Response to McQueen et al.: Theoretical and empirical arguments support interactive processing

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1 McQueen et al. [1] continue to argue against interactive processes in speech perception, but we suggest that their arguments are unconvincing. They inappropriately interpret data that they acknowledge are compatible with interactive processes. McQueen et al. [1] have provided neither a theoretical basis nor a sufficient argument to bring into doubt the evidence that supports interactive processes in selective adaptation (the unambiguous condition in Ref. [6]), as predicted by interactive processing.

2 In sum, McQueen et al. [1] have provided neither a theoretical basis nor a sufficient argument to bring into doubt the evidence that supports interactive processes in selective adaptation (the unambiguous condition in Ref. [6]), as predicted by interactive processing.

3 We suggest that the empirical arguments offered by McQueen et al. are also unconvincing. The failure to find selective adaptation (the unambiguous condition in Ref. [6]) in auditory–visual speech perception: contrasting build-up courses. McQueen et al., which requires an additional decision level and a specialized feedback mechanism that affects information integration [2]. We argue that interactive, rather than feedforward, processing is the algorithm that the brain uses to accomplish optimal information integration. Interactive processing provides a more parsimonious algorithm than the feedforward approach of McQueen et al., which requires an additional decision level and a specialized feedback mechanism that affects information integration. We suggest that the empirical arguments offered by McQueen et al. are also unconvincing. The failure to find selective adaptation (the unambiguous condition in Ref. [6]) in auditory–visual speech perception: contrasting build-up courses.

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References

1 McQueen, J.M. et al. Are there really interactive speech processes in speech perception? Trends Cogn. Sci. (in this issue)