Observations on embedding verbs, evidentiality, and presupposition

This paper discusses the semantically parenthetical use of clause-embedding verbs such as *see, hear, think, believe, discover* and *know*. When embedding verbs are used in this way, the embedded clause carries the main point of the utterance, while the main clause serves some discourse function. Frequently, this function is evidential, with the parenthetical verb carrying information about the source and reliability of the embedded claim, or about the speaker's emotional orientation to it. Other functions of parenthetical uses of verbs are discussed.

Particular attention is paid to the parenthetical uses of semi-factive and factive verbs. It is demonstrated that when so used, these verbs are in no way presuppositional; that is, there is no presumption, or even pretense, that their complements have common ground status. It is further demonstrated that the loss of presuppositionality is *not* accompanied by a loss of factivity: in their parenthetical use, these verbs are non-presuppositional, but still factive. It is argued that this non-presuppositional use of factive verbs provides support for the (minority) view that presupposition is not a conventional property of lexical items.

0. Introduction

In sentences in which a declarative clause is subordinated under an embedding verb such as *say, think, believe* and so on, it is natural to expect that the content of the main clause – the saying, thinking or believing – will constitute the main point of the utterance[1]. But this is not

1.Here are two illustrative cases where this assumption is made, and where it indeed plays a fairly significant role in the theories developed. From Abbott 2000:"Typically the asserted proposition [=what is presented as the main point of the utterance (m.s.)] will correspond to the main clause of the uttered sentence, though of course this is not necessarily the case" (1431); similarly, Wilson and Sperber 1979 (305-306) suggest that entailments of a main clause will automatically be taken as more important (relevant) than entailments of a

necessarily the case. Many embedding verbs allow for what has been called a *parenthetical use* (Urmson 1952), in which case it is the content of the embedded clause which has main point status. An example of this is shown in (1)B.

(1) A: Why didn't Louise come to the meeting yesterday?
B: I heard that she's out of town.

We can assume that whatever content in B's utterance constitutes an answer to the question is the main point content. Here, that main point content is contained in the embedded clause, while the main verb is used parenthetically.[2]

These semantically parenthetical uses of verbs correlate to a large extent with the possibility of using the same verb, with its subject, as a syntactic parenthetical, as in (2).

(2) a. Louise, I hear(d), is out of town.
b. Louise is out of town, I hear(d).

Observations about parenthetical uses of verbs have been made in a variety of contexts in the literature, although not, to my knowledge, in the very recent literature. In this paper, I will bring together these observations, adding some of my own, with the goal of constructing a coherent picture of parenthetical uses of main clauses.

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subordinate clause.

2. I will be using the term 'main point' throughout this paper, without attempting to define it. The strategy used here for identifying main point may be taken as definitional: the main point of an utterance U given in answer to a question is that part of the content of U which constitutes the proffered answer to the question.

Beyond this descriptive goal, however, the paper has a theoretical goal: to consider the implications of these facts for the study of presupposition. The phenomenon bears on the issue of presupposition because some of the verbs which have parenthetical uses are standardly classed as presuppositional. But in their parenthetical uses, they do not show presuppositional properties. I will argue that the phenomenon of parenthetical uses of supposedly presuppositional verbs bears on the question of whether presupposition is to be explained in terms of formal properties of particular lexical items, or in terms of general properties of conversation. In some recent papers (Simons 2001, 2004), I have argued for the latter position, claiming that linguistic presupposition is a consequence of the ways in which speakers use sentences.[3] This view contrasts with a currently more popular idea, that presupposition is a conventional phenomenon, a consequence of conventional properties of particular lexical items. I will suggest that the data considered here provide support for the view of presupposition as conversational. The data also have bearing on a proposal due to Abbott 2000, relating presupposition to non-main-point content.

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3. I am of course not alone in holding this view. Stalnaker, particularly in his earlier published work on this topic, has "conjectured that one can explain many presupposition constraints in terms of general conversational rules without building anything about presuppositions into the meanings of particular words or constructions" (1974: 212). But Stalnaker has always remained staunchly agnostic on this point, and continues in the same paragraph: "But I make no general claim here. In some cases, one may just have to write presupposition constraints into the dictionary entry for a particular word." Some others, who advocate Stalnaker's view of presupposition as constraints on the common ground, have tried to spell out some cases in which these constraints might be conversationally generated; see Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet 2000, p. 354ff., Abusch 2002. J.D. Atlas, on the other hand, has argued consistently for a neo-Gricean account of presupposition, according to which presuppositions are inferences derived on the basis of general Gricean considerations (see, among others, Atlas 1977, 1989, Atlas and Levinson 1981).

1. Main clauses as evidentials: the non-factive case

1.1. Embedded clauses with main point status

Let's begin by elaborating on the claim made in the introduction, that the main point of an utterance may be located in an embedded clause. As noted, I use question/answer sequences as a diagnostic for main point content, assuming that whatever content in the response constitutes an answer to the question is intended as the main point. Given this, consider the examples below. (Note that indications of unacceptability only relate to acceptability as a response to the question.)

(3) A: Why isn't Louise coming to our meetings these days?

B: a. She's left town.

b. Henry thinks/I think that she's left town.

c. Henry believes/I believe that she's left town.

d. Henry said that she's left town.

e. Henry suggested that she's left town.

f. Henry hinted that she's left town.

g. Henry imagines/I imagine that she's left town.

h. Henry supposes/I suppose that she's left town.

i. Henry heard/I heard that she's left town.

j. Henry is convinced/I'm convinced that she's left town.

k. (?)Henry hopes/I hope that she's left town.

l. ?Henry wants her to have left town.

m. ?Henry dreamt that she's left town.

While the responses in b.-j. *could* be taken as meaning that Louise's absence is due to Henry's, or the speaker's, thoughts, beliefs, and so on, the more natural interpretation here

is that in each case, the answer being proffered – with some degree or other of limited certainty – is that Louise has left town. In other words, the content of the embedded clause, not the main clause, constitutes the main point of the utterance.

Of course, in other environments, the main clause could have main point status, for example in the most natural interpretation of the sequence in (4):

(4) A: Why didn't Henry invite Louise to the party?
B: He thinks that she's left town.

This demonstrates the non-parenthetical use of *think*.[4]

The observation that embedding verbs have these parenthetical uses is, as far as I am aware, originally due to Urmson 1952. In using a verb in this way, Urmson claims, "we prime the hearer to see the emotional significance, the logical relevance, and the reliability of our statements" (484). In other words, to use more current terminology, this use of a verb is evidential, a point which we will elaborate on in the next section[5].

Urmson also notes that many of the verbs with which he is concerned can occur syntactically both as surface main verbs, and in syntactically parenthetical forms, as in (2) above and (5)-(6) below.

(5) Louise has left town, I realize / suspect / believe / think / assume / hope.
(6) Louise has left town, I'm sorry/glad to say.

4.Here I differ from Urmson 1952, whose view is that some verbs, including *think*, are always parenthetical. However, he does not explicitly consider issues of main vs. non-main point.

5.Rooryk 2001 similarly observes that Urmson's description "comes very close to a definition of evidentiality" (128).

There are some verbs, however, which allow a parenthetical use in their main verb occurrences, but which do not occur in syntactic parentheticals. One set of cases involves recent coinages. Consider, for example:

(7) a. Jane emailed me that she'll be here next week.
    b. *Jane'll be here next week, she emailed (me).

Another set of cases are embedding predicates like *be likely* and *be possible.* As main verb predicates, they are easily used parenthetically, but they do not easily occur as syntactic parentheticals. On the other hand, there are closely related adverbials which seem to abrogate this latter function. Consider:

(8) Why isn't Louise coming to our meetings these days?
    a. It's likely/possible that she's left town.
    b. *She's left town, it's likely/possible.
    c. She's left town, possibly / most likely[6].

Parenthetical uses of verbs are also discussed at length by Hooper (1975). Like Urmson, whom she cites, Hooper invokes notions of evidence and degrees of commitment in describing this parenthetical use. She calls verbs which allow a parenthetical use *assertives*, adopting this term "not because [the predicates] are themselves assertive, but because their complements are assertions" (95). That is, assertive verbs have the property that, in certain uses, their complements are "asserted," or, as she in one case puts it, carry "the most important semantic content." Thus, my characterization of parenthetical uses as involving embedded clause main point echoes hers.

6.In my dialect, *likely* cannot occur alone as an adverbial, but *most likely* can.

I do, though, differ from Hooper in one important respect. Hooper admits as assertive verbs only those which occur both as a main clause predicate and in syntactic parentheticals. Thus, she categorizes *be likely*, *be probable*, and related predicates as nonassertive. She claims further that the syntactic property of non-occurrence in syntactic parentheticals is correlated with a semantic property: these predicates, she claims, "express a much weaker opinion about the truth of the complement proposition [than assertives do]; for this reason the complement proposition is not an assertion." Now, in some cases, this claim seems straightforwardly incorrect. The speaker of (7)a. for example, which involves a non-alternating predicate not considered by Hooper, indicates fairly robust confidence in the content of the embedded clause. Similarly, the speaker of (9) seems to have at least as much, if not more, confidence in the claim that it is raining as the speaker of (10).

(9) It's likely that it's raining.
(10) I suppose that it's raining.

Yet *be likely* is classed by Hooper as nonassertive, and *suppose* as assertive, simply on the basis of the possibility of using the predicate in a syntactic parenthetical.

However, the real difficulty with the proposed semantic criterion is in Hooper's use of the notion of assertion. As I will discuss further below, it is not clear that an embedded clause is *ever* asserted, even when the embedding verb is used parenthetically. The function of the parenthetical verb is very often precisely to indicate the weakness of the speaker's commitment to the truth of the complement, while assertion generally involves an absolute commitment to the truth of what is asserted. But this does not prevent the content of the embedded clause from constituting the main point of the utterance. And indeed, as we have noted, Hooper elsewhere takes main point status of the embedded clause as the diagnostic for an assertive verb. If we set aside the problematic notion of assertion, and focus instead on the question of what part of the sentence carries main point content, it seems clear that

even verbs which do not occur in syntactic parentheticals can have a parenthetical use in embedding constructions.

So, while I adopt the term *assertive* from Hooper, I use it in a somewhat different way: in my terms, a predicate is classified as assertive just in case it allows for a semantically parenthetical use.

The distribution of main point and non-main point material in an utterance involving an assertive predicate can be more complex than the discussion so far indicates. As prelude to some more complicated examples, note that a felicitous response to a question may, instead of proffering a positive answer, exclude certain answers that may have been under consideration. For example:

(11) A: Why isn't Louise coming to our meetings these days?
B: Well, she hasn't left town. [I ran into her in the supermarket yesterday.]

Now observe that we can use forms with an assertive verb to convey an exclusionary answer of this sort:

(12) Why isn't Louise coming to our meetings these days?
a. Henry, the idiot, thinks that she's left town.
b. Henry, entirely wrongly, is convinced that she's left town.
c. Henry, falsely, said that she's left town.

All of these are ways of conveying both that Louise has *not* left town (and thus, that this is not the reason for her non-appearances); and that Henry mistakenly believes that this is the explanation. In these examples, it *is* part of what the speaker conveys that Henry thinks, or is convinced, or said, a particular thing. However, this thinking or saying is not the main point of the utterances. The main point is carried by the embedded clause; but of course, the

main point is not to assert this content, but to deny its truth. The verb *doubt* can perform the same function.[7] Consider example (13) as response to the question in (12):

(13) I doubt that she's left town.

But in all of these examples, main point content cannot be identified with the content of either the subordinate clause alone or the main clause. Rather, main point content emerges from the interaction between the subordinate clause content and the attitudes to that content expressed by the other predicates used. In the next section, we explore further the role of assertive predicates as expressions of attitude toward embedded content.

1.2. Main predicate as evidentiality marker

As Urmson and Hooper both observe, in the cases where the embedded clause has main point status, the main clause appears to be functioning as a kind of evidential. Evidentials, according to Rooryck 2001, carry information of two sorts: information about the source of a claim; and information about the status of that claim with respect to its reliability, probability, expectation or desirability. This is precisely the information carried by the main clauses in the examples above. Consider again these examples, repeated from above:

(14) A: Why isn't Louise coming to our meetings these days?
B: a. Henry thinks that she's left town.
b. I heard that she's left town.

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7. *Doubt* is one of the verbs which Hooper classifies as nonassertive, on the grounds that (a) it does not occur in syntactic parentheticals and (b) its complement is not asserted. But *doubt* undoubtedly serves in a parenthetical function to express the speaker's attitude toward the embedded content. And as we will see below, this is the typical role for a parenthetical main verb.

Response (a) can be paraphrased as follows:

(15) "The answer to your question might be that Louise has left town. The source of the claim that Louise has left town is Henry; but Henry is not fully committed to its truth."

Similarly, we might paraphrase response (b) as:

(16) "The answer to your question is probably that Louise has left town. I'm asserting this on the basis of hearsay evidence, so the claim is as reliable as my sources."

The oddity of responses k.-m. in example (3) above is presumably due to the fact that Henry's hopes, desires and dreams do not provide very good evidence as to what is the case, and so are not evidence on which answers to a factual question should be based. (On the other hand, if Henry has a reputation as a seer, response m. is fine!)

The previous two examples show parenthetical verbs carrying information about the reliability of an embedded claim. These verbs can also serve some of the other functions listed by Rooryck. As noted above, predicates such as *be (un)likely* and *be probable* provide information about the probability of the embedded content. And in sentences like (17), the main verb indicates the speaker's emotional orientation toward the embedded content:

(17) I regret that your request has been denied.

We will return to sentences of this last sort later.

As we noted above, many of the embedding verbs which have a semantically parenthetical use also occur in syntactic parenthetical constructions. And, again according to Rooryck, syntactic parentheticals express evidential meanings (127). As pairs such as

(18)a-b. are essentially synonymous in the environment indicated, this is further reason to consider that in both cases, the sequence *I believe* has a primarily evidential function.

(18) Why hasn't Louise been coming to our meetings recently?
   a. I believe she's left town.
   b. She's left town, I believe.

These observations raise a further question, however: In sentences like (18)a., is the sequence *I believe* really an ordinary main clause which embeds a complement clause, or is it in fact a sentence initial syntactic parenthetical?[8] This matters for the discussion of semi-factives and factives in sections 2 and 3. One might argue that verbs in syntactic parentheticals are semantically distinct from the parallel embedding verbs, and thus are expected to have different presuppositional properties. The suggestion would be supported by the fact, noted by all the authors cited so far note, that verbs used parenthetically (either in syntactic parentheticals or in apparent embedding constructions) have "reduced semantic content" (Hooper 1975), or "de-intensified" meaning (Bresnan 1968, cited in Rooryck 2001).

Thompson and Mulac 1991 argue that at least *I think* and *I guess* have, through the process of grammaticalization, been reanalyzed by speakers as epistemic phrases, functioning much like epistemic adverbs even when they occur sentence initially. This, they claim, accounts for the observed semantic bleaching, as well as the overwhelming tendency for these phrases, even in apparent embedding constructions, to occur with a *that*-less

8. On some views, including that of Rooryck 2001, syntactic parentheticals in fact *do* embed the related sentential. However, the presumption is that the position occupied by the parenthetical predicate is not the same position occupied by an ordinary main verb embedding a complement clause. For simplicity of exposition, I'll continue to contrast syntactic parenthetical predicates with embedding predicates.

complement.[9] Similarly, Anderson 1986 argues that some embedding verbs have been grammaticalized as evidential markers. He notes that the verbs *hear* and *understand* may be used in the present simple in their evidential function, even when the hearing or understanding occurred in the past, as in:

(19) I hear/understand that Mary won the prize.

The same is true of the verb *see*. These tense-unmarked forms have significantly reduced semantic content compared with the tensed forms of the verbs. Compare (19) with (20) below where, even if the subordinate clause carries the main point content, the main clause is more likely to be taken to refer to an actual event of hearing or understanding (i.e. coming to know):

(20) I heard / understood that Mary won the prize.

The distinction between (19) and (20) makes clear that while some verbs – or perhaps simply some forms of some verbs – may indeed have been grammaticalized into pure evidential markers, others simply have evidential *uses*. Anderson indeed emphasizes the need to distinguish between these two cases. So, even if we adopt the grammaticalization account, this does not entail that all of the cases we are considering involve syntactically parenthetical constructions. In fact, only a minority do.

I will assume in what follows that the cases I am concerned with, which look like ordinary embedding constructions, indeed are such. Two considerations support this assumption. First, consider Rooryck's observation that in syntactic parentheticals,

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9.In fact, it is the frequency of *that*-less complements which supports the grammaticalization claim.

modification of the parenthetical verb with adverbs which require the original meaning of the verb is impossible:

(21) Jules is back, I'm (*really) afraid.

(22) Jules is back, I (*firmly) believe.

This restriction supports the semantic bleaching claim.[10] But note now that such modification is perfectly acceptable for assertive verbs in embedding constructions, even when these are construed parenthetically:

(23) Why hasn't Louise been coming to our meetings recently?

a. I'm really afraid that she's left town.

b. Henry firmly believes that she's left town.

This suggests that in embedding constructions, assertive verbs retain more of their original semantic meaning than in syntactic parentheticals.

The second consideration is simply that some embedding verbs which allow evidential readings do not occur in syntactic parentheticals, or are limited in parentheticals to particular persons or tenses. Consider:

(24) a. Jane emailed me that she'll be here next week.

b. *Jane'll be here next week, she emailed (me).

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10. Another possibility is that parentheticals are fixed expressions which disallow modification in just the way that other idioms do. Either way, the fact that in canonical embedding structures, modification is possible even when the verbs are used parenthetically suggests that the verbs are functioning just as ordinary embedding verbs.

(25) a. I bet / Tom bets (that) they'll reinstate the draft.
b. They'll reinstate the draft, I bet / ??Tom bets.

On this basis, then, I assume in what follows that the difference between a parenthetical and a nonparenthetical use of an embedding verb is a difference only of use, and does not indicate a syntactic or semantic difference.

1.3. Summary so far, and some implications

Let us summarize our observations so far: A rather large number of embedding verbs can be used parenthetically. In this use, the embedding verb has an evidential function,[11] while the main point of the sentence is the content of the embedded clause. Adapting Hooper's (1975) term, I call verbs which allow for this parenthetical use *assertive verbs*. I have proposed that, although some cases of parenthetical uses of assertive verbs may be the result of grammaticalization or may involve special syntactic configurations, a good many are ordinary embedding constructions, and thus we can think of the parenthetical and non-parenthetical uses as involving the same lexical item in the same syntactic configuration.

The question then is how evidential uses of embedding verbs come about. In fact, a fairly straightforward pragmatic story might give the answer. Consider again the following question/answer pair:

(26) A: Why hasn't Louise been coming to our meetings recently?
B: Henry said that she's left town.

The interpreter might find it implausible that Henry's saying that Louise has left town explains her non-attendance. But the interpreter expects the speaker to give a plausible

11. We will see below (p.28) that parenthetical verbs may serve other discourse functions too.

answer. She might therefore conclude (via some inference process) that it is the *content* of Henry's saying that the speaker is proffering as answer. She might further conclude, from the fact that the speaker has not simply asserted that Louise left town, that the speaker herself does not have adequate evidence to make this assertion. The speaker has, though, asserted that *Henry* made this assertion. Therefore, the speaker must intend to present Henry's saying as the source of the proffered answer that Louise has left town.

I don't wish to commit to this sort of account being correct, only to note that it is a possible explanation. It is very likely that this strategy for expressing attitudes towards some content has become conventionalized in the language, so a hearer does not really need to work out the speaker's intention each time she encounters this kind of usage. But this sort of pragmatic account might explain how the usage originates.[12]

Note that this account commits one to saying that the proposition expressed by the sentence as a whole is asserted. This is consistent with facts about agreement and disagreement. Consider two different ways a hearer might respond to B's utterance below:

(27) A: Why isn't Louise coming to our meetings these days?
B: Henry thinks that she's left town.
C: a. But she hasn't. I saw her yesterday in the supermarket.
b. No he doesn't. He told me her saw her yesterday in the supermarket.

In utterance (a), C is responding directly to the main point of B's utterance. But in the denial in (b), C is responding to the claim about what Henry thinks. From the fact that the claim can

12. Urmson 1952 suggests a very different view, at least for some of the verbs here labeled assertive. He proposes that the parenthetical use of some verbs is their *primary* use, with their (occasional) use as "psychological descriptions" being derivative on the parenthetical use. It would be interesting to explore the plausibility of this proposal further, but I shall not do so here.

be denied, it is clear that it has been made. So, even though B's main point is that Louise (might have) left town, her utterance commits her to the proposition that Henry thinks this. This is the kind of commitment which accompanies assertion. Thus, what is asserted is distinct from the main point content. I would want to maintain this distinction even if the account sketched above were abandoned.[13]

My main interest in the phenomenon I have presented lies in its relation to presuppositionality. To see this relation, we must turn to the cases of semi-factive and factive predicates, which we do in sections 2 and 3. However, our discussion so far does have a point of intersection with discussions of presupposition. For our observations seem to undermine an explanation of the presuppositionality of *know* (and other factives) offered by Stalnaker 1974 and echoed by, among others, Abbott 2000.

Stalnaker suggests that a speaker who says "*x* knows that *P*":

> would be saying in one breath something that could be challenged in two different ways. He would be leaving unclear whether his **main point** [my emphasis – ms.] was to make a claim about the truth of *P*, or to make a claim about the epistemic situation of *x* ... Thus, given what "*x* knows that *P*" means, and given that people normally want to communicate in an orderly way ... it would be unreasonable to assert that *x* knows that *P* in such a context.

Stalnaker, presumably, has supposed that *know* sentences are subject to this ambiguity of main point because they entail the truth of their embedded clause. However, our data show that *non*-factives show this ambiguity. Stalnaker's argument would thus lead us to expect that non-factive embedding verbs should require, for their felicitous use, that either their main

13. In making the distinction, I differ from Hooper 1975, and also, I think, from Abbott 2000.

clause content or their subordinate clause content should be presupposed in his sense, i.e. taken to be common ground information. But this is clearly not the case.

There is another theoretical proposal which seems to be impacted by these data. Abbott 2000 proposes that presuppositions (of an utterance) are non-main point propositions conveyed by the utterance. But in our examples, although the main clause content is not main point, we would not want to describe it as presupposed. There may, however, be a difference between these cases and the ones which she considers, a point we will return to below.

2. Semi-factives, evidentiality and presuppositionality

One of the central discoveries of Hooper 1975 is that semi-factives (a class originally identified by Karttunen 1971) are assertives. That is, they have parenthetical uses in which their complements constitute the main point of the utterance. The examples in (28), showing semi-factives in syntactic parentheticals, are Hooper's; the examples in (29) are mine.

(28) a. There are two kinds of factive predicates, I found out.
b. She was a compulsive liar, he soon realized.
c. It was difficult to make ends meet, they discovered.

(29) Why isn't Louise coming to our meetings these days?
a. Henry discovered that she's left town.
b. Henry realized that she's left town.
c. Henry figured out that she's left town.
d. Henry learned that she's left town.

As Hooper notes, the parenthetical use of semi-factives constitutes a problem for the assumption that these predicates are presuppositional, for what is presupposed cannot also be asserted. Hooper, writing in 1975, takes presupposition to be simply whatever the speaker

takes for granted. However, these instances of semi-factives are non-presuppositional also in the sense in which this notion is currently understood by a majority of researchers: as whatever is treated by the speaker as being part of the conversational common ground.[14] It is intuitively clear that in these examples, the proposition that Louise has left town is being presented as new and main point information.

It is well known that in some cases, a speaker can exploit presuppositionality in order to convey some information without directly asserting it. In these cases, a presupposition might become the main point of an utterance. Consider, for instance, the following well-worn example:

(30) A: The new guy is very attractive.
B: Yes, and his wife is lovely too.

The standard story about this example goes as follows: B's utterance presupposes (and does not assert) that the new guy has a wife. By producing this presupposing utterance, B is acting as if she believes that proposition to be part of the common ground. The pretense is intentionally transparent, and has the result that A comes to believe that the new guy has a wife. And under easily imaginable circumstances, B might well intend this as the main point of her utterance.

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14. There are in fact a number of varieties of this "common ground" view of presupposition: see Simons 2003 for discussion. And there are a number of researchers who do not subscribe to any version of the common ground view: see for example Abbott 2000, Simons 2004. However, I think that everyone accepts that, whatever the correct analysis of presupposition might be, it is descriptively correct to say that the presuppositions of an utterance are in some sense backgrounded, and thus contrasted with what is foregrounded or asserted.

Examples such as these show that what is presupposed *can* be the main point of an utterance.[15] So we might consider that, in examples (28)-(29), the complement is presupposed even though it constitutes the main point of the utterance. But it is rather clear, I think, that these examples are quite different from (30). In (30), there is an obvious attempt to be indirect, but this is completely absent in (28)-(29). In the examples in (28), the occurrence of the semi-factive in a syntactic parenthetical makes it completely clear that the main point is carried by the non-parenthetical clause. In the examples in (29), there is simply no way to explain the actual communicative effect by assuming that the speaker is engaging in a transparent pretense that the content of the complement is part of the common ground. So, we must conclude that in these cases, the complement indeed is not presupposed.

Now, it is well-known that semi-factives show variable presuppositional behavior. That is, sometimes their complements are presupposed and sometimes they are not. However, the standard examples in the current literature which used to show this are cases where the expected presupposition disappears along with the factive implication. Consider, for example, sentences (31)-(33):

(31) If Henry discovers that Louise is in NY, he'll be furious.
(32) Why is Henry in such a bad mood? Did he discover that Louise is in NY?
(33) Henry is in a terrible mood. Perhaps he's discovered that Louise is in NY.

It is standardly noted that examples such as these, where the semi-factive is embedded in the antecedent of a conditional, in a question, and under an epistemic modal, respectively, can be uttered both if the speaker believes that Louise is in NY (and believes that his interlocutors believe this too) and if the speaker has no idea about Louise's whereabouts. Thus, in this environment, the complement of *discover* is not necessarily presupposed. But

15. Simons 2004 introduces a distinction between the *ostensible main point* of an utterance and its *intended main point* to deal with such cases.

it is also the case that in these examples, if *discover* is read non-presuppositionally, then it is also read non-factively. That is, on one way of taking the sentence the speaker seems to take for granted that Louise is in NY; this reading is presuppositional *and* factive. On the other way of taking the sentence, the speaker does not treat it as common knowledge that Louise is in NY; but on this reading, there is no commitment whatsoever on the part of the speaker that Louise is in NY.

But the examples in (28)-(29) are different. Here, the speaker *is* committed to the truth of the complement proposition; but, as we have already observed, none of the other characteristics of presuppositionality are preserved. In particular:

(a) The speaker does not take the complement proposition to be common ground.

(b) There is no pretense that the speaker takes the complement proposition to be common ground.

(c) It is not necessary for a hearer to accept the complement proposition *prior* to accepting or rejecting the main point proposition: this precisely *is* the main point proposition.[16]

So, going by the simplest intuitions concerning what it is for a proposition to be presupposed, these appear to be non-presuppositional uses of semi-factives which are *not* coupled with an elimination of the factive implication.

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16. In making this point, I'm addressing the proposal in Stalnaker (2002) as to how to think about informative presuppositions: cases where a piece of new information is introduced via a presuppositional expression. Stalnaker proposes that presuppositions are required to become common ground at some point, possibly after the utterance has been made, but before "it has been accepted or rejected." (fn.14). But in our cases, as the embedded clause has main point status, acceptance or rejection of the utterance would seem to be constituted by acceptance or rejection of the embedded clause content.

In the case of parenthetical uses of nonfactive assertive verbs, the speaker does not necessarily take on any commitment to the truth of the complement proposition if the assertive predicate is not first person, or is not present tense:[17]

(34) Henry believes that Louise left town (but he's wrong).

(35) I once believed that some wars are just (but I was wrong).

In the case of semi-factive assertives, however, the speaker is committed to the truth of the complement, even if she names a third party as the source of the information conveyed. This follows straightforwardly from the lexical meaning of the verbs. An agent can discover *p* only if *p* is true. Now, given that a speaker should assert only that for which she has adequate evidence, it follows that a speaker should assert that *x* discovered *p* only if she is certain that *p* is true. For only under these circumstances can she be certain that *x* discovered it.

Here is a final illustration of the fact that even in their parenthetical uses, semi-factives maintain their factive implication. Compare examples (36)a-b. with examples (12)a-b., repeated from above.

(12) Why isn't Louise coming to our meetings these days?

a. Henry, the idiot, thinks that she's left town.

b. Henry, entirely wrongly, is convinced that she's left town.

(36) a. Henry, the idiot, discovered that Louise has left town.

b. #Henry, entirely incorrectly, realized that Louise has left town.

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17. Cf. Urmson (1952: 492): "What is said to be supposed, regretted, believed etc., by others, or by oneself in the past, is not in general implied to be true or reasonable by the speaker (there are exceptions to this, in each case with a special reason, *know* being an obvious example)."

As we noted, the utterances in (12) can be used to convey simultaneously that Henry believes that Louise has left town, and that this is not true. But this is not possible with the examples in (36). Sentence (36)a. says that Henry is an idiot, but also says that he indeed discovered that Louise has left town. (36)b. is simply anomalous. The bottom line is that the use of the semi-factive assertive indeed does commit the speaker to the truth of the complement clause.

Thus, we observe that in the case of semi-factives, presuppositionality and factivity can come apart. So, for those of us interested in finding the source of presuppositionality in particular cases, it seems that we cannot take presuppositionality to be *simply* a consequence of factivity. However, it seems unlikely that the two properties are entirely unrelated.

3. Factives and evidentiality

3.1. *Know* as an evidential

Hooper 1975 classifies true factives as nonassertive, on two grounds: first, that they do not occur in syntactic parentheticals; and second, that their complements are always presupposed, never constituting the main point of an utterance.

It is the second criterion that we are concerned with, having rejecting the first as a diagnostic. And at first blush, the claim seems to be correct. Looking at the same environment we have used to induce parenthetical readings of nonfactives and semi-factives, it seems impossible to get a main point reading of a subordinate clause embedded under *know* or other robust factives:

(37) Why isn't Louise coming to our meetings these days?

a. ??I know / Henry knows that she's left town.

b. #Henry forgot that she's left town.

c. #Henry remembered that she's left town.

d. #It's odd that she's left town.

But a little further investigation shows otherwise. Let's begin by focusing on *know*; we will return shortly to other factives.

First, consider a minor variant on (37)a.:

(38) A: Why isn't Louise coming to our meetings these days?
B: I know from Henry that she's left town.

This is much better. Moreover, the evidential function of the embedding clause is clear. It identifies Henry as the source of the information, while indicating (with *know*) a strong degree of commitment to the truth of the embedded claim.

The contrast between (37)a. and (38) suggests that bare *know* cannot have a purely evidential reading. But further examples undermine this idea too. The following, for instance, seems very natural. Suppose that we are in a restaurant, and you notice that I keep staring at a diner at another table. Finally I say:

(39) I KNOW I've run into that guy somewhere, but I can't for the life of me think where it was.

(The capitalization of *know* is to indicate that, for me at least, this would be most natural with heavy stress on this verb.) In the context, an utterance of (39) might well be more natural than utterance of the same sentence without *I know*. However, *I know* doesn't seem to add to the communicated content. Rather, by prefacing the (main point) claim with *I KNOW...*, the speaker makes explicit her strong commitment to the truth of that claim. The emphatic stress may serve to bring out the implicit contrast with weaker degrees of commitment.[18]

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18. Urmson, although he gives no examples with *know*, certainly indicates that he thinks that *know* does have a parenthetical reading. In fact, this is one of the cases where he thinks the parenthetical use is primary.

There is another type of parenthetical use of *know*, illustrated in (40):

(40) A: Is Henry coming to the meeting tonight?

B: a. Well, I know that his wife is.

b. Well, I know that he was working in Cleveland today [so he might not make it].

Here again the clause embedded under *know* has main point status. (Note that, *Well, his wife is* would be an answer virtually equivalent to a.) In light of the unacceptability of (37)a. above, it is somewhat puzzling why these are allowable. One clue may lie in the fact that the responses offered here are not direct answers to the question asked.[19] Rooryck 2001 observes that the only parenthetical involving the verb *know* is *y'know*. He glosses this as a marker of current relevance. Similarly, one might gloss the (a) answer above as:

"I don't know the answer, but here is relevant fact which I do know: his wife is coming to the meeting."

If this is correct, then *I know* is not functioning here as an evidential, but does have some kind of discourse function beyond the simple expression of content. We return to other such cases below.

But first, let us try to find an answer to the following question: If *know* can be used parenthetically, and in some cases with an evidential function, why is (37)a. ruled out? I would suggest that the answer is simply that evidential *know* is not informative in this environment. Consider first the first person case, repeated here:

(41) A: Why isn't Louise coming to our meetings these days?

B: ??I know that she's left town.

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19. Hence, the *well*, which, following Schiffrin 1987, I take as an indicator that what follows is a less than maximally coherent response.

Suppose that speaker B had said *She's left town*. Then she would have asserted that Louise left town; and having asserted it without any qualification, would be strongly committed to the truth of that assertion.

Now, what is the effect of evidential *know*? Presumably, to indicate strong commitment to the truth of the embedded proposition. But this effect is redundant in the case at hand. Therefore, an interpreter, looking for a non-redundant interpretation, will take the main clause content (i.e. the knowledge claim) as the main point.[20]

In the discussion so far, I have been assuming "neutral" intonation for B's utterance in (41). (In any case, the same intonation that would be appropriate if *know* were replaced by, say, *think*.) The utterance could be rendered more natural by a change in intonation. For example, suppose we have intonation indicating a tentative utterance (for me, this would involve a rise-fall on *town*), perhaps accompanied by an initial *well*. Then we have a case similar to (40) above. The overall effect of the utterance could be glossed as:

> "Louise has left town; I know this is true, but I'm not certain if it is the answer to your question."

Thus far we have argued that the difficulty of obtaining a main point reading for a clause embedded under *know* with a first person subject is that the parenthetical (evidential) reading of *know* would be redundant. Hence, a non-parenthetical reading is preferred. What about the case of a third person subject, as in (42)a.? Here, we have to consider the contrast with the successful (42)b.

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20. This still leaves the acceptability of an evidential reading of (39) a little puzzling. The heavy stress on *know* seems to play an important role, so we might consider that the stress is what marks it as evidential. This suggests that (41) could be improved by heavy stress on *know*, but I don't have a clear sense of the effect of the change.

(42) Why isn't Louise coming to our meetings these days?

a. ??Henry knows that she's left town.

b. Henry believes that she's left town.

As we have already discussed, (42)b. is a way of proffering the proposition that Louise has left town as an answer to the question, while indicating very weak commitment to its truth. The speaker doubly distances herself from commitment to the truth of the complement. She attributes the claim to a third part (Henry), while indicating that even he is only weakly committed to its truth: he merely believes it. Hence, the parenthetical use of *Henry believes*.. has a definite effect on the communicative value of the utterance.

But what about (42)a.? Because *know* is factive, the speaker commits herself to the truth of the complement whether or not *know* is interpreted parenthetically. The attribution of this same commitment to a third party does not add to this effect. So if the main point is contained in the complement, the use of *Henry knows*... is again redundant. Once again, then, an interpreter will tend to prefer a non-parenthetical interpretation for the main clause.

Note the very different effect of a second-person subject in the same environment:

(43) A: Why isn't Louise coming to our meetings these days?

B: Y'know she's left town.

This is a way of giving *She's left town* as an answer, while also indicating that this is something the questioner already knows, or should already know.

The point of this extended discussion of *know* is to show that parenthetical readings of this verb are possible. Certainly, its factivity does not rule out such a function; nor would we expect it too, given the observation in the previous section that parenthetical readings of semi-factives are compatible with their factive implication.

We have also seen, though, that the availability of parenthetical (evidential) readings for *know* is limited by its particular evidential function, which in turn is a consequence of its particular lexical meaning. Hooper observes that factives and semi-factives have meanings of different sorts: factives "express a subjective attitude about the complement proposition" while semifactives "describe processes of knowing or coming to know" or, in the case of *reveal*, for example, processes of "letting someone else 'come to know'" (117). It's clear that the latter sort of meaning will be more useful in conveying evidential information. Hooper claims that it is this meaning difference which explains why semi-factives are assertives, but true factives are not. My discussion shows that factives *are* assertives, in my use of this term, i.e. to denote predicates which can serve a parenthetical function. But Hooper is no doubt correct that the difference in meaning between the two classes of verbs accounts for the more limited evidential usage of true factives.

3.2. Other factives

With the importance of the specific content of particular verbs in mind, let's look at the other examples we constructed where a main point reading of a clause embedded under a factive seemed impossible. I repeat the examples here:

(44) Why isn't Louise coming to our meetings these days?

a. #Henry forgot that she's left town.

b. #Henry remembered that she's left town.

c. #It's odd that she's left town.

In each of these cases, the lexical content of the main predicate seems to exclude an evidential reading. Beginning with the *forgot* case: If Henry has forgotten that Louise has left town, then it is hard to see how he could be the source of the information that she has. The *remember* case is less obvious. My hunch here is that the predicate gives us too much detail

about the subject's epistemic relation to the embedded proposition for it to have a purely evidential function. *It's odd that...*, on the other hand, just doesn't have any evidential content at all.

So, my argument is that the factivity of these verbs is not what excludes a parenthetical reading. Rather, we are looking at an environment in which a parenthetical reading would have to be evidential; but the lexical content of the verbs rules out an evidential reading, at least in the context under consideration.

It is not hard, however, to find other kinds of parenthetical readings for these verbs.

(45) Yikes! I just remembered/realized that I didn't turn off the stove!

(46) Sorry, we're going to have to change our plans for dinner tonight.

a. Henry forgot that he has an evening appointment.

b. Henry just realized/remembered that he has an evening appointment.

In these cases, the main verb doesn't have an evidential function, but does seem to have some kind of utterance modifier or discourse coherence function. For example, (45) seems to have an effect along these lines:

"I didn't turn off the stove; and the reason I'm saying this out of the blue is that I just remembered/realized it."

Similarly, the effect of (46)a. might be glossed as follows:

"We can't come to dinner because Henry has an evening appointment; and the reason I didn't tell you until know is that Henry forgot about it."[21]

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21. Cf:

(i) I forget – is Louise a vegetarian?

(ii) Is Louise a vegetarian? – I forget.

Here, *I forget* seems glossable as follows: "I know you expect me to know the answer to this question; I'm asking because I have forgotten." Note the simple present form of *forget*,

This collection of examples suggests that a parenthetical interpretation for a main clause predicate is possible whenever that predicate can be interpreted as doing something other than – or perhaps, in addition to – conveying what we might call 'informational content'.

This brings us back to a point raised earlier (see p.17), concerning Abbott's (2000) account of presuppositions as non-main point propositions conveyed by an utterance. As observed above, in our cases where the embedded clause has main point status, there is no intuition that the remaining, non-main point content is presupposed. But perhaps there is a difference between my cases, and those which Abbott discusses. Consider one of the (many) sorts of cases which Abbott discusses: the case of non-restrictive relatives:

(47) Jane, who once supported the Republicans, is now a committed Democrat.

The relative clause seems to be a vehicle for informational content, just like the main clause. The distribution of the information between a relative clause and a main clause gives the hearer information as to what is main point, and what is backgrounded. But perhaps it is only because both clauses convey the same kind of content that this relation of foregrounding and backgrounding can hold. In the cases of utterances with parenthetical verbs, I have suggested that the situation is different: the two clauses convey two different types of content. Hence, there is no need, as it were, to treat the content of one as foreground, and of the other as background; in fact, there is perhaps no sensible way to do this. Hence, we get no presuppositional effects in this case. The substantive proposal being made here is that the presupposition/assertion distinction can hold only between sentence contents of the same sort. But as sentences can convey different types of content, we may find – as we seem to do here – cases where the main point/non-main point relation does not map onto the assertion/presupposition relation.

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indicating grammaticalization. (See Anderson 1986.)

3.3. Embedded announcements

In addition to the sorts of cases considered so far, there is another familiar case where the complement of a factive verb has main point status. This is the case of embedded announcements, as in (48)-(51):

(48) We regret that children cannot accompany their parents to commencement exercises. (Karttunen 1974: ex.26a.)

(49) We regret to inform you that your insurance policy is hereby cancelled.

(50) I'm afraid that your insurance policy has been cancelled.

(51) We are pleased to announce that your visa has been renewed.

Such cases have been the subject of a fair amount of discussion, because, like the other cases of parenthetical factives discussed here, they seem to challenge the claim that factive verbs are conventionally presuppositional in the sense of requiring their complement to be (treated as) common ground. Responses to this challenge generally observe that these are polite forms, and propose that they involve some kind of pretense, on the part of the speaker, that the main point is other than it actually is. Even Abbott, despite her alternative take on the nature of presuppositionality, advocates a treatment along these lines. She claims that in examples like (49), "the form of utterance...presents the regret as what is being asserted,"[22] although real world knowledge tells us that "the fact that an insurance policy is cancelled is much more important than the fact, or pretense, that the insurers are unhappy about the cancellation" (1430). So, the suggestion goes, real world knowledge allows the interpreter to identify a main point which is 'concealed' by the grammatical form.

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22. Note here Abbott's conflation of what is asserted with what is main point. I agree with her that the regret is what is asserted. But I deny that this has anything to do with identification of the main point content.

However, we have by now seen a host of examples of sentences which easily allow for a main point interpretation of their embedded clause, and without any sense that some pretense – even a transparent one – is involved. It would seem most natural to consider embedded announcements as another such case, and to deny that the complement clauses are in any sense presupposed. This suggestion is, I think, reinforced by the observation that the main verbs in (48)-(51) appear to serve the same function as the parentheticals and adverbials in the following, cases which Rooryck calls *surprisals*.

(52) Regrettably, children cannot accompany their parents...
(53) Your insurance policy has been cancelled, I'm afraid.
(54) Your visa has been renewed, we are pleased to inform you.

Indeed Urmson, unfettered by current assumptions concerning factivity and presuppositionality, offers *regret* as a central example of a parenthetical verb. It is used, Urmson says, to indicate the emotional orientation of the speaker towards the content of the embedded clause, whose content constitutes the main point of the utterance.

In light of the data presented here, then, it is rather clear that embedded announcements are not an anomaly. They are rather one of many cases where a predicate which is in some cases presuppositional turns out not to be in a particular discourse environment.

4. General conclusions for the study of presupposition

But this point also extends to the many other cases we have seen where the complement of a supposedly presuppositional predicate constitutes the main point of an utterance. To reiterate the point made above with respect to parenthetical uses of semifactives: When factives are used parenthetically, as in for example, (38)-(40) and (45)-(46), the speaker is in no sense treating the complement as "given": it is not being treated as if it were common ground, and there is no pretense that it is being so treated. But this content is also not

presuppositional in the sense of Abbott 2000: it *is* main point content. From a descriptive point of view, the most natural thing to say is that when the main clause predicate is used parenthetically, the complement clause is not presupposed.

Many researchers consider the presuppositionality of verbs such as *know, realize* and *forget* to be a lexical property which imposes strict definedness conditions on utterances which contain them. According to satisfaction theories of presupposition (e.g. Heim 1983, 1992), the presuppositionality of a (semi)factive consists in a formal requirement that the content of its complement be entailed by the context to which the asserted proposition is added. According to the presupposition-as-anaphora theory of Van der Sandt (1992), presuppositionality consists in a requirement that the content of the complement have an anaphoric antecedent in the Discourse Representation Structure to which it is added. In both theories, the requirements may be fulfilled via accommodation, a process whereby the necessary updates are made (in some sense) prior to processing of the presupposing sentence. The observations made here are compatible with the claim that this formal requirement is in force, but only if we disconnect the formal requirements from intuitions of backgrounding, being taken for granted, and so on. And this would seem, in turn, to undermine the appeal of such theories.

But indeed the data seem problematic for any view of presupposition as a lexical or conventional property of particular items, for they suggest (as do many other kinds of data) that many cases of presupposition have a "now-you-see-it-now-you-don't" character. These data in particular suggest that the presuppositionality of an embedding verb is crucially tied to its function in the discourse. And this kind of variability is just what we expect of phenomena which are a consequence of conversational processes and constraints.

The alternative open to advocates of the presupposition-as-lexical-requirement view is to take verbs in their parenthetical functions to be lexically distinct from the homophonous verbs in their fully "lexical" functions: that is, to say that parenthetical *know* is a distinct lexical item from non-parenthetical *know*. We considered evidence for and against this

position earlier, when we examined the question of whether sentence-inital occurrences of parenthetical verbs should be treated as ordinary embedding predicates. (See p.11ff. for discussion.) The principal argument for that position is the lexical bleaching observed in parenthetical uses of verbs. But as we observed above, the fact that adverbial modification of assertive verbs is possible (as in (55), repeated from above) suggests that ordinary lexical content is preserved to some degree.

(55) Henry firmly believes that Louise has left town.

Moreover, as we've now seen, the lexical content of verbs plays a crucial role in the sort of parenthetical use available: *regret* and *realize*, for example, have different parenthetical uses because their lexical contents differ. So, there is obviously a connection between nonparenthetical *regret* and its parenthetical cousin.

And in fact, all kinds of words allow for more or less "literal" applications. Here are two random examples. First, consider the verb *run* in (56)-(57):

(56) I'm going to run out and get some milk.
(57) Would you run upstairs and get me a blanket?

In both cases, *run* seems to be semantically bleached, meaning something very close to *go*, but perhaps with an added sense of urgency or speed. Second, consider the word *dog*. We would normally assume that to be a dog is to be animate. But of course I can also call a stuffed toy a dog, without incurring any commitment that it is animate. These are merely illustrations of the fact that lexical meaning is extremely flexible, and thus it seems foolhardy to posit new lexical entries for every new use of an item that we encounter.

A final consideration against the idea that parenthetical uses of verbs involve distinct lexical items is that the parenthetical use of predicates is productive; even recent coinages can be so used. Consider:

(58) A: When d'you expect to see Jane next?
B: She emailed / faxed / text-messaged me that she'll be here next week.[23]

A second alternative to treating assertive verbs as ambiguous is provided by Rooryck's 2001 syntactic analysis of parentheticals. He proposes that verbs in their parenthetical use move to the head of $\text{Mood}_{\text{evidential}}$ Phrase (see Cinque 1999). The proposal is offered in order to explain the semantic bleaching effects: these are due, Rooryck suggests, to the syntactic position itself, which in some way "filters" the semantic content of items it contains, allowing only those aspects of their content compatible with an evidential interpretation to survive. Rooryck does not specify whether the account can be extended to embedding verbs in canonical embedding position. If so, one might posit that presuppositionality is one of the semantic features filtered by the Evidential head, and hence account for the elimination of presuppositionality without positing a lexical ambiguity.

But to me, the far more convincing alternative is that presuppositionality is simply not lexically specified. Suppose we assume instead (as I have argued elsewhere) that presuppositionality is a property of utterances, and that interpreters infer what presuppositions a speaker is making as part of the process of making sense of the speaker's communicative acts. Then it is to be expected that as the role of some expression in a speaker's communicative act changes, related inferences about the speaker's presuppositions will shift too. When a speaker produces an utterance whose main point is to express her regret about some event, an interpreter could reasonably assume that she is taking it as given that the event took place. When a speaker produces the same sentence in a different context,

23. As noted above, these *don't* occur in syntactic parentheticals.

in which it is clear that her main point is to inform the hearer about the event while simultaneously expressing her emotional orientation towards it, then the hearer has no reason to assume that she is presupposing the occurrence of the event.

Certainly, some sentence types might well be typically associated with particular communicative intentions, and thus there might be particular presuppositions that are usually associated with utterances of that sentence. But as the data presented here demonstrate, notions of normal usage ensconced in the theoretical literature may require some revision.

5. Appendix

While I've suggested that the phenomenon of parenthetical uses of verbs is widespread in ordinary spoken language, all the examples I have given above are constructed. To reinforce my claims, I give below some examples of the phenomenon culled from two corpora: the Santa Barbara Corpus of Spoken American English and the Corpus of Spoken Professional American English. (Selections from each corpus are indicated as SBC and SPAE, respectively.) I present the examples in three sets, to correspond with the discussion above: non-factives, semi-factives, and true factives. In the latter two cases, I have selected examples where the embedded clause is clearly not presupposed. In each example, I give the relevant verb in bold face. I have tried to give enough of the context for it to be clear that the main point of the relevant utterance resides in the embedded clause, but in some cases this isn't feasible, as the chunk of discourse over which the point is made is too long. In one or two places, I have deleted some of a speaker's utterance, or intervening utterances by other speakers, where these are distractions. I indicate these deletions with the symbol +++. I have also deleting coding of pauses and so on to increase readability.

5.1. Nonfactive embedding verbs in parenthetical use

Example 1 (SBC)

MILES: This infectious disease woman, +++

MILES: at San Francisco General,

PETE: Mhm,

MILES: she **said** that, ... this doesn't seem like it can be true, but she **said** that, ... ninety per cent of gay men, ... are HIV positive, ... and fifty percent of a=ll males, ... are HIV positive.

Example 2 (SBC)

HAROLD: See I'd **heard** that it was mainly, +++

HAROLD: in .. t's mainly urban areas,

PETE: Yeah.

HAROLD: that had this really ... disproportionately high= .. propor-
... um, ... percentage.

Example 3 (SBC)

DORIS: ... Well,
.. maybe we've talked for forty-five minutes.

SAM: ... I don't know whether it's to go off,
or not.

ANGELA: ... Does it automatically go off at the end [of] --

DORIS: [I **thought**] it did.

5.2. Semifactive embedding verbs in parenthetical use

Example 1 (SPAE)

It's also the case that in reading over the summary of the last meetings which is under tab F, I believe, we **discovered** that we had such a good summary of the meeting that there are some things in the summary that haven't been yet transferred to the document.

Example 2 (SBC)

So I'm driving up to the house, ... and there's a car in front of me, and the guy is just like sitting there, and, .. you know I wanna park the [car] +++ you know, and th- -- there's no .. parking either, on one of those sides, because it's street sweeping day, or something, it's like, .. Would you mo=ve, so I= can come park my car. (H) And then I **realized**, it's ~Liza and ~Antonio.

Example 3 (SBC)

I think it's important. .. Because, ... I mean I **realized**, .. that I'd never seen the bylaws, .. since I was [on the board] until .. I asked for a copy.

Example 4 (SBC)

REBECCA: well tell me about the ... year ago incident.

RICKIE: .. U=m, .. that one was at night time. ... And, um, I was working la=te, and it was around, .. I **remember** I used to get off ar- around nine,

5.3. Parenthetical use of *know*

These deserve brief comment. In the Corpus of Spoken Professional American English I found frequent occurrences of what I take to be evidential uses of *know*, such as I discussed on p.23 above. When I originally thought about these cases, I was a little uncertain about the reliability of my intuition that such uses are possible. But it is clear from the corpus that they are. Note also that although the examples below are all taken from a transcript of one meeting, each is from a different speaker.

Example 1 (SPAE)

And my understanding was that that's why we were going to have the supplementary materials to show what the implications for instruction might be. I think most of us sitting around this table could very comfortably look at the stances and mold that and put that into instruction. But **I do know**, having worked with a variety of teachers, that many times that just by looking at an assessment, they can't then change it and mold it into what they see as instruction.

Example 2 (SPAE)

I'm very concerned about the notion of individual assessment and the ease with which it can slip into diagnosis and immediate recommendations for what can happen in the classroom. Diagnostic tests are very, very different. And **I know** because we know this from many tests in the past that tests that were meant only to provide aggregate scores were in fact very often used for all good reasons with intentions by districts and teachers to try to make diagnosis implications, inferences from them.

Example 3 (SPAE)

A couple of years ago Michael Luger in City and Regional Planning did an economic analysis, and he's updated it. And basically what **we know** is that for every dollar the State

gives to support the University at Chapel Hill, we generate another three to four dollars for the State.

Example 4 (SPAE)

It's been my experience that quite often, we as -- we who are in the classroom as a teacher, we have our little pet curriculums, things that we like to do, little topics of whatever it happens to be. I **know** that in our state, in the state of Colorado, one of the things that we are working on right now is meeting standards and benchmarks for curricula.

Example 5 (SPAE)

MILLER: How do we motivate eighth grade students?

BERRY:Well, if I had that answer, I would be on the road. (Laughter)

BERRY:You know, I really don't have a simple answer for that one.

I **know** that there have been some suggestions from NCTM to consider perhaps a presidential scholar, you know, kids who do well.

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