applications, social networking, and search to force users into “take-it-or-leave-it” terms of service, charge excessive fees, stifle startups, and

Joseph Bunyard is a first-year graduate student in the Master’s of Information Technology Strategy (MITS) program at Carnegie Mellon University. He often writes on the intersection of technology and national security, with his work appearing in CMU’s Triple Helix, the US Naval Institute’s journal Proceedings, the International Journal of Naval History, and Jeune Ecole.
extract sensitive consumer data. In separate civil antitrust lawsuits, US DoJ and the FTC accuse Google and Facebook of “monopolistic” and “anti-competitive” practices.

How the United States Regulates Electronic Evidence

US technology companies provide digital goods and services to users around the world. As a result, foreign governments often rely on electronic evidence (EE) from US companies to prosecute those suspected of criminal activity ranging from transnational cybercrime to domestic terrorism. However, under US Code, foreign governments must request the assistance of US DoJ, through the Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA) treaty process, to acquire EE from US companies.

Under US Code, providers are not required to store potential EE on their servers for any set period. Since storing data incurs physical and administrative costs, providers often do not retain potentially incriminating data users mark for removal, such as the examples of EE provided in Table 1. Collecting data from providers requires a court order, which often involves a lengthy legal process. In order to ensure potential EE is safeguarded until a court order is obtained, US DoJ may file a non-compulsory preservation request with a provider. Finally, and crucially for the MLA process, US providers comply, decline, or do not respond to the request for EE based on its capabilities, policies, and interests.

Figure 1: Facebook’s acquisition of select competitors (left), development of new services (center), and potential “breakup” scenario (right). Figure by author.

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9 Ibid, 14.
Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Examples of Electronic Evidence (EE)</th>
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<td>Amazon</td>
<td>Data stored on the Amazon Web Service cloud, e-commerce user details and activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apple</td>
<td>IP addresses, iCloud data, device information, user activity, location, iMessages, Apple Pay transactions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facebook</td>
<td>IP addresses, posts, comments, photos, direct messages, activity history</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Google</td>
<td>IP addresses, search/activity history, Google services data (Maps, Gmail, YouTube, etc).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Company Websites

US DoJ serves as the indispensable link between Big Tech and foreign governments. As the administrator of the MLA process, US DoJ often modifies or rejects requests in the interest of safeguarding civil liberties, due process, and human rights at home and abroad. For example, US DoJ often denies requests for EE related to a political offense, such as the 2020 pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong. Furthermore, the United States is able to leverage its unique ability to provide EE from the world’s largest tech companies in the ongoing negotiation of new treaties governing cloud services, data privacy, and extraditions. “Breaking up Big Tech” jeopardizes the international rule of law by hamstringing the MLA process, which would diminish a vital facet of American soft power during once-in-a-generation treaty negotiations.

Law & Order

Smaller tech companies are often less capable and less willing to comply with US DoJ preservation requests. To collect EE on large groups — such as the rioters who stormed the US Capitol on January 6, 2020, for example — US DoJ must file separate requests for each suspect. The speed at which this is done depends on the ability and cooperation of the provider. Are the provider’s EE policies easily accessible? Does the provider have a portal where law enforcement can send preservation requests? Will the provider tip-off the suspect whose information is requested? Table 2 summarizes a survey of legal guides, transparency reports, and terms of service from providers of various size and sectors. “Breaking up Big Tech” would leave its successors with fewer resources to comply with preservation requests and eliminate “one stop shopping” for US DoJ. Smaller companies do not have the personnel, capability, or server space to offer the same resources to law enforcement as Big Tech. For example, SnapChat preserves the metadata of opened messages but not their content, which has complicated high-profile investigations by law enforcement. Companies that do have the resources may still choose not to cooperate with preservation requests out of retaliation for antitrust action by the US government.

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<td>Delays court order compliance to allow suspect to challenge it</td>
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Source: Company Websites\(^20\)

**American Soft Power**

The prominence of Big Tech overseas benefits the US economy, amplifies American culture and values around the world, and provides platforms for creativity and freedom of expression. Following the “breakup” of AT&T in the 1980s, successors turned from international expansion towards solidifying market share in the United States.\(^21\) If Big Tech’s successors are less able or inclined to compete abroad, foreign providers—who are not under the jurisdiction of US DoJ—would likely meet the demand of ever more users for ever more services. The international influence of China’s TikTok illustrates the ability of foreign providers to wrestle market share from Big Tech at home and abroad.

Monopolies are bad for consumers and markets. But antitrust action against Big Tech would irreparably degrade American soft power abroad. Congress must refrain from applying old solutions to new problems. Monopolistic behavior, content management, and market access can be regulated without “breaking up Big Tech.” Crafting the tools necessary to regulate Big Tech while preserving American influence will require public and private sector leaders who are not only tech-literate but well versed in the international relations challenges facing the United States. Applying antiquated approaches to modern monopolies neglects the global, interconnected nature of the modern economy to the detriment of American soft power abroad.


The Islamic Republic of Iran has been subject to a campaign of foreign economic pressure for years in response to human rights abuses and its pursuit of illicit nuclear activities. With tensions accelerating in 2011, sanctions were imposed by the European Union, United Nations Security Council, and the United States. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) – the “Iran Deal” signed by the P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia and the United Kingdom and the United States) in July 2015 – was a turning point, promising sanctions relief for Iran in return for concessions designed to halt Iran’s development of nuclear weapons. After the Trump administration withdrew from the JCPOA in May 2018, the United States imposed sanctions through an unprecedented “maximum pressure” campaign.

In this article, I present a detailed case study of the impact of global economic sanctions on both the Iranian and European automotive industries. After considering the United States’ sanctions on Iran and then detailing actions by the United Nations’ Security Council and European Union towards Iran, this analysis focuses on the potent secondary effects on large European automotive manufacturers who have been coerced into scaling back their presence in a fast-growing automotive market, heightening tensions between the United States and the European triumvirate of France, Germany and Italy.

US Sanction Policy on Iran

In 2010, prior to the Trump administration, the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act (CISADA) expanded the scope of energy-related sanctions from the 1996 Iran Sanctions Act, defining sanctionable activities to include investments that “directly enhance Iran’s ability to develop its petroleum resources” with a total value of over $20 million, the sale or lease of goods or services that could help maintain or expand Iranian domestic refined petroleum products with a fair value of over $1 million, the sale of refined petroleum products with the fair market value of over $1 million or the provision of insurance, reinsurance, financing, brokering, ships or shipping services with values over $1 million. All nine explicitly enumerated possible sanction provisions have been applied to various parties through CISADA. The CISADA also included measures addressing human rights, obliging the president to report a list of heinous human rights’ abusers to Congress for visa bans.

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In 2012, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) set the framework for the legality of future sanctions pertaining to specified resources. Section 1245(d) requires the clear indication of sufficient foreign supply of comparable resources. To adhere to the framework of the 2012 NDAA, the president must “sanction private foreign financial institutions that are found to knowingly conduct or facilitate significant non-petroleum transactions” with a “US-designated Iranian financial institution.”

On August 6, 2018, President Trump signed Executive Order (EO) 13846, reimposing certain sanctions on Iran that had been removed while the US was a party to the JCPOA. President Trump said the sanctions would “advance the goal of applying financial pressure on the Iranian regime” in the effort to pursue “a comprehensive and lasting solution to the full range of the threats imposed by the Iranian government.” The first of EO 13846’s two sections enabled sanctions for entities that support the Iranian government’s purchase of US bank notes and precious metals, Iranian shipping, energy, port building and shipbuilding sectors. Foreign financial entities aiding these efforts would also be subject to sanctions. The second section of EO 13846 concerns the automotive and energy sectors, outlining restrictions on the sale of petroleum, petroleum products and petrochemical products. Citing Section 1245(d) of the 2012 NDAA, sanctions could be imposed on entities who materially supported the National Iranian Oil Company (NOIC), Naftiran Intertrade Company (NICO), or the Central Bank of Iran. Outside of EO 13846, Iran is also subject to a bevy of other sanctions from the United States.

Global Sanction Policy on Iran

The United Nations has also actively sanctioned Iran. Starting with Resolution 1696 in 2006, the UN Security Council has passed resolutions attempting to halt Iran’s nuclear program by embargoing arms, freezing Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) assets, imposing travel bans, and restricting access to the international banking system. Despite the wide swath of sanctions, it is imperative to note that the United Nations has not sanctioned petroleum or petroleum products as the United States has done repeatedly. The United Nations withdrew its sanctions as part of the JCPOA. Following the United States’ exit from the JCPOA, the UN Security Council rejected a US proposal to resume the arms embargo on Iran.

The European Union has also repeatedly sanctioned Iran, but to a much lesser degree than the United States. In 2011, the Blocking Regulation against Iran, originally instated in 1996 (Council Regulation (EC) No 2271/96), was amended to include certain secondary sanctions from the United States. Since debuting in 2011, EU asset freezes and visa bans for gross human rights violators and export bans on Iranian entities relating to “internal repression and of equipment for monitoring” have been extended on an annual basis, through 2021.

Unlike the Trump administration, the so-called E3, comprised of France, Germany and

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4 Ibid.
6 Ibid. The sanctions imposed include EO 38939, Reimposing Certain Sanctions with Respect to Iran; EO 13949, Blocking Property of Certain Persons with Respect to the Conventional Arms Activities of Iran; EO 13902, Imposing Sanctions with Respect to Additional Sectors of Iran; EO 13886, Modernizing Sanctions to Combat Terrorism; EO 13883, Administration of Proliferation Sanctions and Amendment of EO 12851; EO 13876, Imposing Sanctions with Respect to Iran; and EO 13871 Imposing Sanctions with Respect to the Iron, Steel, Aluminum and Copper Sectors of Iran.
the United Kingdom, decided not to implement “maximum pressure” against Iran, but rather
strived to bring the country back to compliance with the JCPOA through other means. Despite
triggering dispute resolution procedures in the JCPOA, the E3 reiterated their commitment to
preserving the JCPOA in January 2020. Despite the European Union’s disdain for the Trump
administration’s approach, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) indicated “serious
concern” over Iranian refusal of access to two nuclear facilities, so speculation around the
possibility of the E3 warming up to the idea of imposing increased economic pressures has
recently emerged at the forefront of discussion.10

Although European sanctions did not prohibit the completion of business transactions
with Iranian corporations following the American exit from the JCPOA, copious European firms
closed transactions with Iranian firms. Particularly hard-hit sectors included aircraft producers,
oil companies and auto manufacturers, many of whom had earlier rushed to invest in Iran’s
economy to seize its enormous economic opportunity after the JCPOA was signed in 2015.11

Renault and the Automotive Sector in Iran

Renault, a leading European car manufacturer and one of the biggest global automotive
players, has been consistently eager to get involved in Iran. Between cheap resources – both
labor and land – and a market with a considerable amount of room for expansion, Iran has
been a key target for the firm.12 Starting in 2004, with a majority stake in Renault Pars, the joint
venture between Renault and Iran’s Industrial Development Renovation Organization (IRDO),
Renault became the biggest foreign direct investor in Iran’s automobile industry.

After European and UN Security Council sanctions were imposed from 2011 onwards,
a different European car manufacturer, Peugeot-Citroën, left the Iranian market. Renault,
however, maintained its production operations in Iran but fell far short of its goal production
pace of 300,000 cars per year. After the American withdrawal from JCPOA in 2018, Renault
signed a deal rumored to be worth over $1 billion to produce at least 150,000 vehicles a year
in a factory outside of Tehran. Renault maintained 60 percent ownership of the venture, with
the remainder of stock held by the IRDO. Renault, for the first time, was supposed to be able to
develop its own distribution network within Iran, however, given material changes, this could
not occur. Renault’s former CEO Carlos Ghosn projected local Iranian demand for over two
million cars by 2020 and noted the market’s “undeniable potential” that never materialized.13

Renault’s tough decision to step back from the Iranian market was driven by the threat
that American sanctions would damage the market position of Renault and its strategic partners
(Nissan and Mitsubishi) in the United States. Although the E3 vowed to protect European
companies’ interests in Iran against the economic pain imposed by the US sanctions, this is a
difficult vow to keep in practice, as indicated by Renault’s decreased presence in the country.14
Leaving Iran’s market severely damaged Renault’s top-line, with sales in the Middle East and
Africa region falling over 27 percent after the withdrawal. Iran was one of Renault’s fastest-
growing countries in the region, with sales increasing 48 percent in 2018, and, given that market
share was still only 11 percent, there was considerable room to continue growing.15

boston.com/cars/cars/2018/05/09/european-businesses-most-affected-by-us-sanctions-on-iran.
12 Renault, with its strategic partners Nissan and Mitsubishi, sells more than one of every nine vehicles sold worldwide. See "About
13 Associated Press, “French Automaker Renault Signs Deal with Iran as Its Economy Opens,” *Toronto Star*, September 30, 2016,
com/a/renault-pullout-iran-us-jcpoa/29243980.html.
news/438249/Renault-regional-sales-drop-drastically-after-exit-from-Iran.
directly noted that its “Drive the Future” emerging market expansion plan was adversely impacted by the “cessation of sales in Iran due to the application of American sanctions.”

Outside of Renault, European auto makers with shallower roots in Iranian vehicle production have also been struggling to succeed in the Iranian market amid the imposed sanctions. Citroën, a brand within French Peugeot-Citroën (or Groupe PSA), agreed to sell and produce vehicles in Iran during US participation in the JCPOA. With a deal worth over $330 million, PSA entered a joint venture with SAIPA and Iran Khodro in 2016. SAIPA was also their partner in their joint ventures in the early 2000s. By 2018, after the American withdrawal, PSA suspended its joint venture activities despite Iran being a substantial driver of the business growth, with 445,000 vehicles sold in Iran in 2017 alone. PSA’s bottom-line was also severely affected by the withdrawal from Iran, with a 1.1 percent year-over-year revenue decline of $20.1 billion reported in the first quarter of 2019.

Effects on the Automotive Sector in Iran

The Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” campaign has had incredibly stark effects on the Iranian economy, especially in the automotive manufacturing sector. Using 2019 data to shield results from the skewed effects of COVID-related economic distress, the decrease in automobile product is sharp. In 2019, Iran produced a mere 770,000 automobiles, representing a 45 percent decrease from the 1.4 million produced two years prior.

US and European sanctions, which were loosened with the JCPOA (only temporarily in the US case given JCPOA withdrawal), have clearly impacted the output of Iran’s automotive sector, as can be seen in Figure 1. In 2012, production output for cars fell 39 percent, before falling an additional 26 percent in 2013. After a 47 percent rebound in 2014, the annual output was still down 32 percent from its peak of 1.4 million cars produced in 2011. Through the JCPOA discussions and formal announcement, years of 21 percent and 32 percent growth brought the output slightly above the 2011 height. However, given the additional constraints imposed by the US “maximum pressure” sanctions, output fell to 45 percent of its 2017 record in 2019.

As the automotive industry is the second largest driver of the Iranian economy following energy, the impact of auto production output volume is incredibly significant. The automotive industry is responsible for 10 percent of the Iranian Gross Domestic Product and accounts for 4 percent of the Iranian workforce. The two largest local manufacturers, Iran Khodro (IKCO) and SAIPA, directly hire 100,000 Iranians, with 700,000 more employed in related industries. In 2019, IKCO increased its production to more than 172,000 cars, up 36 percent, given the foreign exits from the market.

Due to the Trump administration’s resumption of US sanctions, particularly those enacted through Executive Orders 13645 and 13846, Iran now has to produce key automotive parts that had been previously imported domestically. This actually presents substantial cost

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savings for the Iranian auto industry on net over the long run; however, this requires a massive initial investment of over $2 billion. Domestic parts production will then save Iran an estimated $360 million each year, as noted by the Iranian government.23 In addition to the magnitude of the initial investment cost, troubles are compounded by the struggle to secure foreign currency needed to purchase raw materials, given that Iran is currently only 80 percent self-sufficient in automotive part manufacturing.24 All of these additional cost burdens are amplified as population growth continues to stabilize and market potential remains.

Conclusion

Through the Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” campaign, the United States has materially hindered the Iranian economy. US sanctioning decisions have resulted in consequences globally, including added strain to relationships with historically-strong European allies. Focusing specifically on the automotive sector and Executive Orders 13645 and 13846, we can see that ripple effects have affected both those within and outside the Islamic Republic of Iran's borders. Although the Iranian market is underexploited and growing with ideal demographic conditions and a dearth of transportation infrastructure, the United States has effectively stopped mutually profitable automotive sales from occurring. This inflicts severe pain on not only the Iranian government and ordinary citizens, but also on European automotive manufacturers and economies more broadly. Given the recent change in administration, I expect that the Biden administration will ease the “maximum pressure” campaign in an effort to undo many of the moves of the Trump administration, inadvertently helping European automotive manufacturers and relationships between the US and European powerhouses.

Should unpaid labor be included in Gross Domestic Product (GDP)? GDP has been one of the most widely-used summary measures of the value of all goods and services produced by a nation each year since the creation of the metric in 1937.\(^1\) Unpaid labor describes work that household members do for free, whereas a non-household member performing these same tasks would be paid. This type of work varies within different cultures and nations; unpaid tasks may include cleaning, cooking, child or elder care, gathering firewood, and harvesting food.\(^2\)

Because unpaid labor is disproportionately done by women, accounting for unpaid work in GDP could promote gender equality and positive societal change. In this paper, I review key normative and empirical arguments for and against including unpaid labor in GDP, in hopes of fostering more informed debate on this important yet underappreciated issue.

**Arguments for Inclusion**

The first argument for including unpaid labor in GDP is normative, namely that it would be a huge step towards gender equality. Across the world, women consistently bear more of the burden of unpaid labor. In the United States, for example, women do an average of 242 minutes of unpaid labor per day compared to 148 minutes for men.\(^3\) In India, women do an average of 352 minutes of unpaid work per day compared to only 52 minutes for men.\(^4\) This unequal distribution is harmful to women because they have less time to learn, relax, work on hobbies, or put in extra hours at work to get a promotion.\(^5\) This disparity between men and women directly inhibits women’s quality of life and limits their financial mobility. In many societies, unpaid labor, often seen as “women’s work,” is not valued comparable paid work. For example, women dominate the food industry and do most of the cooking in most households and yet often do not reach the higher pay or prestige that male chefs do in restaurants.\(^6\)

Some economists, such as Phyllis Deane, believe that including unpaid labor in GDP accounts for the tremendous economic value of tasks such as gathering wood and cooking at

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\(^2\) Unpaid labor does not include tasks such as giving your child a hug, because this is not an essential household function. “Redistribute Unpaid Work,” *UN Women*, accessed January 15, 2021, https://www.unwomen.org/en/news/in-focus/csw61/redistribute-unpaid-work.


\(^5\) Berman, “Women’s unpaid work is the backbone of the American economy.”

Should Unpaid Labor be Included in GDP?

For example, cooking food prevents starvation, nourishes those who go to work or school, and can allow a household's breadwinner to earn more income. Similarly, taking care of children allows other household members to spend time working, relaxing, or learning. All of these tasks hugely benefit individuals, the household, and community as a whole. Yet these economic contributions literally count for nothing in the traditional GDP measure, even though they would be included if non-household members were paid to do the same things. For example, someone cleaning their own house is unpaid labor and is excluded; however, if they were to hire a cleaner to clean their home that individual's work would be included in GDP. Quantifying the economic value of unpaid work in GDP would increase its perceived worth, reinforce the benefit this work brings to the economy, and recognize sacrifices that unpaid laborers make to allow other members of the household to do paid work and thus create a stronger paid workforce.

Second, much data has been collected on unpaid labor, making its inclusion in GDP increasingly feasible for many countries. The Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) collected statistics on the amount of unpaid work done by men and women in dozens of nations, though they do not break down the types of work done or their monetary value. The American Time Use Survey, a US Census phone survey which tracks how individuals spent their time in the last 24 hours, has collected some detailed data on unpaid labor and this process could be replicated in other nations. Since unpaid labor can be measured and tracked with instruments not all that dissimilar to surveys of paid economic activity, as the availability of multiple surveys demonstrate, it can be included in GDP.

Argument Against Inclusion

There are few persuasive normative arguments in support of the traditional GDP measure. Depending on a nation's cultural perspective, unpaid work is not held to the same esteem as paid work. To some, it would be an insult to men and their work to include unpaid labor or “female” labor in GDP in the same way that “male” labor is included. This problematic and outdated argument, however, further demonstrates why unpaid labor should be included in GDP for the purposes of furthering gender equality. If “men's labor” and “women's labor” were held as equal perhaps society would view women more equally as well.

Most objections focus on the mathematical challenges or logistical difficulties of including unpaid labor into a measure of GDP. Unpaid labor differs from paid work insofar as both unpaid household labor and volunteer work outside the home depend on volunteering one's time and thus do not entail monetary exchanges or set prices for labor performed. How should GDP value unpaid labor in the absence prices or purchase records? Currently, GDP is calculated by gathering data from a diverse array of places and generally relies on receipts and tracked transactions to get values (e.g. for consumption, production, net exports) to aggregate into the GDP total. Some skeptics highlight the difficulty of measuring the output of unpaid labor since unpaid labor does not have formal transactions. Without these receipts, it would be

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7 Economic value is defined as the value an individual person places on a good or service based on the benefit they receive from it. Messac, “Women's unpaid work must be included in GDP calculations.”


9 OECD, “Employment: Time spent in paid and unpaid work, by sex.”


11 OECD, “Employment: Time spent in paid and unpaid work, by sex.”

12 Messac, “Women's unpaid work must be included in GDP calculations.”

difficult to get consistent numerical values to add to GDP.\textsuperscript{14} Additionally, some claim that it would be too hard to get accurate data globally, especially in countries where detailed time use surveys are not conducted regularly. One of the benefits of GDP as a measure is the ability to compare levels of economic development across countries over time. In order to be legitimate, a GDP measure inclusive of unpaid labor would need to be representative of a nation and must enable tracking across countries over time. Collecting the necessary data may pose significant, but arguably not insurmountable, challenges, especially with additional investments in data collection.

### Developing an Alternative to GDP

Some economists, including Nobel prize winning economist Joseph Stiglitz, have proposed abandoning GDP as beyond reform and instead using a completely new indicator or switching to a current alternative.\textsuperscript{15} They argue that GDP can often be misleading, because it is centered around a single number that cannot encompass the specifics of the life of an average person in that nation.\textsuperscript{16} For example, it does not include measures for quality of life, resource depletion, economic inequality, or average debt individuals have, all of which would broaden understanding of the economic reality for the typical citizen.

If unpaid labor continues to be excluded from GDP, what alternative economic indicators could measure it? Historically, one metric that has been used as an alternative to GDP is the United Nations Human Development Index (HDI), which includes factors such as life expectancy, income per capita, and education level. Most of the data used to create the HDI comes from various organizations and recognized scholars across the globe, such as the International Monetary Fund and International Labor Organization.\textsuperscript{17} Using available datasets from credible sources reduces the UN’s workload and allows a focus on aggregation. However, this index has not overtaken GDP as a metric and is primarily seen as a supplement.\textsuperscript{18}

After examining several GDP alternatives, I believe that the Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare (ISEW) developed by Daly and Cobb would be effective if used on a broader scale. This index not only incorporates unpaid domestic labor, but other economic aspects such as personal consumption (adjusted for inequality). It also includes climate change related factors, such as environmental emissions, resource depletion, and land loss. ISEW has been attempted to be implemented in Australia, Chile, and even the state of Maryland. However, there have been some issues within nations relating to data collection and availability, especially in regards to cross national comparison.\textsuperscript{19}

To ease a possible transition from GDP to ISEW, the hurdle of collecting data to complete

\textsuperscript{14} Jason Fernando, "Gross Domestic Product (GDP)," Investopedia, November 13, 2020, accessed November 20, 2020, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/gdp.asp; UN Women, "Redistribute Unpaid Work."


\textsuperscript{16} Messac, "Women's unpaid work must be included in GDP calculations."


all of ISEW’s categories is admittedly hard to overcome. To do this would likely require either domestic resource redistribution or for entities such as the United Nations or Gates Foundation with more resources to subsidize data collection. If ISEW data could be captured in a variety of countries, it is likely that its use would spread because it could be used for international comparison. However, these comparison issues highlight the appeal of including unpaid labor in GDP. GDP focuses on one economic measure versus a high number of values that ISEW measures. Adding one extra number to GDP calculation is easier than finding the extra time/money/data to implement ISEW in a multitude of nations.

Unpaid Labor GDP Inclusion Data Collection and Analysis

Investments in data collection would be necessary to include unpaid labor in GDP. A survey would be the most effective form of data collection because it could reach a wide audience and get data directly from the households themselves. Surveys could be conducted via phone, mail, in person, or using online panels. Other sources of potential data on benefits distribution and tax information could come from various government, non-governmental, or international agencies. Having a variety of data sources would help to create a full informational picture of the amount and characteristics of unpaid labor within a nation.

Another key reason to collect data is to discern the monetary value of unpaid labor. To assign these values properly, types of unpaid labor would have to be categorized and coded both across and within countries. Additionally, the standard hourly compensation for the type of labor being done would need to be known. Once determined, the hours worked of unpaid labor can be multiplied by the standard hourly pay, so the monetary value of the unpaid labor can be included in GDP. These values would vary depending on the nation, and industry standards would likely vary regionally as well.

The coded survey question responses would need to be stored in a secure database and the identity of respondents would have to be protected. Following careful analysis and scrutiny of the data collected for accuracy (with the aid of machine learning), reports would be drafted. Currently, GDP in some nations such as the United States is released as an advance estimate, preliminary estimate, and a final estimate. This review and correction practice ensures that the final number given is reliable. In order to maintain this standard of reliability, unpaid labor estimates should go through the same process as a component of GDP.

Conclusion

While the question of whether unpaid labor should be included in GDP has not been a major focal point for discussion in policy circles, a dialogue on the issue is necessary. Reexamining traditional metrics ensures that the values we use to define our world are the best possible measures. Constantly challenging current practices leads to either affirmation that the systems we use are working well, or confirmation of the need for necessary improvement. Reexamining the current way we account for economic productivity highlights the need to include unpaid labor in GDP. There is massive benefit for its inclusion such as an increase of the valuation of women in society and a more accurate measure of economic value created by a nation. Additionally, the roadblocks against its inclusion such as concerns over data availability and reliability have been exaggerated and are surmountable with moderate investments. Overall, a change to GDP is needed to improve its accuracy and bring to light the contributions of those who work behind the scenes to keep economies running.

Reconciling Partisan Groups on Carbon Fees and Dividends

NICOLE SHI

Climate change is a serious, complicated, and global problem. According to a landmark risk assessment of both the probability and severity of the consequences of a hotter planet, leading economists estimated an 11 percent probability of global temperatures exceeding six degrees Celsius from preindustrial levels by 2100, which would lead to severe socio-economic and political consequences, and potentially even civilizational collapse.¹ Considering the extreme severity of potential consequences, a consensus has emerged among climate scientists and economists that the scale of current climate change mitigation and adaptation policies are woefully insufficient.² Bob Litterman, a risk manager at Goldman Sachs, echoed the emerging consensus when he noted that “choosing not to price climate risk appropriately is insane. Every generation that follows ours will suffer if we do not brake in time.”³

Economists strongly favor market-driven solutions to climate change. A carbon tax and a cap-and-trade system are the two most common forms of pricing emissions that other countries and states have individually implemented. Carbon fee and dividend plans, where revenue is allocated back to households, is emerging as a popular alternative. It has been called “the most cost-effective lever to reduce carbon emissions” by nearly four thousand US economists, including Nobel Laureates, former chairs of the Council of Economic Advisors and of the Federal Reserve, and former Treasury secretaries.⁴ One proposed bill, the Energy Innovation and Carbon Dividend Act, has garnered bipartisan support with 82 co-sponsors and fueled hopes of passage through Congress. However, adopting any form of a national carbon price in the United States has been controversial, especially given continued partisan and intra-party divides in Congress. This paper looks into reconciliation strategies for parties to help pass the carbon fee and dividend.

An Analysis of Proposed Carbon Fee and Dividend Plans

In 2008, both Switzerland and Canada implemented carbon fee and dividend systems, and the successes of these programs at lowering emissions has attracted international interest.⁵ Several prominent climate organizations back robust carbon fee and dividend plans. The nonpartisan and grassroots Citizens’ Climate Lobby (CCL), for example, has advocated the plan


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for over a decade. The Climate Leadership Council (CLC), an international policy institute founded in 2017, backs “a carbon dividends framework as the most cost-effective, equitable and politically-viable climate solution.” CLC put forth their own plan, called the Baker-Shultz Plan after its primary co-authors, James A. Baker, III and George P. Shultz, who both served as Secretary of State and Secretary of Treasury under several Republican administrations.

In Congress, several bills with carbon fee and dividend plans have been introduced, but to date none have been enacted. Of these bills, the Energy Innovation and Carbon Dividend Act (EICDA) has been the first to receive bipartisan support, a unique achievement amongst all climate bills in the last decade. The bill has four key mechanisms:

1. **A Carbon Fee**: A fee on fossil fuels, measured in metric tons of CO₂ equivalent emitted, would increase energy costs, products, and services by about 1 percent (with annual incremental increases), incentivizing cleaner and more efficient energy sources.

2. **Carbon Dividends**: A portion of the carbon fee would be allocated back to people in equal shares, helping most low and middle-income households break even or get a boost. Dividends would continue to increase along with the carbon fee.

3. **Border Carbon Adjustment**: A fee on imports to hold other countries accountable and protect U.S. manufacturing competitiveness. Exports would receive a refund.

4. **Regulatory Adjustment**: During the first 10 years after the policy’s enactment, the authority of the Environmental Protection Agency to regulate emissions would be paused and would only be reinstated if emission targets are not met.

The EICDA’s primary sponsor, Ted Deutch, Democratic Representative of Florida’s 22nd Congressional District, first introduced the bill near the end of the 115th Congress. He reintroduced it to the 116th Congress, where it was referred to the House Energy and Commerce Committee (ECC) for debate, but did not receive any vote. Based on the success of past bills with the primary sponsor’s state (Florida), assigned committee (ECC), and primary subject (taxation), the EICDA had an estimated 3 percent chance of being enacted. With Congress politically polarized, facing a crowded legislative agenda (two thousands more bills were introduced than in any Congress in forty years) and preoccupied with the coronavirus pandemic, it is perhaps not surprising that the 116th Congress did not enact the EICDA in 2019 or 2020.

On the EICDA’s webpage, the bill is touted as “the bipartisan climate solution” with both parties “on board, cosponsoring this bill together.” Yet of 82 co-sponsors in the House of Representatives, 81 are Democrats and only one is Republican – Francis Rooney of Florida's

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12 This is still higher than the 1 percent average for enacted laws by the 116th Congress, the lowest average in 45 years and an indication of deep disagreements in Congress overall. "Statistics and Historical Comparison," GovTrack.us, accessed December 12, 2020, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/statistics.
19th Congressional District, one of seven original co-sponsors to the bill. This distribution is scarcely reflective of the 116th Congress House overall, which had a slight Democratic majority at the time of the bill’s introduction (233 Democrats vs. 200 Republicans). Thus, understanding the history of both parties’ decision making and perspectives on similar climate bills may help reconcile the clear partisan divide preventing its enactment into law.

**Positions, Perspectives, and Power from Partisan Parties**

While there are many stakeholders who influence the enactment of a carbon fee and dividend plan, in this article I limit discussion to the two groups that play the largest role – representatives of the Democratic Party and Republican Party.

Political history over the last several decades suggests that America’s major political parties have generally had different preferences on policy vis-à-vis climate change. GOP Presidents from Ronald Reagan to George W. Bush supported cap-and-trade, a carbon price policy that sets an allowable limit of emissions to be traded. During this time, the Democratic Party deemed cap-and-trade as a “license to pollute.” Despite opposition from the Democratic Party, Presidents Reagan and George H.W. Bush still managed to pass cap-and-trade policies under the Clean Air Act through Congress in an overwhelming show of bipartisanship. In 1997, despite knowledge of bipartisan opposition in Senate, the Clinton Administration signed the Kyoto Protocol requiring developed country parties to reduce emissions. In response to Clinton’s signal to implement the treaty without Senate ratification, the Senate unanimously passed (95-0) the Byrd-Hagel resolution, declining to ratify the Kyoto Protocol and any other international climate treaty without mandated emission commitments for developing countries and demonstration that it would not cause harm to the United States economy.

Before the Obama administration, the United States Congress had yet to see a carbon fee and dividend bill. During the Obama administration, divisions between the two parties deepened. Conservatives active on climate during the previous administration were alienated when center-left representatives began pairing climate action with other policy proposals. Although passing other agendas within larger legislation is common practice, doing so centralized and narrowed the field of climate advocates to the Democratic Party, bringing about a reflexive opposition from the Republican Party and rendering cooperation impossible. By the time the Democratic Party attempted to pass a cap-and-trade policy within a larger climate change bill, the Republican Party flipped, deeming it a ‘cap-and-tax’ policy.

Identity-based polarization and education levels may explain the persistence of these perspectives throughout the Trump administration. According to a 2017 study, more educated individuals have more polarized beliefs about climate change, with highly-educated conservatives more likely to be skeptical and highly-educated liberals more likely to accept the scientific consensus on climate change. Such divisions among educated political partisans help explain

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18 Alex Bozmoski, “S4CD Summer Fellowship Session #2” (Zoom Seminar, Students for Carbon Dividends Summer Fellowship, Virtual, July 24, 2020).
19 Chris Arnold, “GOP Demonizes Once Favored Cap-And-Trade Policy.”
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why GOP representatives are more likely to engage in climate denial and are more hesitant to back the carbon fee and dividend plan. Given the Republican Party’s long-standing opposition to greater taxation in general, GOP representatives are also more likely to oppose carbon fees in favor of more voluntary natural solutions like planting trees to sequester carbon. Support from Representative Rooney is currently an outlier but may signal the potential openness of center-right Republicans to back a carbon fee and dividend plan.

The Democratic Party has divisions of its own on climate issues, with the center-left more inclined towards a carbon fee and dividend. The far-left acknowledges the existence of climate change and fiercely advocates for its mitigation, but favors more aggressive revenue-raising solutions that would fund government investments in growing the clean energy sector.21 In general, they support legislation in line with a Green New Deal, a resolution introduced by Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and Senator Ed Markey, calling for wealth-generating investments in communities, infrastructure, and technology. Despite a democratic majority in the new 117th Congress, divisions within the party reveal that uncertainties continue to lie ahead for a carbon fee and dividend plan, if reintroduced.

Recommendations for Reconciliation

Actions to reconcile partisan groups on the carbon fee and dividend plan should be targeted towards members of the 117th Congress, as they have the ability to enact it. Interventions made now can make it a priority as they assume office. Because the center-left is the captured demographic already behind the carbon fee and dividend plan, the group should direct interventions towards neighboring groups: the far-left and the center-right. These groups agree on the existence of climate change but disagree on the best strategies. Thus, interventions do not need to dwell on whether to pass any climate policy, and instead can focus on why the carbon fee and dividend is a climate policy that should be passed. Recommended interventions are primarily communication strategies that connect stakeholders to convince and address information needs of the target demographic.

The center-left must first establish communicator credibility and trust of target groups.22 First, communications should prioritize human-centric rhetoric that frames the plan as protecting people and the economy. This type of messaging will be more effective with the far-left, as it aligns with the goals of the Green New Deal. Second, because the plan has such strong backing from economists, communications should also use economy-centric rhetoric appealing more to the center-right, which could emphasize how the policy is a market-based solution that would help maintain American competitiveness and create new jobs. To gain credibility, advocates must also be forthcoming about how the plan affects populations like coal workers, acknowledging that they will be harder hit, but reaffirming that there will be additional effort to aid transitions to other industries. The center-left must also employ two-way information sharing with its target groups by listening to their concerns of and building a relationship.23 They

should also continually communicate their findings and progress to all stakeholders.

The center-left should involve other stakeholders, as they may have separate points of entry and appeal. They should enlist the help of trusted conservatives to work within the center-right. This could include expanding the role of Representative Francis Rooney, as his reasons for co-sponsoring the EICDA and position within the Republican Party may resonate more with other members of his party. Conservatives active on the climate and well connected to the political sphere, like Secretary James Baker, are among other voices to amplify to continue building a coalition of center-right representatives behind the carbon fee and dividend plan.

In addition, the center-left must recognize the crucial role of volunteers. In fact, 63 percent of new co-sponsors on bills has come from volunteer lobbying work. Some experts have found that it takes just one hundred people per constituency to convince their representative to work on climate. While galvanizing such support is not impossible, it will require a reallocation of resources towards right-wing climate organizations, as 99 percent of climate dollars currently go towards left-wing organizations.

Presenting risk analysis will help to settle debates for those seeking evidence on the importance or urgency of passing the carbon fee and dividend plan. Risks should be presented as a combination of probability and severity using both qualitative and quantitative assessments. For the far-left, the risk to passing future climate policies if the bill fails should be communicated. For the center-right, the risk of climate inaction needs to be known. Both create an apocalyptic narrative that may encourage the target demographic to get on board.

Misconceptions preventing representatives from signing onto the bill must be addressed and dispelled. These may be a result of cognitive overload, rumors, and/or misinterpretations. Representatives may not read every bill in its entirety and, instead, will base decisions off of synopses or the opinions of trusted peers. Confusing the carbon fee and dividend with a carbon tax will arouse fears and bring on skepticism. Thus, the center-left should reframe the plan as a ‘free market adjustment’ and draw a distinction that the carbon fee will only be imposed on fossil fuel companies and not people. Some also believe that enacting the carbon fee and dividend means the United States is shouldering the responsibility of other polluters. Counterarguments must stress that the plan encourages international action through the border carbon adjustment and, while the carbon fee and dividend plan is not new and numerous other countries have already enacted similar legislation, most countries still look to the United States for leadership.

Conclusion

The failure to pass the carbon fee and dividend plan through the United States Congress can be attributed to polarized partisan divisions between the Democratic Party and Republican Party. This article has articulated a series of communication strategies that may help reconcile partisan groups to the carbon fee and dividend plan. I identified far-left and center-right congressional representatives as the most persuadable groups to target for reconciliation strategies. As the center-left is the only group firmly behind the carbon fee and dividend plan, recommended interventions are for them to reconcile the target groups by establishing communicator credibility, involving stakeholders, presenting risk analysis, and addressing misconceptions.

24 Taylor Krause, “S4CD Summer Fellowship Session #4” (Zoom Seminar, Students for Carbon Dividends Summer Fellowship, Virtual, August 10, 2020).
25 Alex Bozmoski, “S4CD Summer Fellowship Session #2.”
Cultural intelligence (or cultural quotient, CQ) and linguistic competence are important for the craft of human intelligence (HUMINT) and gaining behavioral and motivational understanding of foreign actors. Cultural competence fosters cooperative international relationships and thus aids the success of foreign covert action operations.\(^1\) In an increasingly globalized world, understanding how cultural differences affect how actors in different countries conceptualize risk can also improve national security leaders’ decision-making over when and in what ways to intervene overseas. This paper, therefore, seeks to understand how greater comprehension of another country’s values, morals, and culture affects the political environment and the potential consequences of covert operations. By utilizing two cultural competence frameworks, presented by William Wunderle and Geert Hofstede, to examine Operation JAWBREAKER and the Bay of Pigs Invasion, we can begin to understand the importance of CQ in the selection and execution of covert operations as well as its influence on a country’s risk perception and their military decision-making processes.

**Background**

Cultural competence is “the ability to understand, communicate with and effectively interact with people across cultures.”\(^2\) According to William Wunderle, Division Chief in the J-5 Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate of the Joint Staff, culture has three main dimensions: cultural influences (religion, literature, language), variations (behaviors and ideas), and concrete manifestations.\(^3\) Such cultural nuances affect an actor’s psychology (decision-making, planning, style of negotiation, risk-assessment) and thus ultimately influence politics.

HUMINT, or acquiring information by deploying and consulting with human assets, “plays a critical role in developing and implementing U.S. foreign and national security policy and in protecting U.S. interests.”\(^4\) Skilled HUMINT agents “both influence the perceptions of important foreigners and provide essential information for covert operations.”\(^5\) By gathering information from people who have more local knowledge and personal attachment (e.g. those with more cultural awareness), HUMINT can leverage “expert elicitation” to boost cultural competency, fill in the gaps in other types of intelligence (e.g. electronic/satellite intelligence)


\(^3\) William D. Wunderle. *Through the Lens of Cultural Awareness: A Primer for United States Armed Forces Deploying in Arab and Middle Eastern Countries* (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006).


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done from a distance, and inform policymakers’ decision-making.\textsuperscript{6}

Decision-making regarding covert operations generally follows the same template as decision-making in other policy domains: create options, predict their consequences, and make tradeoffs among those consequences.\textsuperscript{7} Ideally, this process is ethical and rational, i.e. based on considerations of expected utility such that covert operations are chosen that provide the greatest probability of benefit (success) given the expected risks.\textsuperscript{8} At the same time, some cultures may be more risk averse than others, seeking to minimize the probability of failure rather than maximize chances of success.\textsuperscript{9} Actors’ frame of reference, preferences, and even risk perceptions are highly dependent on cultural nuances and social axioms which can vary across and within countries.\textsuperscript{10} Given uncertainty over risks of alternative interventions, cultural intelligence should enable better predictions of the consequences and tradeoffs of intervention options and thus even shape the formulation of better options. As a whole, increased cultural competence should lead to more ethical and effective interventions overseas with fewer human costs and greater benefits for both the intervener and target country.

Two frameworks are helpful in thinking about the role of culture and cultural values in decision-making over covert operations. The first framework is Geert Hofstede’s five dimensions of national culture: individualism vs. collectivism, egalitarian vs. hierarchical, masculinity vs. femininity, uncertainty avoidance index (UAI), and long-term vs. short-term orientation. The second framework is Schwartz’s seven cultural dimensions (that have some overlap with Hofstede’s): intellectual autonomy, affective autonomy, conservatism, harmony, mastery, egalitarianism, and hierarchy. Each of these dimensions have implications for covert operational decision-making. For example, egalitarian and harmonious cultures value cooperation, see others as equal contributors, and favor decisions that benefit all parties.\textsuperscript{11} By contrast, hierarchical cultures tend to promote the dominance (“mastery”) of decision-makers who are thus more likely to see seeking outside opinions as a weakness rather than strength.

Hofstede’s Uncertainty Avoidance Index (UAI) is particularly relevant to thinking about decision-making and the perception of risk for covert operations. The UAI ranges from zero (pure risk takers) to a hundred (pure risk avoiders). Typically, countries with a lower UAI score tend to be societies that “have fewer rules and do not attempt to control all outcomes and results. [They also tend to have] a greater level of tolerance for a variety of ideas, thoughts and beliefs.”\textsuperscript{12} The United States falls below the global average UAI index, with a 43; Japan, by contrast, has an above average UAI index of 89. High UAI cultures tend to value structure and obedience to authority, avoid risk and debate, and “tend to be more analytical and perhaps better at quantifying risk. The same cultures tend to place more trust in the control mechanisms. For example, cultures with a high UAI score rely heavily on employee integrity.”\textsuperscript{13}

Thus, the framing of decisions and risk management policies can affect different cultures in different ways. Individual actors in different countries may respond to the same decision

\textsuperscript{10} Social axioms can be defined as the “high-level abstractions of generalized beliefs people hold about the way people interact with each other or with things around them.” See Sharon Glazer, “The Role of Culture in Decision Making,” Cutter IT Journal 27, no. 9 (2014): 23-29.
\textsuperscript{11} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{13} Ibid.
constraints (or interventions) in completely different ways. Accounting for those nuances can not only aid in reaching better outcomes but also in ensuring greater probabilities of success in covert military operations abroad. To further explore the importance of cultural competence for covert operations, I examine two separate campaigns that differed in their levels of CQ. The cultural competence in the decision to approach covert operations in Operation JAWBREAKER contrasts sharply with the cultural incompetence that led to The Bay of Pigs.

**Case Study 1: Operation JAWBREAKER**

Just fifteen days after the 9/11 attacks, President George W. Bush approved and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) launched a covert operation, Operation JAWBREAKER, against al-Qaeda and its Taliban supporters in Afghanistan that had provided Osama Bin Laden a safe haven. The CIA tapped Gary Schroen and Gary Bernsten to prepare the operation. These men had high levels of cultural competence. Not only did they have linguistic abilities, but they had also spent years relationship-building with the Northern Alliance leaders and were well-versed in their religious beliefs, political interests, and even their non-verbal expressions.

The CIA advance team had conversations with the Northern Alliance commanders to coordinate the operation. Since the Northern Alliance was composed of mostly ethnic Tajiks and Uzbeks, “the team leads needed to capitalize on their cultural intelligence in order to establish working relationships across cultures and unify them towards a common goal.” As a result, the CIA created a cell with the Northern Alliance to share intelligence (including GPS tracking data) about al-Qaeda and Taliban groups in the north. Lastly, they prepared the ground for US special operations forces to intervene in the Panjshir Valley by deploying “SOFLAM Laser Target Designators (LTDs) in order to call in precision guided weapons from US warplanes down onto Taliban / Al Qaeda positions along the nearby Shomali Plains.”

Cultural competence, namely linguistic capabilities, geographic understanding, and psychological awareness, was necessary to accomplish these various tasks. However, there were not enough people with the necessary competencies to spearhead all these operations so the solution that was implemented was to employ Afghans themselves alongside the US military officers in the paramilitary operations that the CIA implemented. This was the most convenient course of action given that many Afghans had an “understanding of the enemy and powerful warrior ethos and shared a mutual interest with Americans—a hatred of al Qaeda.”

The key to the success of this operation was also dependent on properly approaching and establishing a collaborative relationship with Afghan rebel groups. This relationship could only be achieved through high levels of CQ and a greater understanding of the nuances in

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15 Chip Michael Buckley, “Overt Acceptance: Cultural Intelligence in Covert Operatives.”
16 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 Chip Michael Buckley, “Overt Acceptance: Cultural Intelligence in Covert Operatives.”
20 Ibid.
foreign groups’ understanding of risk and danger.\textsuperscript{21} Northern Alliance commanders did not make decisions based purely on expected utility. Thus, the CIA was able to appeal to Afghan “sacred values,” namely their willingness to sacrifice their lives for a deep-rooted commitment to their nation and religion, thus gaining cooperation despite the big military risks involved. Gaining local allies changed how US forces approached the terrain, reduced uncertainty over local responses to military intervention, and increased the probability of success. In this case, high cultural competence directly contributed to a successful covert military operation.

Case Study 2: Bay of Pigs Invasion

By contrast, the operation to oust Fidel Castro in Cuba that led to the Bay of Pigs fiasco in 1961 lacked cultural competence and was instead characterized by a complete lack of understanding and dialogue between relevant groups. The Bay of Pigs was initially conceived as a covert operation but through an information leak, it became overt.\textsuperscript{22} Since his rise to power in 1959, the United States had a deep distrust in Fidel Castro and his increasingly close relationship with Nikita Khrushchev, the leader of the Soviet Union. The ultimate goal was to overthrow him and to install a pro-American, anti-communist leader (José Miró Cardona). The framework for this operation was drawn up mostly during President Dwight Eisenhower’s term, and was later completed in the beginning years of the Kennedy administration.

The first step in this failed operation was the training of anti-Castro Cuban exiles for an assault landing and guerrilla warfare. The following plan would be to launch, “two air strikes against Cuban air bases. A 1,400-man invasion force would launch a surprise attack. Paratroopers would be dropped in advance of the invasion to cause disruption. The United Revolutionary Front would send leaders from South Florida and establish a provisional government. The success of the plan depended on the Cuban population joining the invaders.”\textsuperscript{23} The plan foundered for many reasons. First, there was little to no accurate knowledge of the Cuban terrain they were supposed to bomb. This led the US air force planes to miss their targets, leaving the Cuban air force practically untouched while alerting the Cubans as to the US’ intentions. Second, the ground invasion force faced poor weather conditions and lacked adequate equipment and were easily run down by the Cuban forces. Third, President Kennedy ordered an “air-umbrella” but the American fighter planes arrived an hour later, “most likely confused by the change in time zones between Nicaragua and Cuba. They were shot down by the Cubans, and the invasion was crushed later that day.”\textsuperscript{24}

The main reasons why this operation failed, however, have much to do with the lack of high cultural competence. The biggest miscalculation was not tactical but resulted from a general misunderstanding of the actual desires of the Cuban people. “Although the key judgment in the Bay of Pigs operation was whether a sufficient number of Cubans would rise up to support the invaders...no one with good capability on the question was consulted and permitted to express an opinion, with the exception of CIA officers themselves.”\textsuperscript{25} In this case, the success of the operation depended on local Cuban support but their interests and likely response were assumed rather than confirmed. The overwhelming importance placed on maintaining the secrecy of the operation led to a lack of adequate planning and therefore a lack of understanding about the risks involved. There was also, contrary to Operation JAWBREAKER, no consultation with


\textsuperscript{24} Ibid.

important Cuban representatives or people familiar with the state of mind of the Cuban people. Also, in contrast to Operation JAWBREAKER, the Cubans to which the United States allied were exiles; they lacked local knowledge or capacity. The limitations of the planned invasion came down to misunderstanding “the Cuban Scene.”

The failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion led President Kennedy to seek a more robust decision-making process. Decisions would now be openly conversed about, benefits and consequences analyzed, and international law considerations made. The importance of diversity in opinion and international consultation would lead there to be “maximum intergovernmental coordination sought out between the various actors, agencies, and branches of government” involved in planning and responding to crises.26 The Bay of Pigs invasion, however, also led President Kennedy to question authority and expert opinions, as he correctly concluded “the nature and the quality of evidence that experts draw on to make probabilistic judgments is often highly variable.”27 President Kennedy overly relied on “experts” who had remained stuck in the old judgments that had existed during the preceding Eisenhower administration, and thus failed to adequately adapt the operation to the change in times. The lack of a structured approach to expert elicitation led to an incapacity to truly adapt the decision-making process to the situational and cultural implications of the time.

Conclusion

Cultural competence – the ability to effectively communicate, understand, and connect with various constituencies – is important, especially when it comes to planning and executing covert operations overseas. Cultural norms and situational factors are at play in all kinds of decision-making contexts, and intelligence operations ignore them at their peril. As this paper has shown, social scientists have attempted to quantify cultural competence. The ways in which cultural competence affect an individual’s (or group’s) willingness to take risk, to ask for help, and even to cooperate with others show just how relevant this is to the outcome of the decisions that are taken in coordination with external stakeholders (such as foreign rebel groups and populations). In Operation JAWBREAKER, high cultural competence led to more consultation and cooperation with local actors, better intelligence, and ultimately operational success. By contrast, in the Bay of Pigs operation the incapacity and unwillingness to have conversations with relevant actors (both in the US government and within Cuba) paved the way for a debacle. At a more general level, these cases suggest that ignoring cultural values and cultural intelligence does not lead to the generation of better policy options or favorable outcomes. Rather, it hinders our capacity to reach a higher level of understanding of foreign cultures and increases the risks of failure and human costs associated with covert operations.

27 M. Granger Morgan, “Use (and Abuse) of Expert Elicitation in Support of Decision Making for Public Policy.”
What General Soleimani’s Death Means for the Middle East

ALINA V. GUERRA

On January 3, 2020, General Qasem Soleimani – commander of the Quds Force, a powerful branch of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) – was assassinated in a US drone strike.¹ Prior to his assassination, Soleimani’s significance as a military leader and prominent figure in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) was largely underappreciated in the West. In this article, I first review Soleimani’s background and achievements to draw ‘lessons learned’ from his career and then I assess the implications of his assassination for Iran, the future of the Middle East, and US strategic interests in the region.

Who was Qasem Soleimani?

Qasem Soleimani was one of Iran’s leading military officers and Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei’s top military advisor. Born and raised in a village in the Kerman Province near Afghanistan and Pakistan, Soleimani from a young age showed interest in the Arab world. Soleimani entered the IRGC after the 1979 revolution, becoming a new recruit trainer following graduation from basic training.² During the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88), Soleimani’s unfaltering leadership earned him a fast track to the top of the IRGC. He became the commander of the Quds Force by 1997. Though Khamenei generally set term limits of ten years for top military and political positions, General Soleimani kept his military command for over twenty years until his death. As Khamenei’s right-hand military man, Soleimani was nearly indispensable in loyally propping up Iran’s theocratic regime and in attacking Iran’s enemies.³ In a 2018 speech, at a memorial service for Imad Mughniyeh – the former deputy leader of Lebanese Hezbollah who was assassinated by a CIA car bomb in 2008 – a fiery Soleimani warned that the “enemy knows that punishment for Imad’s blood is not firing a missile or a tit-for-tat assassination. The punishment for Imad’s blood is the eradication of the Zionist entity” (a reference to Israel).⁴

Assessing Soleimani’s Career and Legacy

As Quds Force Commander, Soleimani turned the Quds Force into a powerhouse of the IRGC designed to project Iranian power throughout the Middle East and diminish or oppose western (especially US) influence in the region. Under his leadership, the Quds force successfully trained, equipped, and financially supported proxy groups, including armed

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militias – such as Hezbollah – in Iraq and Syria throughout their regional conflicts. Already established Shia militia groups such as Asaib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) followed Soleimani’s military lead. Rather than directly attack rivals, General Soleimani cultivated a diverse network of proxy militias (from differing religious backgrounds) and regional governments.5 Soleimani’s regional strategy was “to work with the grain of government power, and thus to co-opt governments from within, fusing militant and state power into a formidable whole.”6 Soleimani thus aided the spread of Iran’s power through indirect means, allowing the IRGC’s strategic planning to involve sponsoring asymmetric warfare across multiple regional conflicts.

With support from General Soleimani, the IRGC militias became heavily involved in Iraq. Since the Iran-Iraq War, Iran has cultivated links with Iraq’s Shia opposition. After the United States invaded Iraq in 2003, Iran filled the vulnerable nation with Iranian proxy forces.7 As the United States battled the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria between 2014 and 2017, one journalist witnessed Soleimani “shuttle back and forth between Syria and Iraq. When the war to prop up Bashar al-Assad was going poorly, Soleimani would leave Iraq for Syria [and vice versa].”8 Under Soleimani, the Quds Force aided in the defeat of ISIS but continued to economically support local militias and fight against the US presence.9 Despite the United States’ designation of the IRGC as a terrorist group in 2019 and the Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” campaign, Soleimani showed no signs of stopping Quds operations beyond Iran’s borders.10

**Aftermath of General Soleimani’s Death**

To many in Iran, General Soleimani was a national military hero and religious protector who aided the Palestinian cause and stood up to Israel. Some even compared him to Imam Hussein, the grandson of Prophet Muhammad, or heroes in the Shahnameh (the Book of Kings). Even many of the Iranian regime’s domestic critics, such as Mahmoud Dowlatabadi, mourned Soleimani’s death.11 Despite the official friction between Iraq and Iran, in January 2021 thousands of Iraqis commemorated Soleimani’s death with protests against US occupation and by reaffirming “the strong bonds between Iraq and Iran.”12

Long before his death, Soleimani had established a clear hierarchy within the IRGC that made the leadership transition less turbulent. After Soleimani’s death, Brigadier General Esmail Qaani, Soleimani’s long-time deputy in Afghanistan, became the new head of the Quds Force. His primary mission is to “expand Iran’s ballistic missiles program and bolster Shiite militia groups” in the Middle East. Like Soleimani, Qaani supports destabilizing behavior as a policy tactic all while avoiding any direct warfare with the United States.13 However, Qaani lacks Soleimani’s charisma and has not yet established the relationships of trust that Soleimani opened with the leaders of Iran’s many regional proxy forces.14 Whether or not this reduces the

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9 Parker and Noack, “Iran Has Invested in Allies and Proxies across the Middle East.”
operational effectiveness of the Quds force in the months and years ahead remains to be seen. Internationally, there has been debate over the legality of Soleimani’s killing as the United States was not engaged in a declared war with Iran, a prerequisite to such military missions. The White House initially justified the assassination as part of the global war on terror and by claiming, without any evidence, that Soleimani was plotting imminent attacks on regional US targets (i.e., US forces in Iraq). Many suspect that President Trump approved the assassination in the hope it would boost his national approval ratings prior to the 2020 presidential elections. The Trump administration hailed the elimination of what it called a huge threat to US security. Yet, Soleimani’s death was not a major element to ending Iranian-sponsored terrorism in the Middle East as non-state proxy actors such as Hezbollah still thrive despite the absence of Soleimani. With Iran’s willingness to exhaust its proxy groups and resources in order to eliminate Western presence in the Middle East, it is not likely that Soleimani’s death will deter Iran from its current political and military trajectory.

Implications for the Future

General Soleimani’s death raised concerns of escalating conflict between the United States and Iran (and its proxies) and the fear that it might put US allies in the region in danger of Iranian retaliation. In response, the US military prepared for such attacks and placed new air defense systems in Iraq to protect US forces there. So far, Iran has not directly retaliated, perhaps because Iran’s leaders fear that a direct retaliatory strike against a major power could backfire, prompting US retaliation that could imperil the survival of the Iranian regime. In all, General Soleimani’s death, while not hugely impactful to the war on global terrorism, has put a spotlight in Iran’s strategic military developments while under his command.

Another major unintended consequence that could arise from the US assassination of Soleimani is that ISIS could become resurgent with greater speed. Within the Middle East, groups like ISIS and the IRGC tend to thrive off of regional instability. A deeper US-Iranian conflict could lead to the US withdrawing from Syria and other regional conflicts – making way for extremists’ groups to exploit these unstable regions and potentially threaten the national security of surrounding nations like Saudi Arabia.

The impact of General Soleimani’s death, however, may not have an impact on talks between Iran and the United States concerning the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). While Iran has lost its major strategic planner, Iran’s leaders must still face stiff economic sanctions that were imposed by the Trump administration on Iran. Thus, while the death of Iran’s major military player may impact their strategic abilities, Iran has a continuing strategic interest in relief from sanctions imposed by Trump’s administration. The Biden administration must deal with a defiant Iran in the wake of General Soleimani’s assassination.

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20 Mona Yacoubian, “How the Soleimani Strike Impacts Syria and the Fight Against ISIS.”
In 2014, Brazilian authorities uncovered an intricate network of bribes and systemic corporate and government corruption headed by the Brazilian conglomerate Odebrecht.\(^1\) Multiple government officials, former heads of states, political parties, and influential individuals in over fourteen Latin American and African nations were implicated in the largest corruption scandal in Latin American history, highlighting the extent and scale of international corruption. Past international corruption scandals spurred members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to enact the Anti Bribery Convention (ABC) in 1999, the first and only international anti-corruption regime to target bribery of foreign officials by multinational firms.\(^2\) Existing empirical studies of the treaty have deemed it a success, yet issues with their methodology and events like the Odebrecht scandal call into question the treaty’s effectiveness. My study improves on prior studies by retesting past results with new data, testing for offsetting corruption by non-signatories that had not been properly addressed, and utilizing a more precise proxy measure of financial corruption, banking monopolization. My results thus offer a better understanding of the overall effect of the convention on international bribery.

**Literature Review**

Although corruption is widely studied, the literature assessing the effectiveness of the OECD ABC is quite small and lacks robust treatment. This literature can be broken down into two camps: optimists and pessimists. The optimists examined the financial and trade flows of ABC signatory states to corrupt states, noting that after its implementation corrupt states saw reductions in economic flows.\(^3\) This suggested that the treaty raised the expected risk for foreign businesses in countries with corruption problems. The pessimistic studies, in contrast, note that the treaty has had mixed results, succeeding in altering firm behavior only sometimes.\(^4\)

There are three primary issues that exist within the OECD ABC effectiveness literature. First, prior studies rely on aggregate economic flows that may only be indirectly related to corruption and are subject to multiple push and pull factors that are only weakly measured by existing regression analyses. Therefore, there is considerable gain in using a variable that is a direct consequence of corruption. Second, prior studies have ignored variation in enforcement of the OECD ABC, which should help to explain which countries’ firms actually change their

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2 For more background on the OECD ABC, see http://www.oecd.org/corruption/oecdantibriberyconvention.html.
behavior or not. Finally, most studies have focused on flows from signatory states, yet they fail
to account for the possibility of offsetting flows from non-signatory exporting states, such as
China, whose firms would have no domestic incentive to halt bribery practices.

Theory

To deter firms from using bribery abroad, the OECD ABC stipulates that bribing firms
are subject to sanctions in the form of fines and possible dissolution. Yet, enforcement of these
sanctions by signatories may vary. In theory firms should not conduct business and trade in
highly corrupt states as their operations there would require bribery to function smoothly.
This means that there should be an observable reduction of trade flow from these OECD ABC
signatories, especially those enforcing the treaty, to these corrupt states as the cost of doing
business in those markets outweighs the potential gains for these firms. However, this reduction
of trade from signatory states may be offset by trade inflows by non-signatory states.

Bribery, rather than being reduced by the OECD ABC, could simply be shifted, as a result of “corruption
leakage.” Like carbon leakage, wherein greenhouse gas emissions in one country increase following an emissions
reduction by a second country with a stricter climate policy, states that have stringent anti-corruption laws may
see their own firms’ involvement in bribery decrease. Yet firms located in states with little to no regulation on the use
of bribery abroad may continue or increase their use of it especially if the market opportunities outweigh their costs.
Thus, it is possible that there is increased trade from non-signatory exporters to those highly corrupt nations as their
firms seek to exploit the opportunities left by the reduction of trade from firms in OECD ABC signatory states.

In addition to trade flows, I argue that banking monopolization should also be
examined, especially in the period of the conventions’ phase 3 (2010-2014) implementation.
The reason for this is that this period generated the most pressure on states to sanction firms
that utilized bribery due to this phase’s special prosecutorial review mechanism, which allowed
for other members of the convention to investigate and publish scathing reports on the efforts
(or lack of effort) of other members. Banking monopolization is ideal to examine the treaty’s
effectiveness due to the relationship between corruption and the formation of monopolies due
to rent seeking. Rent seeking is the attempt to increase an individual’s or firm’s wealth without
any increase in costs or productivity. Corruption is a classic type of monopolistic rent seeking. Often firms will attempt to use bribery in order to capture contracts and exclusive privileges
with government entities and by doing so these firms reduce overall market competitiveness
as they raise the barrier to entry to prevent rival rent seekers from the doing the same. Banks,
like any other industry, have been involved in corruption before and through examining how
competitive a nation’s banking sector is the effectiveness of the treaty can be gauged. In light of
the theoretical considerations outlined above, I developed three testable hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: OECD ABC signatory states' firms will decrease trade with highly corrupt states.

Hypothesis 2: Non-signatories trade flows will offset OECD ABC outflows to corrupt states.

Hypothesis 3: The OECD ABC Phase Three will result in the reduction of banking monopolies.

Design

To test these hypotheses, I created two panel data analysis models shown below:

Model One: \log(\text{Trade inflow}) = q \log(\text{Trade Flows})_{t-1} + \beta_2 \text{Corruption} + \beta_3 \text{OECD Phase Three} + \beta_4 \text{Corruption} \times \text{OECD Phase Three} + \text{Controls} + \alpha + \epsilon

Model Two: \text{Banking monopolization} = q \text{Banking Monopolization}_{n,t} + \beta_2 \text{Corruption} + \beta_3 \text{OECD Phase Three} + \beta_4 \text{Corruption} \times \text{OECD Phase Three} + \text{Controls} + \alpha + \epsilon

My sample size for these models consisted of 180 countries for the period from 1995 to 2014. The dependent variables for the models were bilateral trade inflows, measured in millions of US dollars, and a measure of banking monopolization, which measures market power as a product of a bank's output pricing compared to its marginal costs on a 0 to 1 scale.9

My main independent variables are (1) a measure of OECD ABC Phase Three, which equals 1 if a country was a signatory in a given year since 2010 and equals 0 otherwise; and (2) a measure of political corruption, which varies from 0 (least corrupt) to 1 (most corrupt).10 I also interact these variables, to detect whether the treaty's effects vary by a country's level of political corruption. I also test an alternative independent variable, the level of OECD ABC treaty enforcement, measured on a scale from 1 to 3, with one being assigned to states with little to no level of treaty enforcement to 3 being reserved for states with highly active levels of enforcement.11

In all models, I also control for a plethora of standard variables thought to influence trade flows and banking monopolization, including population size, growth, level of democracy, GDP per capita, the presence of a systemic banking crisis, a nation's level of financial market regulation, the distance between nations' capital cities, de jure and de facto financial flows, de jure trade flows, whether or not the nation's currency was pegged to another nation's currency (currency peg), the nominal exchange rate of a nation's currency, and the percentage of market control that foreign bank have in each nation's markets (foreign bank).12

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10 The data on political corruption reflects rescaled perceived levels of government corruption on a scale of 0-100 by country expert surveys and adjusted measurement model. It is taken from Michael Coppedge et al., V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v8, 2018, distributed by Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project, available at https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemcy18.

11 Data on treaty enforcement is rescaled from Transparency International's 2019 Corruption Perceptions Index, which has a 4 unit range. Data is available at https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2019/index/nzl.

Table 1: OECD ABC Signatory Trade Flow Impact

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) Phase 3</th>
<th>(2) Phase 3</th>
<th>(3) Phase 3</th>
<th>(4) Phase 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All Countries</td>
<td>Low Corruption</td>
<td>High Corruption</td>
<td>Enforced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Flows_{t-1} (log)</td>
<td>0.825***</td>
<td>0.805***</td>
<td>0.766***</td>
<td>0.823***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
<td>(0.034)</td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>-0.010</td>
<td>0.119</td>
<td>-0.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.041)</td>
<td>(0.043)</td>
<td>(0.197)</td>
<td>(0.041)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD ABC Phase 3</td>
<td>-0.171***</td>
<td>-0.137***</td>
<td>0.183**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.027)</td>
<td>(0.028)</td>
<td>(0.089)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption * OECD ABC Phase 3</td>
<td>-0.086**</td>
<td>-0.085**</td>
<td>-0.354**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.033)</td>
<td>(0.033)</td>
<td>(0.147)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enforcement Level</td>
<td>0.082***</td>
<td>0.070***</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>-0.016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.026)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enforcement (dummy)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.105**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.040)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controls</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year Fixed Effects</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Random Effects</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region Fixed Effects</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>42,201</td>
<td>39,130</td>
<td>1,378</td>
<td>42,201</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.001.
Dependent variable is dyadic trade imports. Coefficients for the constant and these control variables are omitted due to space considerations: currency peg, Population (log), Nominal Exchange Rate (log), Growth, De jure Global Trade Flow (log), GDP per capita (log), Democracy, Dyadic GDP per capita (log), Year, and Distance (Km).

Results

Table 1 shows the results of four different models used to test whether or not trade to corrupt states would be reduced by the treaty. Like prior literature, my findings ultimately support hypothesis one as the treaty consistently saw a significant reduction of trade to corrupt states from the treaty’s signatories in most of the models. An interesting finding is that when the trade flows were subset to OECD ABC signatories that had high levels of corruption the coefficient effect was -.35, quadruple the amount of the previous models. This suggests that firms based in these highly corrupt signatories saw the largest declines in trade to other corrupt states signaling a shift in business patterns. Figure 1 shows the variation in the impact that high levels of OECD ABC enforcement have on trade, as states with high corruption saw significant decreases in trade while there was no discernible impact for the least corrupt states.

Although not shown here, I also ran seven models to test for offsetting flows by non-signatory states. These models produced statistically significant negative coefficients, directly contradicting hypothesis two. During this period, non-signatory states also reduced trade with highly corrupt states while diverting their trade to states with low to no levels of corruption. These results were unexpected and could be driven by increased international attention on these problems.

13 Although not shown due to space constraints, I also ran models that used fixed and random effects on both interaction measures and found similar results to those reported here.
highly corrupt markets as the OECD ABC Phase Three investigations were underway or the fact that their export presence may have not been large enough to account for massive outflows of OECD ABC trade. Results from the enforcement level and banking models cautiously suggest unobserved factors are not driving the lack of observed “corruption leakage.”

Table 2 presents three models examining the impact of the OECD ABC on banking monopolization and banking concentration, an alternative dependent variable that examines how much control a nation’s three largest banks has on a nation’s commercial market. Models 1 and 2 examine banking monopolization, and both show a statistically significant negative interaction effect in which the OECD ABC led to increased banking sector competitiveness especially in states with high levels of corruption. To further reinforce these findings, model 3 used banking concentration as an alternative dependent variable. Again, the model suggests statistically significant negative interaction coefficients.

This meant that over time the percentage of market share held by the country’s three largest banks decreased, showing increased banking sector competitiveness. These findings make the most sense because a significant portion of international financial hubs are found within OECD ABC signatory states meaning that these global banks are exposed to the treaty’s enforcement directly.

Conclusion

Corruption has continued to be a pressing issue for international development scholars and policymakers. Failure to combat corruption deters economic development and creation of

\[ Figure 1: \text{Marginal Effect of OECD Anti-Bribery Convention Enforcement on Trade Flows by Corruption Level} \]

14 Although not shown due to space constraints, I also ran two additional models that utilized random effects on both dependent variables with the results being consistent with these other models.
political stability in developing nations. This paper sought to address issues within the existing corruption literature by addressing a specific type of corruption: international bribery on the part of international firms. My results provide much greater clarity and confidence that the OECD ABC’s criminalization of foreign bribery did have a positive impact. This treaty changed the behavior of OECD ABC signatory firms as it forced them to divert trade flows away from highly corrupt states at greater rates to low and non-corrupt states. Likewise, the reduction of banking monopolies in these highly corrupt states further lends credence to the treaty’s effectiveness. Although I hypothesized that the treaty would result in the creation of offsetting trade flows by non-signatory exporters, like China, it was surprising to find the opposite was the case. Since 2010, non-signatories have also avoided pursuing trade in highly corrupt states.

Future researchers can build upon this work in three ways. First, scholars should continue retesting the impact that the OECD ABC has on its signatories’ flows. As more nation’s join the treaty in the future it will alter the way the flows are being directed. Second, corruption research should employ banking monopolization (and banking concentration) as variables that proxy bribery much more closely than the aggregate flow models. Third, although I did not find offsetting corruption, “corruption leakage” should be revisited as this risk grows larger as more corrupt nations gain export shares along with their development.

Table 2: OECD ABC Signatory Banking Sector Impact

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) Banking Monopoly</th>
<th>(2) Banking Monopoly</th>
<th>(3) Banking Concentration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Banking Monopolization_{t-1} (log)</td>
<td>0.443*** (0.041)</td>
<td>0.699*** (0.049)</td>
<td>0.797*** (0.025)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banking Concentration_{t-1} (log)</td>
<td>0.061 (0.056)</td>
<td>0.035 (0.027)</td>
<td>-1.232 (2.925)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>0.027* (0.015)</td>
<td>0.029** (0.013)</td>
<td>0.564 (0.976)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD ABC Phase 3</td>
<td>-0.055* (0.029)</td>
<td>-0.052** (0.021)</td>
<td>-3.445** (1.646)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Controls: Yes
Year Fixed Effects: Yes
Country Fixed Effects: Yes
Region Fixed Effects: No
Observations: 1256
Number of Countries: 91
Years per Country: 13.8

Dependent variable is banking monopolization (models 1 and 2) or banking concentration (model 3). Coefficients for the constant and these control variables are omitted due to space considerations: Population (log), Growth, Democracy, Banking Crisis, Foreign Banks (percentage), De Jure and De facto Global Financial Flows (log), Market Regulation, GDP per capita (log), and Year.

Standard errors in parentheses * p<0.1 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.001.
Foreign Policy Campaign Promises From Truman to Trump

ANTONIO FREIRÍA

Do presidents keep their campaign promises? According to democratic theory, presidents have an incentive to keep their campaign promises to maintain political support, or else risk being punished by voters. However, for voters to hold presidents accountable, they need a better understanding of what affects whether a promise is kept or not because there are times where failure to keep a promise is justified or not the president’s fault. To that end, I study what factors affect when foreign policy campaign promises are fulfilled.

Presidents have plenty of leeway when it comes to conducting their foreign policy since domestic actors have limited influence on president’s foreign policy tools, with the partial exception of economic foreign policy and treaties for which Congress gives advice and consent. However, these same actors can affect how a president’s domestic policy is implemented. Therefore, whether a president’s foreign policy platform is achieved or not is largely due to the president’s actions, not those of other political actors. By focusing specifically on foreign policy, this study can narrow its focus on the factors evaluated and the president himself.

Theory

Among the many factors that could affect when a president keeps their foreign policy campaign promises, this article highlights four major factors.

First, as Pew Research Center surveys have shown, the economy tends to be the main concern for the American electorate. During economic recessions, presidents thus concentrate their resources to handle economic issues and discuss the economy more than twice as often than when the economy is strong. Thus, we should expect presidents to de-prioritize foreign policy matters during economic recessions. Stated formally, the first hypothesis is:

(H1) The rate of presidential campaign promises fulfilled will decrease during a period of economic downturn.

3 There is a large literature on the rise of the “imperial presidency” in the realm of US foreign policy. As a result, Congress’ constitutional war making and treaty making power has also withered in recent years. See Curtis Bradley, Oona Hathaway, and Jack Goldsmith, “The Death of Article II Treaties?,” Lawfare, December 13, 2018, https://www.lawfareblog.com/death-article-ii-treaties.
A second factor that can affect when presidents keep their foreign policy promises is military involvement. When the United States is at war, the president's priorities (in terms of budget and attention) naturally shift to winning or ending that conflict. Military conflict also affects the priorities of the American electorate. For example, the Iraq War became a top priority issue for voters heading into the 2004 presidential election. In war time, successfully attending to other foreign policy matters may be put on the back burner. Thus, I propose that:

(H2) The rate of presidential campaign promises fulfilled will decrease during a period in which the United States is fighting a war.

The US government is characterized by separation of powers between three branches: the judiciary, the executive, and the legislative. While the executive branch is granted many responsibilities regarding foreign policy matters, the legislature also has an important role. Senators have an indirect say in foreign policy decisions by confirming nominees for high level foreign policy positions and, more importantly, by ratifying treaties. This would suggest that if a president's political allies control the US Senate, he should receive more support from the legislature and, therefore, have an easier time completing his foreign policy objectives and campaign promises. Cumulatively, this leads to the third hypothesis:

(H3) The rate of presidential campaign promises fulfilled will increase if a president's political party is in control of the US Senate.

Finally, to maximize their re-election chances a president should complete all his campaign promises. But this fails to consider the timing in which promises are completed (i.e. whether a promise is completed on the first year of a president's term or his last year). It is assumed that most voters depend on campaigns, predominantly media portrayals of a candidate and campaign statements, to become informed on a candidate's policy positions and use issues as a determining factor for their vote. Therefore, presidents should complete more promises during their re-election year so that more voters can see them acting on the issues they campaign on. Theoretically, this would lead to a higher reputation for the president in the eyes of issue-oriented voters. As a result, the final hypothesis is:

(H4) The rate of presidential campaign promises fulfilled will increase during president's re-election year.

Data and Methods

I coded foreign policy campaign promises from presidential debates, party convention speeches, and inauguration speeches for every presidential campaign for 1948-2020. The dataset did not discriminate between presidencies that lasted their full terms and those that did not. However, for presidencies that failed to last their full term, it excluded the period in which the vice-president governed as president. This means that any promises completed during 1964, when Lyndon Johnson was president, and 1974-1977, when Gerald Ford was president, were excluded from the dataset.

8 Data was sourced from the University of California Santa Barbara’s The American Presidency Project’s database, available online at https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/, and presidential libraries.
Presidents made a total of 229 foreign policy campaign promises since 1948. Each foreign policy campaign promise was classified as either measurable or non-measurable. Measurable promises, totaling 153, were those that outlined concrete plans and actions that could be verified for completion. Non-measurable promises were those that were too vague to quantify completion or that lacked sufficient information to corroborate completion. A total of 76 non-measurable promises were made, at an average of 4.47 non-measurable promises per presidential term. The 153 measurable promises were then evaluated on their completion with a four-point scale, with a score of zero for promises that were not completed at all, one for partially completed promises, two for mostly completed promises, and three for fully completed promises. Rather than a simpler binary coding of promises as “kept” or “broken,” this ordinal coding system better accounts for variation in the extent of fulfillment of each promise.

All promises that achieved at least partial completion were grouped according to their completion year, the president who made the promise, and the term number. This grouping was necessary to conduct cross-sectional time-series analysis that would evaluate which factors affect the completion rate of foreign policy campaign promises.

The dependent variable used in the analysis was refined fraction of completed promises. The variable was calculated using the following equation:

\[ \sum_{p \in m} \frac{Score_p}{3N_m} \]

Where \( score \) refers to the level of completion given to every completed promise in that year added up. \( N_m \) equals the total number of measurable promises in the pertinent presidential term. The number three in the denominator corresponds to the four-point scale that measures the completion rate of a promise, in which three is the maximum valuable that can be received. The resultant number accurately represents the percentage of the total measurable campaign promises made by a president completed in the given year, while considering the degree of completion of each promise. This allows the analysis to use an accurate percentage of promises completed each year when evaluating the factors that affect when promises are completed.

A total of four independent variables and up to ten control variables were used in the statistical analysis. The independent variable corresponding to \( H1 \) is \textit{Unemployment rate}, which measures the unemployment rate of the United States each year. The unemployment rate was chosen because it is a good measure of how the general population is doing financially and the state of the economy. \( H2 \), which argues that the completion rate of promises will be negatively affected if the United States is in a state of war, is tested with the variable \textit{designated period of war} which denotes the beginning and ending for periods of military conflict in US history. \( Party control of Senate \) measures whether the president’s political party was in control of the US Senate.

9 Completion was evaluated using a large variety of sources, with preference for official government sources. In addition to those, international organizations and agencies’ archives, academic databases, biographies, and, on occasion, news reports were used.
10 Some promises were based on inaction (e.g. “will not get involved in new military conflicts). For these types of promises, the completion year used was the final year of the term as presidents had until then to break that promise.
11 The grouping signifies that promises had to be completed in the term that immediately followed the campaign in which they were made. For example, President George W. Bush made twenty-nine promises during his first presidential campaign. He had until 2004 (the end of his first term) to complete all twenty-nine of those promises.
12 The control variables were: Age, \textit{Businessman}, \textit{Combat Experience}, \textit{Education}, \textit{First Year in Office}, GDP Growth, GDP per Capita, \textit{Party Control of Congress}, Political Party, and \textit{Socioeconomic Origin}.
13 Data on economic variables were acquired from the World Bank.
and is used to test $H3$. The last hypothesis, $H4$, is tested with a binary re-election year variable that equals one in a president's re-election year and is zero otherwise.

Results

Table 1 presents the results of the cross-section time-series analysis. It includes the four hypotheses and one control variable, Promises. The control variable accounts for the total number of promises made to identify whether it affected the completion rate. The results show that the unemployment rate and re-election year significantly affect when presidents complete their promises, supporting $H1$ and $H4$. This means that presidents complete less of their foreign policy campaign promises when the unemployment rate in the country is high, and complete more of them during their re-election year. Because promises did not become statistically significant, the number of promises a president made did not make it harder or easier for them to complete their promises.

$H1$ proving statistically significant is consistent with the idea that a re-prioritization of policy occurs when the economy becomes weak. It indicates that not only are more resources allocated to handling the economy, but that they are done so at the expense of foreign policy. Arguably, a weak economy means the country’s ability to handle foreign policy matters is weakened, therefore presidents face more difficulties in completing their promises. However, more research is needed to uncover the underlying causes that explain this result.

$H4$ proving statistically significant can be attributed to several reasons. Presidents might decide to complete more promises during their re-election years to improve the electorate’s opinion of them. More media attention is given to the presidential election during the election year since rallies, town halls, debates, and campaign speeches become nationally televised. Since voters have more opportunities to see the candidates during this time, they have more opportunities to see the president achieving his policy goals and completing campaign promises. In theory, this would lead voters to see the president as more trustworthy and qualified thereby increasing his re-election chances. Therefore, by completing more promises during their re-election year, presidents gift their accomplishments larger visibility.

$H2$ proving to be statistically insignificant was surprising. However, this priority could also be reflected in the foreign policy campaign promises made. If the United States is involved in a conflict, many foreign policy campaign promises could be geared towards the conflict, thereby counteracting the de-prioritization of other foreign matters. $H3$ not being statistically significant can be attributed to the president enjoying a great deal of liberty when it comes to foreign policy matters. For example, the Senate’s main foreign policy power is the ability to ratify treaties, a responsibility that has grown less important over time. Since end of World War II, executive agreements, which do not need Senate approval, have become more numerous.

Results from models with more control variables (not shown due to space constraints)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Benchmark model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>-0.06**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War Period</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control of Congress</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reelection Year</td>
<td>0.39***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promises</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.89***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

15 Data on party control of Congress were acquired from official Congressional records.
are largely similar. When added as control variables for H1, GDP growth and GDP per capita, were not statistically significant. The reason for the relationship is unclear, but it could mean that the unemployment rate is a better measure of the state of the economy. For H4, the control First year in office is statistically significant but negative: presidents fulfilled fewer foreign policy campaign promises in their first year in office. This could be due to a focus on domestic policy during their first year in office or a difficulty in completing foreign policy campaign promises. Lastly, Combat experience was statistically significant, indicating that presidents with combat experience completed more of their promises. This relationship could be due to a different perspective gained through experiencing combat or through foreign policy tools learned in the military. Further research is necessary to examine these potential reasons more closely.

**Conclusion**

The analysis conducted in this article revealed that presidents complete fewer of their foreign policy promises when the unemployment rate is high and in their first year in office. In contrast, presidents are more likely to complete their foreign policy promises during their re-election year.

The results imply that, first, presidents act strategically to complete their promises and, second, there is a connection between domestic policies and foreign policies that remains understudied. The results show that presidents prioritize economic issues over foreign policy and complete more of their promises during their last year in office. Strategic behavior implies that winning re-election is a priority for presidents and therefore they will act in a way that maximizes those chances. For presidents in their second terms, the assumption is that completing their promises is beneficial for their legacy and to their successor’s election chances. However, future research is necessary to corroborate this idea. The second implication means that domestic and foreign policies are intimately related, and therefore geopolitical factors can affect domestic policy and vice-versa.

In conclusion, the results provide new insight into campaign promises and how presidents complete them. However, these results should only be considered the beginning and would ideally inspire continued research into campaign promises and when/why they are completed. Future research could build on this investigation by expanding the dataset to include domestic campaign promises as well and to consider whether the factors affecting domestic and foreign policy promises differ. It could also investigate the effect of different economic factors on campaign promises completion, as the variables used in this investigation are only a few of the many possible economic variables available.

"The results imply that, first, presidents act strategically to complete their promises and, second, there is a connection between domestic policies and foreign policies that remains understudied."
What drives or stunts voter turnout in United States elections? Getting American voters to the polls often is a struggle, especially in non-federal elections which typically see a 10-20 percent smaller turnout compared to federal elections. Voter turnout is also greatly affected by voter suppression policies that have become more common and more forceful across the United States in the last twenty years, threatening our representative democracy. States and districts are implementing strict ID laws, voter purges, and inconvenient polling locations and times that have detrimental effects on voter turnout, specifically in minority districts.

The literature has mainly focused on the presence of voter suppression in elections and its correlation with the decrease in voter turnout overall. However, relatively little literature addresses the individual motivations of voters facing voter suppression and how legislators and interest groups can work towards utilizing those motivations to increase voter turnout and combat voter suppression. Does voter suppression motivate or demotivate individual voters and are voters motivated by civic duty or self-interest? In this article, I present the results of an original survey experiment designed to gain insights into this crucial question.

Motivation: Combating Voter Suppression in the United States

The United States has a long history of voter suppression. From the birth of the country, and for many years after, voting rights were restricted to white (land-owning) males. It was not until 1870, with the passage of the 15th amendment following the Civil War, that black men gained the constitutional right to vote. Women only gained the right to vote with the ratification of the 19th amendment in 1920. Even so, voting. In practice, voter suppression through Jim Crow laws, for example, continued to undermine constitutional voting rights.

After years of mobilizing by the civil rights movement, Congress passed the Voting Rights Act in 1965 to enforce the 15th amendment and outlaw discriminatory voting practices. The act banned the use of literacy tests in elections, it provided federal oversight of voter registration in areas where less than 50 percent of the non-white population had not registered to vote, and finally it authorized the US attorney general to investigate the use of poll taxes.


Micah Rabin graduated from Carnegie Mellon University with a BS and MS in International Relations and Politics, with an additional undergraduate major in Decision Science. While at CMU, Micah was the constitutional advisor for student government and served on the University Disciplinary Council and Academic Review Board. She has congressional and non-profit internship experience. Micah worked on a federal senate campaign following graduation in 2020 and is now applying to law school.
in state and local elections. In 1966, the Supreme Court banned poll taxes in state elections. Importantly, section five of the Voting Rights Act prohibited offending districts – those that had a voting tests and less than 50 percent turnout for the 1964 presidential election – from enacting changes to their election laws and procedures without gaining federal authorization.\(^5\) These districts had to prove to the Attorney General (or a three-judge panel of a Washington, D.C. district court) that the proposed change “neither has the purpose nor will have the effect” of negatively impacting an individual’s right to vote based on race or minority status.\(^6\)

Despite the landmark civil rights legislation of the 1960s, which sought to increase voting access, elections did not automatically become freer and fairer. Remnants of restrictive voting laws persisted throughout southern states and new suppressive laws were modified to work around new restrictions. In 2011, Shelby County in Alabama filed a lawsuit that sections five and four(b) of the Voting Rights Act were unconstitutional. In 2013, the Supreme Court decided 5-4 in favor of the plaintiff in \emph{Shelby County v. Holder}, a major blow to voting rights that essentially gave free reign to states to enact suppressive laws with no federal oversight. Within twenty-four hours of the Supreme Court’s decision, Texas announced that it would implement a strict photo ID law. Mississippi and Alabama followed soon after and began to enforce photo ID laws that had previously been barred because of federal preclearance.\(^7\)

The negative ripple effects of the \emph{Shelby} decision are still being felt today. Since 2013, the state of voting rights in America has continued to worsen. Conservative states have taken advantage of the repeal of section five and four(b) to enact strict voter ID laws as well as early voting cutbacks. In 2016, the ACLU found that seventeen states may have restrictive voting laws in place and these laws affect over 110 million people.\(^8\) In 2018 even more states enacted restrictive voting laws, including Georgia, North Dakota, and Kansas. With increasing numbers of states across the United States passing restrictive voting laws it is imperative for legislators and interest groups to find ways to motivate voter turnout despite restrictive laws.

\section*{Hypotheses}

In this study, I focus on self-interest and civic duty as two main alternative individual motives that may explain voter turnout. According to a leading social psychologist, “the self-interest motive is singularly powerful according to many of the most influential theories of human behavior and the layperson alike.” In fact, Quentin Kidd claims that self-interest is the best indicator of political motivation.\(^9\) However, under classical median voter theory models, voting is irrational from the perspective of self-interest. So why do people vote? Eminent political scientists often argue that citizens vote to fulfill a civic duty (citizens fear that democracy will collapse without their participation).\(^10\) I assume self-interest and civic duty are important political motivators and should affect participants’ willingness to vote (even after being exposed to suppression rhetoric) or influence their identification of voter suppression.

I assume that individual behavior may be sensitive to the kinds of information and framing to which individuals are exposed. In particular, I test the following four hypotheses:

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textquoteleft\textquoteleft Shelby County v. Holder.'\textquoteright\textquoteright Oyez, accessed April 23, 2020, https://www.oyez.org/cases/2012/12-96.
\end{itemize}
(1) Exposure to voter suppression rhetoric makes respondents more likely to view tactics in the article read as voter suppression.

(2) Respondents are more likely to vote if exposed to self-interest motivations.

(3) Respondents are more likely to vote if exposed to civic duty motivations.

(4) Respondents are more likely to vote if exposed to both self-interest and civic duty motivations.

Methodology and Survey Design

To test these hypotheses, I designed and fielded a randomized survey experiment. The survey was conducted through Amazon Mechanical Turk and had a total of 723 participants. The 723 participants were randomly assigned into one of five separate groups, four treatment groups and one control group. Each participant was asked a set of pre-test questions, then shown an article, and then asked a set of post-test questions. The four treatments align with the four hypotheses. Each treatment group was shown a vignette that included a quote meant to engage their motivations for self-interest, civic duty, or self-interest and civic duty combined. These vignettes were based off real world news journals that I found to write something that would emulate what the participants would typically read in their daily news. The goal was to identify whether self-interest by itself, civic duty by itself, or self-interest and civic duty together significantly affect participants’ views of voter suppression and willingness to vote.

Results

After reading the vignette, participants were asked to rate their level of concern about voter suppression on a one to five Likert scale (Not at all Concerned, Slightly Concerned, Somewhat Concerned, Moderately Concerned, Extremely Concerned). Figure 1 shows the average level of concern (with 95 percent confidence interval) for the control group and each treatment group. All treatments groups showed more concern than the control group on average (and each is statistically significant at the 0.05 significance level). What is most notable is that utilizing self-interest and civic duty motivations combined was most effective in pushing respondents towards the “extremely concerned” option. Participants were also asked to provide a one-word reaction after reading the vignette. The responses for the combined treatment are displayed in a “word cloud” in Figure 2.

Participants were also asked to share their beliefs about the existence of voter suppression. They could select one of the following statements that most align with their views: any barriers to voting should be seen as voter suppression, only deliberate actions taken to prevent voting should be seen as voter suppression, voter suppression does not exist, or other. Only the last treatment (self-interest and civic duty combined) had a statistically significant effect (at the .05 significance level) increasing views that all barriers to vote should be considered voter suppression. While neither of the motivators individually had an effect on suppression beliefs, the two combined did influence participants into recognizing voter suppression.

Respondents were also asked to select which option most aligned with their views: purging voter lists and increasing voter ID requirements is a form of voter suppression or purging voter lists and increasing voter ID requirements is a way to prevent voter fraud.13

12 The survey was approved by the IRB at Carnegie Mellon University. Funding was provided through the Graduate Student Assembly as well as through the Institute of Politics and Strategy. The MTurk sample was not necessarily representative of the US voting age population. Further research is warranted based on a nationally-representative sample.

13 Voter purges are the mass removal of registered voters rolls without notifying the voter they have been removed. States typically cite lack of voting activity or address changes for these actions.
Only the self-interest treatment was statistically significant (at the 0.05 significance level), with the self-interest treatment moving participants toward believing that purging voter lists and increasing voter ID requirements is a form of voter suppression. Interestingly, neither the civic duty nor the combined treatment had any effect. This suggests that self-interest more than civic duty may be the strongest motivator when comparing voter suppression and voter fraud.

Finally, participants were asked, “are you planning to vote in the 2020 presidential election?”, both before and after being shown the vignette. Table 1 reports respondents’ willingness to vote in the 2020 presidential election. While none of the treatments were found to be statistically significant at the 0.05 significance level, self-interest did decrease the odds that respondents said they planned to vote (significant at the 0.10 significance level). In total, the self-interest treatment changed eight participants’ answers from yes to no when asked if they were planning to vote in the 2020 presidential election.

### Table 1: Are you planning to vote in the 2020 presidential election?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pre-Test</th>
<th>Post-Test</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>664</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>667</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Further Study**

This study creates a foundation for a deeper analysis of the role of motivation in voter suppression’s effect on voter turnout. It could easily be replicated with a larger, more representative sample. Questions could be added to further probe the sources of voter beliefs and motivations surrounding voter suppression and turnout. I also expect a larger sample would produce a better chance of finding statistical significance in the interactions of the key variables that I simply lacked statistical power to detect. A larger sample size would also make the results more generalizable, thus increasing the significance any findings.

Another avenue for future research, building upon this study, is a case study that looks at levels of voter suppression rhetoric in the media and voter turnout for different election cycles. This could be done by further defining suppression rhetoric and aiming to find generalizable...
levels on either the state or county level for the months leading up to an election. This could then be compared with levels of voter turnout and levels of suppression reported to see if there are any significant ties between the two factors. This could further aid legislators and interest groups in the fight against voter suppression and find effective ways to target suppression and increase voter turnout through directed motivational rhetoric.

Conclusion

Voter suppression and low voter turnout continue to be rampant problems in the United States that need to be combatted. Any barriers to voting should be considered voter suppression, including limited access to mail-in ballot options during the COVID-19 pandemic. Without free and fair elections, the United States cannot be considered a model democracy, much less a superpower that can “make the world safe for democracy.”

This study’s findings suggest a significant relationship between self-interest and civic duty motivations and beliefs about voter suppression. The purpose of this thesis was to identify some causal relationship between voter suppression and voter turnout, and the final results do just that. The survey experiment shows a small negative relationship between self-interest and voter turnout, suggesting that self-interest motivates have some effect on reducing participant’s willingness to vote. The study also found that utilizing the motivations of self-interest and civic duty combined was the best way to urge participants towards identifying voter suppression.

Both legislators and interest groups can utilize these initial insights from this study in their continued fight against voter suppression. Knowing that self-interest may reduce a citizen’s likelihood to vote is important when utilizing promotional or media exposure to promote voting. It is also helpful for stakeholders to play on self-interest and civic duty motivations when trying to aid citizens in identifying voter suppression. Knowledge is power, and when legislation cannot be blocked or changed, having the ability to knowingly and efficiently educate the public on voter suppression will hopefully boost voter turnout.
Interview with Dr. Margarita Konaev

Colin P. Clarke and Jure Erlic

Colin P. Clarke and Jure Erlic, then an assistant teaching professor and graduate student in Carnegie Mellon University's Institute for Politics and Strategy, respectively, interviewed Dr. Margarita Konaev on March 2, 2020. Dr. Konaev was visiting CMU's Pittsburgh campus to give an IPS Policy Forum lecture on US military investments in autonomous and AI-enabled weapons and systems. John Chin, the journal's managing editor, lightly edited the interview for concision and flow.

Dr. Konaev is a research fellow at Georgetown University's Center for Security and Emerging Technology, specializing in military applications of artificial intelligence, Russian military innovation, and urban warfare in the Middle East and Eurasia. After receiving her PhD from the University of Notre Dame, she was a post-doctoral fellow at the University of Pennsylvania's Perry World House and the Center for Strategic Studies at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, as well as a Nonresident Fellow with the Modern War Institute at West Point. Dr. Konaev's research has appeared in the Journal of Strategic Studies, Journal of Global Security Studies, and Conflict Management and Peace Science, as well as in outlets such as The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Lawfare, and War on the Rocks.

Jure Erlic: What got you into studying specifically the automation of military AI [artificial intelligence]. What was the background? Why did you choose this for your field of study?

Margarita Konaev: For background, I lead the military applications of AI line of research at CSET, the Center for Security and Emerging Technology. I started there in the summer of 2019. But you wouldn't necessarily assume that would be my field of study based on my previous work, because I wasn't directly concentrating on technology.

I did my PhD in political science and I've written a decent amount on armed conflicts, especially urban warfare. Now, urban warfare is very difficult for militaries to fight and particularly hard on civilians. Studying it, one thing you learn is that urban terrain and the presence of civilians tend to erode the technological advantage of advanced militaries like that of the United States or Israel, for example, when they confront committed groups like ISIS or Hamas in the Gaza Strip in urban settings. My research on urban warfare made me into a technology skeptic, or at least encouraged me to be careful in my own predictions about the implications of AI on international security.

So, when I started at CSET, what I really wanted was to develop a systematic understanding of how AI and related technologies connect to specific military capabilities, and how these AI-enabled military capabilities could influence developments and interests at the strategic level. As a social science PhD, I need structure, a clear organization of relationships that shows me how things connect to each other. And while coming to this world from a more skeptical point of view, I have definitely learned a lot about some incredible technological advances and powerful and exciting developments. But there's also a lot of hype and a lot of fear, as well as many things we still don't know about AI and what it can and cannot do.

Colin Clarke: Can you give us a sense of in your interactions, whether they're with senior leaders or with folks in the Pentagon, to what extent do [colonels] and above understand what you're talking about? Or is it more about going for the shiny object? AI is almost talked about like a physical thing, rather than an enabling function or common thread through different technologies. My general impression is that senior leaders don't have a great understanding.
Margarita Konaev: It varies. The Department of Defense (DoD) takes developing, attracting, and retaining AI talent very seriously, since it’s critical for advancing their AI vision. In many of the conversations I’ve been a part of, it’s also been encouraging to see the room filled with people with a variety of backgrounds – technical experts, engineers, developers, international relations and area studies people – from government, private sector, academia, etc. Each bring a different perspective on AI, and by interacting with one another and learning from each other, everyone gets a more comprehensive understanding of this topic. There are a lot of people within DoD working on AI now, whether it’s the JAIC [the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center], the different AI tasks forces within the services, OSD, and many other places. My sense is that within these circles, there is a pretty clear view of what AI can and cannot do, how it can be employed and leveraged to support US military capabilities and interests.

There is also a lot of interest in AI and emerging technologies among senior political leaders, and here the conversation usually turns to China.

Jure Erlic: Shifting on towards China, is their technological rise all hype or actually is Beijing a real threat to the US when it comes to military organization and the use of AI for military purposes? Or would you say Russia is actually a bigger or more capable threat?

Colin Clarke: Let me put this question in context. I remember many years ago now being at a talk at Rand [Corporation] and the title of the talk was something like “A Tsunami of Engineers.” And this guy came in. He was basically talking in terms of quantity, how many engineers China was producing, and someone raised their hand. And they’re like, yeah, but who counts as an engineer in China? Is it the guy that fixes the Pepsi machine? Are these numbers inflated and does quantity signal quality in and of itself? So, we’re trying to get a sense of, you know, is the threat driving the hype? Or what underlies a lot of that?

Margarita Konaev: CSET has a few reports that estimate Chinese investment in AI, not just military but across different industries. While getting an accurate assessment is difficult, what a closer reading of Chinese language sources shows is that the oft-mentioned figures are inaccurate, exaggerated, or provided without the relevant time frame. So, when you hear a bombastic figure like $70 billion, you have to ask if it’s referring to public or private spending, to AI specifically or to research and development in many other emerging technologies, and if this is an overall projection that covers many years ahead under the best-case (i.e. very unlikely) scenario. On the other hand, some believe that much of what China has accomplished technologically happened through reverse engineering and stealing from other nations; that there is no original, home-driven, domestic innovation and there’s only replication. And that is also not a correct assessment. So, I think, like most things, the truth is somewhere in the middle. Moreover, assessments of technological developments, at least in my opinion, should be contextualized within broader strategic questions, and integrated with broader threat assessments.

Colin Clarke: I remember in the late 1990s and early 2000s, China hawks basically screamed that China is modernizing their military. Ergo, they’re a threat. But when you looked at what some of the modernizations were, what country with that economic progress would not do that? Paying salaries or for all the things that come with training a soldier. We were led to believe by the click bait that they are building aircraft carriers by the day. Then you look at it and a lot of it was personnel, resources, and things that every nation would do, including us.

Margarita Konaev: It’s interesting that you mentioned Russia earlier because in discussions of
technology and national security, Russia usually comes up as an afterthought to China, and even then, mostly from the people that focus on the security side of things; the people that focus on the technology side of things don’t really think about Russia.

**Colin Clarke:** Really? Can you explain?

**Margarita Konaev:** I’m exaggerating somewhat for effect, here. Of course, there is good work out there on Russian military innovation, including in new technologies such as autonomous systems and AI, as well as cyber warfare and information operations. But most conversations related to AI and national security are definitely about China, not Russia, as the main competitor to the United States. And to a great extent, it makes sense because China is investing so heavily in these technologies and has been showcasing extremely innovative and sophisticated AI tools and applications in recent years.

Here, the idea of different cultures of innovation is important. The American culture of innovation has a very high level of tech optimism, and a tendency to see cutting edge technologies as a solution to many different problems. I’m simplifying here, of course, but Americans view tech innovation as full of glitz and glamour. It always has to be the fastest, the most exquisite technology. Russia’s approach is very different. It’s not exquisite. It’s practical. It’s pragmatic. It doesn’t need to be revolutionary; it just needs to work, to be good enough. This approach, to some extent, is fed by the Soviet legacy. But it’s also a reflection of how Russia sees its strategic position, how it sees itself as part of an asymmetric competition with more powerful great powers, and of course, budgetary constraints.

**Jure Erlic:** Social constraints as well?

**Margarita Konaev:** Yeah. In the same way that there are constraints here, there are constraints there. But I think what is missing from the technology-centric analyses of the strategic competition that overlook Russia is a clearer understanding that a technology doesn’t have to be shiny, exquisite, or incredibly expensive to be dangerous and detrimental to US interests. The Russians are also testing their new military tech and semi-autonomous and autonomous systems in operational environments in Syria and to a lesser degree Ukraine, because unlike China, they’re involved in theaters of war. And that operational experience is not a joke.

**Colin Clarke:** You were talking about the number of people focusing on China versus focusing on Russia. If you were to give advice to an undergraduate or graduate student really interested in this space, but looking to get into an area that’s not oversaturated, what areas in your opinion are ripe for study that are maybe undervalued right now? Where you say, look, you can get into this area and really make a difference, whether it’s a specific country, a specific technology, or any kind of combination in there.

**Margarita Konaev:** Interesting. I think there is space to try to understand what some of the smaller, wealthier, security-oriented countries are doing. Like Israel, Singapore, Estonia. These countries – because of geography, politics, and their strategic realities – have developed quite competitive technology sectors and innovation industries with very strong security aspects. I think they would make for good case studies.

“A technology doesn’t have to be shiny, exquisite, or incredibly expensive to be dangerous and detrimental to US interests.”
Not a small country, but a country that will inevitably matter because of its size and its potential, is India. It could be interesting to explore India’s possible competitive advantages in things like data labeling and data cleaning, which are critical for the development of ML [machine learning] systems, but also issues such as AI talent, immigration, and ties to the United States.

I would add that its especially useful to have people who study other countries but also understand policy and politics in the United States. If as a country expert, a China or a Russia specialist, you also have an interest in influencing US foreign policy you need to understand American priorities when it comes to the strategic competition. You need to have some sort of a basic knowledge of how institutions work here, how the military works here, the American innovation ecosystem if it’s about technology. So being able to explain how Chinese or Russian or any other international developments may impact US interests, and what can be done from a policy standpoint – realistically, within the institutional, political, and other constraints – can be a very compelling set of skills and a competitive advantage.

Colin Clarke: I spent 10 years at Rand [Corporation], and I went there thinking I’m going to study terrorism and insurgency. Once you actually got down to it, there were very few projects on those topics. There were a lot of projects – because they were well-funded – on what I considered at the time to be non-sexy topics like security cooperation, building partner capacity, logistics. These topics seemed so boring. But they were crucial to the way I understand counterterrorism now because I read some papers and you get to the policy prescriptions section that say do X, Y or Z. And if you don’t have a good understanding of the way security cooperation works or what Leahy vetting is, or all these other kind of constraints on the broader US military ecosystem, it’s laughable. I think that part is understudied and is less understood.

Margarita Konaev: Moving from academia into the think-tank world, I am definitely still learning about the best ways to cover policy implications and package policy recommendations. You know a decent amount about a certain topic, and you want to make that knowledge useful, but it can be difficult to figure out who you need to speak to, and what you need to tell them exactly to make them hear you. International relations students who have an interest in shaping policy should really be learning about how American institutions work, how policy is made and implemented, budgets, different interest groups, etc. All of these domestic issues are essential.

Jure Erlic: Circling back, you noted earlier that we have been really focused on the US and its adversaries such as Russia and China in regards to their AI-enabled capabilities. But has there been any focus on our own allies’ capabilities within NATO, Canada, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand with their own AI and automation programs for the military?

Margarita Konaev: That’s a good question. CSET has a number of reports on working with US allies on research and development, AI standards, defense collaboration, and ensuring that AI technologies reflect shared democratic values and principles. There is a strong push for collaboration in AI, for working closely with US allies and partners. But it is also important to understand that different countries have different priorities. In Europe, the conversation about AI is not as securitized as here. It’s more focused on industrial and service applications, transportation, finance, health care, medicine. And these defense budgets of most of our allies are much smaller than that of the United States, so there are constrains there as well.

At the same time, there are interesting advances. France and Germany, for example, have AI strategies that talk about leveraging greater autonomy and AI for intelligence collection,
logistics automation, and their personnel management systems. I would say that if we want our alliances to remain healthy over the long run and if we want to talk about interoperability with our allies, working closely together on AI is going to be fundamentally important.

Another challenge in promoting multinational collaboration around AI issues is that it can be difficult to talk about military applications of autonomy and AI without getting into the “killer robots” conversation. There are of course important moral, ethical, and legal concerns about the integration of AI into military systems and missions which deserve our attention. But there is a spectrum of AI applications that militaries can make use of, many of them are relatively benign and have no lethal uses. Discussions about AI in safety-critical systems and where life and death questions are involved also need to be more precise when it comes to the capabilities and limitations of new technologies, the constraints of working inside military organizations that have rules of engagement, that have command and control structures, that already have systems for the production and the deployment of new weapons. Of course, there's serious, legitimate concerns about AI safety, about assurance. These are fragile, brittle new systems that we have to be very conscientious with how we advance with them. But I think its counterproductive to create public panic around Hollywood-type scenarios of Terminator, Skynet, and autonomous drone swarms that can select and kill any target they choose without any human oversight.

Colin Clarke: Interoperability sometimes is more something countries pay lip service to than actually focus on.

Margarita Konaev: Yes, it's aspirational, to a degree. But insofar as we are paying lip service to it, there's an opportunity in certain areas to make relatively non-controversial decisions that could enable our allies to operate better logistics, for example. That only helps us. If they are more prepared, if we are more prepared, then everybody is ready to go when they need to.

Jure Erlic: In regard to this issue of interoperability between allies, what has stalled these kinds of more mundane issues like logistics. Is it just the political structure, the data?

Margarita Konaev: The data is definitely a big issue – lack of data, poor data, siloed data, etc. It's certainly one of the biggest challenges to scaling AI across DoD, and an area where there is a lot to be done – overcoming the fact that data is siloed, different levels of data classification, dealing with the legacy systems that store it, and even the fact that not everything is even digitized. Before you do anything that is related to introducing models and algorithms into the equation, you need to deal with the data challenges.

Colin Clarke: That could be cultural, right? This is my rice bowl. I've seen it firsthand way too many times, just in DoD. That says nothing about doing it interagency. That's just another phrase that gets parroted around. So, you know, there's politics involved.

Margarita Konaev: There's a lot of barriers I think even just to the integration and scaling of AI within DoD, technical, political, bureaucratic, organizational, you name it. Even on things that are considered low hanging fruit technologically because they already exist in the commercial sphere, you would think you can just import, say, a commercial system for predictive maintenance, into the Air Force. No. There are a lot of barriers there. The point that I was hoping to make later today is that nobody really likes talking about logistics because it's boring, extremely complicated, and not sexy. But the thing is that logistics is readiness, logistics...
is endurance, and logistics is survivability. So I would really urge for a rhetorical and almost an emotional shift of what logistics means and why it's so important.

**Jure Erlic:** Talking about the structure of the existing systems in place, you mentioned it's hard to import from private companies. I think a lot of people who aren't familiar with this field have a tendency to think that a lot of the innovation for AI and to an extent automation is coming from private endeavors like Google, Amazon, Microsoft. How true is that?

**Margarita Konaev:** It's true, for a number of reasons. First, AI is a dual use technology. AI is not a weapon. If AI was a weapon, DoD would be leading on it. But AI is different, it's an enabling technology, which has a range of uses in civilian commercial applications where it can be very profitable. So private companies and especially tech giants spend a lot money on AI research and development, while the DoD budget goes to legacy weapons systems, US military operations and presence around the world, and even the research and development budget mostly goes to major weapons programs like the F-35 and much less to science and technology and new tech like AI. Then there is the question of attracting talent, and the Pentagon cannot compete with the salaries that data scientists and AI/ML developers and engineers make in the private sector.

That said, I don't think that innovation has to be exclusively in-house for DoD on something like AI. Although it's not always easy, DoD can work effectively with the private sector and leverage the innovation that comes from there.

**Colin Clarke:** Although we have seen some instances where students or Silicon Valley tech workers refuse to work with Google or for a company that does something with Project Maven, right. There's this cultural pushback.

**Margarita Konaev:** I think that varies. We talk about the private sector or even Silicon Valley as a blanket term, but even within those areas you have massive variation. My sense is that many if not most AI engineers and developers and other AI practitioners who work in the commercial space don't necessarily know a lot about what the Department of Defense does or wants to do with AI, and the different types of projects DoD is funding. The JAIC, for example, is doing some very interesting work on AI for humanitarian aid and disaster relief in areas affected by wildfires which we know are getting worse because of climate change. So if you care about climate change, who do you think is going to be at the forefront of putting out those fires? That's a federal and state effort. You're not going to have Google or Facebook deploying to put out fires, or dealing with disaster relief in Puerto Rico. I think that the DoD needs to understand the private sector better, but the private sector also needs to do its homework. People, individuals, smart kids with AI skills have a whole range of opportunities to do a lot of good in public service of some kind, including national security.

**Jure Erlic:** Regarding this DoD versus private initiative, have we seen this on our adversary side as well? Or has it been mostly state driven for the Chinese and for the Russians?

**Margarita Konaev:** In China, the relationship between the public and private sectors is obviously very different than in the United States because of the nature of the regime and military-civil fusion. Some observers believe this gives China an advantage in the technological competition,
and some even wish to replicate aspects of the Chinese model to ensure that the US government
can benefit fully from the advances made by private US companies. But again, different cultures
of innovation, and even more so, the United States is a democratic society, so people are entitled
to their own opinions and the way that they choose to live their lives. That is a strength; that is
not a weakness. It’s also useful to remember that innovation isn’t linear. If your expectation is
that every project that you fund is going to yield the next incredible innovation and technology,
you’d be disappointed because that’s not how research works.

Jure Erlic: Given your time and experience in this field, have you noticed any major changes
in the trends like the technology that’s being focused on? Has there been any consolidation of
thought surrounding doctrinal developments like on how this is going to be used?

Margarita Konaev: I think it’s still very early. On the one hand, there’s been research on things
that used to be broadly defined as AI that we might now not count as AI. For example, I came
across a paper about AI for logistics for the DoD from 1989. If you read its executive summary,
it reads like it was written yesterday, except that AI in this paper refers to expert systems, which
is more a statistical maximization technique that is no longer really defined as AI, or least not a
machine learning approach which is where much of the recent innovation in AI has come from.
So this paper is from 1989, then the 1990s came and then the war on terror came, and priorities
changed. Now with this resurgence of great power competition, there’s a lot of hype around
different emerging technologies. I can have this exact conversation about direct energy. There’s
a whole different community that’s been around for many years and probably has a budget as
big, if not bigger, than AI and autonomy. It’s also a complicated area where the advancements
are unclear and the trajectory of the science itself remains to be seen.

So I can’t say that I’ve seen anything get consolidated. I could say that there are
interesting technological advances and developments that are being stymied or hindered due to
bureaucratic and organizational challenges. I could also say that there is not enough being done
to understand the drivers of trust in human-machine interactions, which is funny when you
think about the fact that one way or another human-machine interactions are the future of war.
It’s not just machines.

Jure Erlic: Thinking of the future, if you had to place money on a development coming out
of these different emerging technologies, what would you think is the most important for the
military to focus on? Is it AI? Is it the logistical aspect of it? Or is it too hard to pick?

Margarita Konaev: Because I’m practical, I would focus on cleaning up their data, infrastructure,
and architecture. Before you can run, you have to learn how to walk.

Jure Erlic: You think that’s ever going to happen in our lifetime?

Margarita Konaev: Who knows what’s going to happen tomorrow? I can’t say anything with
certainty. I think what it needs is strong advocates from as high up as possible. I think it needs
a secretary of defense who has three priorities and the same priorities, and he keeps repeating
them. And in order to enable those priorities, he makes the internal changes that need to be
made. It can’t be 15 different priorities, where February is AI month, March is direct energy
month, and April is hypersonics. The people who get things done are people who have very clear
priorities they stick to, then they move people around and move money around to make sure
these priorities can in fact be implemented.
The Civil-Military Divide: Five Questions for IPS Military Fellows

ABBY W. SCHACHTER

Abby W. Schachter, a Research Fellow in Carnegie Mellon University’s Institute for Politics and Strategy (IPS), sent five questions to two active duty military fellows in IPS in early 2021. The questions are based on a study of the civil-military divide by Jim Mattis and Kori N. Schake entitled Warriors and Citizens: American Views of Our Military (Hoover Institution Press, 2016). John Chin, the journal’s managing editor, lightly edited the interview for concision and flow.

Lt. Cmdr. Clinton Christofk, the 2020-21 Navy Federal Executive Fellow in IPS, is a career Submarine Officer in the United Navy. He earned a master’s degree in Defense and Strategic Studies from the United States Naval War College in 2017.

Lt. Col. Michael Needham, the 2020-21 Army War College Fellow in IPS, is a career artillery officer and operations research systems analyst in the United States Army. He has a master’s degree in operations research from Kansas State University.

Schachter: In their book, Schake and Mattis express concern about a possible “gap” between the US military and the American public and the latter’s misunderstanding of the military, especially given less than half of one percent of Americans currently serve in the US military. Although the US military has been actively at war overseas since 9/11, a broad swathe of American society, they note, has been largely unaffected by America’s wars. Public respect for the US military may be widespread even while the public’s knowledge of the military is shallow.

Schake and Mattis conclude that public ignorance about the military “contributes to strategic incoherence, encouraging politicians to consider their strategic choices hemmed in by public opposition and to shift responsibility for winning policy arguments onto the military; impedes sustained support for the war effort; permits the imposition of social policies that erode battlefield lethality; fosters a sense of victimization towards veterans that skews defense spending toward pay and benefits; and distances veterans from our broader community.”

Do you agree with this assessment of a pervasive illiteracy about the nature, values, and practicalities of warfare among the general population of Americans? Can you offer a personal example? Before you joined the military were you on the civilian side of this “gap”?

Christofk: I do agree with this assessment. We see this in the way that the public writ large is likely to weigh in on military deployments and interventions. Recently, the administration announced a significant troop reduction in the Horn of Africa. When I read this, I found myself specifically wondering how much of an impact this would have and on what portions of the United States. For example, who are these deployed personnel, and where are they deployed from? Where are the communities they are deployed from? And how has their deployment had an impact those specific communities? Perhaps, most importantly, how many Americans actually know that we have personnel deployed to the Horn of Africa? And do they care?

The media will generally discuss the benefits or weaknesses of these types of deployments and drawdowns as relates to their impact on foreign relationships and US interests overseas, but seldom do we hear about the impact on the communities and families. This can then lead to disconnect between policy positions and those who bear the real, tangible emotional and personal cost of the policy. Being able to accomplish US objectives overseas with small footprints of personnel is probably a good thing. On the other hand, it can lower the threshold of intervention and extend the timelines when there is not a significant cost at home that is generating a political dialogue or demand signal to end some of these operations.
I am not convinced there is a good feedback mechanism given our current structures. Military deployments are certainly not the only area of policy where this disconnect exists.

As to my own personal experience, prior to joining the military, I was certainly unaware of the costs of deployments. At the same time, somewhere around 80 percent of personnel serving in the US military come from military families, and I am no exception. My father was a Major in the US Marine Corps, my Grandfather a Lieutenant Colonel in the US Army, and my younger brother will be commissioned as an Ensign in the Navy in a few months. In many ways this aspect serves to exacerbate any gap that already exists and furthers the separate class of those who serve in our military. I do not believe the onus for correcting any existing civilian-military gap is on the US public. Rather, policy makers and senior military leaders need to be aware of this and help inform the public.

Needham: The mission of the military is to win our nation’s wars. In doing so, Congress provides oversight and relies on the best advice from military leaders in performing this role. Each member of Congress then weighs the input from the military leaders and constituent feedback. After military leaders provide their best advice, they execute the decisions made by the Commander-in-Chief and Congress with available resources.

The public’s understanding of the military is not different than that of other specialized professions with which they may have limited interactions. While most of the American public has not served in the military, their perceptions are shaped by the service of a son, daughter, friend, relative, or acquaintance, or through media and social media. Values like honor, courage, selfless service, integrity, and duty are the foundation of the military profession and are reinforced throughout an individual’s service.

Prior to joining the military, my own understanding of the military was mostly through media. I initially enlisted in the National Guard, and not long after, received an ROTC scholarship. While the outcome of an ROTC program is the commissioning of officers, it also affords the opportunity for cadets to introduce the military across campus and into the surrounding communities. This experience allows them to begin to understand the civilian and military relationship.

Schachter: In their book, Mattis and Schake cite public opinion data indicating that the American public is somewhat concerned about the military becoming isolated from the rest of the citizenry, with 32 percent of respondents believing the military is isolated and 60 percent viewing military isolation as bad for the country. Could the military “come to consider itself a society apart, different from, and more virtuous than, the people they commit themselves to protecting, like praetorian guards at the bacchanalia”? Do you agree that this is a danger for the military? As a member of the armed forces, are you worried? Is there a culture gap in terms of values between military personnel and their families and the rest of the society at large?

Needham: Based on my own experience, I do not feel there is a potential danger of the military being isolated from society. Take the access gates at military installations in the early morning hours as service-members drive to their units to conduct physical training for a good example. The long lines, stacked with hundreds of cars, indicate the large number of service members who reside off the military installation in the local communities.

Service members and their support structure includes many non-military individuals, parents, friends, and neighbors. Many are engaged in the local community, schools, or churches. Their children attend public schools, play on a local sports team and with neighborhood friends, and attend birthday parties. Rather than being isolated, they are engaged with others in society.
Military installations may provide a perception of isolation from the larger civilian community, since they are self-sufficient communities that include housing, gas stations, retail stores, grocery stores, churches, and hospitals. To enter these installations, identification and car searches are often required. But not always. Upon my commission into the army, I recall driving onto Ft. Sill, Oklahoma and looking at the empty guard post building wondering what it was for. When I returned three years later, and after the events of September 11, 2001, guards occupied the buildings, checked identification, and searched vehicles.

Christofk: There is a risk of the US military becoming more and more isolated, and I do think this will exacerbate any gap that may already exist. Like the so-called echo chambers that we have seen increasingly polarize our society, a similar echo chamber could begin to exist in our professional all volunteer force. Our military personnel already have news media outlets and social media platforms that are specifically tailored to their interests and communities (Navy Times, Stars and Stripes, Together We Served, etc.). There is definitely potential for these entities to further isolate the military from society.

On the other hand, it is possible that with information technology and social media becoming a bigger part of everyday life for all people – including those in the military – we might see less of a divide. Although I don’t know the specific figure, it is safe to assume that most sailors, airmen, soldiers, and marines across most ranks use the same social media platforms as civilians. What content they consume on these platforms and if it aids in creating echo chambers or not is likely difficult to assess. While I have not specifically observed these issues, I do think it is a good trend to be aware of and look out for. As to how to correct it if it were to develop, that would be a tough problem.

Schachter: In their book, Mattis and Schake express concern that, given societal pressure on politicians, “we could be moving toward a military that is more representative of the values of the 5 percent of very liberal Americans than those of the vast majority of our fellow citizens.” Since you both now find yourselves engaging with part of the elite community described here in the form of the academy, do you agree with this assessment?

Christofk: This is an especially challenging issue for those of us serving on active duty. One of the reasons the US military enjoys such high levels of the public’s trust, and has for years, is that we have embedded in our culture and regulations to remain outside of partisan political debates. I am generally concerned about any positions that cast the US military as either conservative or liberal. To me, the institution exists to serve the people and the nation. The people and the nation get to drive policies via our democratically-elected officeholders across government. Our political system as a whole has many examples of where minority positions get a say in policy making or can at least hinder majority positions. This is a function unique to our system and was an intentional aspect of our founding. No doubt, having increased exposure to civilian academia during my time at Carnegie Mellon University has been beneficial to my development as a military leader. Specifically, I think that it will give me a broader perspective on some of the motivations behind policy decisions to which I may have had less exposure in my career so far.

Needham: Values are the foundation of the military profession and are reinforced throughout an individual’s service. As each service member enters the military, they bring with them values from American society. These values, and military leaders’ reinforcement of the military’s values,
impacts the climate of units or organizations. Academia plays an important role in the political and public debate, allowing Congress another perspective to inform legislation. It is then incumbent upon Congress in their duty to represent the people of their state or district, to determine what is best for the military. Just as Congress engages academia, the military also engages to positively shape our military.

Schachter: In the Mattis and Schake book, one of the contributors, Rosa Brooks, “argues that the combination of ignorance about, and admiration for, our military inclines the public and the Congress toward funneling defense spending disproportionately toward pay and benefits rather than training or the development and purchase of equipment.” Does this imbalance between spending for pay and benefits vs. other spending manifest in your active duty lives?

Needham: It is more about balance than imbalance. Prior to my fellowship, I worked in the organization responsible for building the Army’s five-year budget plan. With our personal budget, we each manage tradeoffs balancing our needs versus our wants, as well as the realities of constrained resources. For the Department of Defense, the National Defense Strategy guides the priorities and informs decision-makers as they identify risks and tradeoffs. Defense leadership determines the appropriate balance across all programs, including pay and allowances, training, and equipment modernization, and submits it all as part of the President's budget to Congress.

Pay and benefits, training, and equipment modernization support each other. If spending in any one area becomes out of balance, military readiness is impacted. Some pay incentives are aimed at ensuring personnel readiness, that is, there is enough of a specific occupation to meet the needs. Over the past several years, the military’s near-term focus was on increasing readiness across the force and investing in modernization through reforms, while supporting service members and their families.

Schachter: Please describe your own sense of the gap between civilians and military personnel and their families. How significant is the gap for you? What about your family or children?

Christofk: I see some developments in this area that are cause for optimism, specifically from our community here at CMU. For example, we have several junior officers who recently graduated from the Naval Academy at IPS working towards master’s degrees, we have a small but growing cadre of Military Fellows at the Institute for Politics and Strategy (Army and Navy this year, Army, Navy, and Coast Guard next year), as well as the Reserve Officer Training Corps. These programs exist at our best universities across the country and can serve to breakdown gaps and barriers that may develop. Also just having this kind of dialogue helps.

Needham: I personally have not encountered significant issues when meeting new people. For those I have met that have had experiences with the military, there is a common point of departure. For those who have not, it is an opportunity listen to what they may think about the military and discuss my experiences with them. My family has always resided within the local community, and our daily interactions have generally been away from the military. Our transition to the Pittsburgh-area for my fellowship was like our other moves. I have a sister and brother who also served in the military, as well as cousins and friends, so there is a level of understanding within my family. While growing up, I recall the American Legion being involved in several events in communities throughout the year; specifically on Memorial Day and parades during the summer. As well, the National Guard and Reserves play an instrumental role in civil-military relations, always ready to serve when called.
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