



Predicting the Predictable

Roni Rosenfeld
Carnegie Mellon University

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Strategy ~~My Prayer~~

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Grant me the humility to accept
the things I cannot ~~change~~ ^{forecast}

The courage to ~~change~~ ^{forecast} the things I can

And the wisdom to know the difference



When Can Forecasting Succeed?

- Prediction: the assertion that a particular event *will* happen
 - it's about *correctness* (“right” or “wrong”)
- Forecast: an assessment of the likelihood of all possible outcomes
 - it's about *accuracy*

Forecasting can succeed when there is:

1. Sufficiently strong theory:
 - accounts for all the factors that matter
2. Adequate data:
 - fill in the details of the theory
 - (i.e., estimate the parameters of the model)


the signal and the noise and the noise and the noise and the noise why so many predictions fail— but some don't the noise and the noise and the noise silver noise noise and the noise

Forecasting *can be demonstrated* when there is:

3. Adequate event rate
 - evaluate the forecasts' accuracy



Theory and Data





When Forecasting Might Fail

- A stochastic system
 - entropy is theoretical limit on predictability.
- A complex system
 - may be deterministic, but is inscrutable to us.
- A chaotic system
 - may be deterministic and even simple, but extremely sensitive to initial conditions.
- A second-order system
 - when forecasting itself affects the system
 - e.g. markets, epidemics



When Forecasting Cannot Be Assessed (and therefore should not be relied on)


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- Specific event types that happen too rarely
 - E.g. Influenza pandemics
- Failures due to unforeseen event types (Black Swans)



The World According to Taleb

- Most important historical events were unpredictable
- We underestimate rare events
 - Mostly because we mistake the model for reality
- We severely underestimate their consequences
 - Our society has become a dynamic system, where small events can have exponential consequences
- Real expertise does not exist in domains involving human behavior.
- We worry about the wrong "improbable" events – those that we can enumerate.
- What tends to happen are the catastrophes we *didn't* anticipate.
- Non-repeatable events are ignored before their occurrence, and overestimated afterwards (for a while).





Risk Mitigation in a World of Black Swans

- DHS, and BARDA, operate in a domain of negative Black Swans.
 - your best scenario is that no one will find out how good you were
- The *probabilities* of rare events are not computable. But their *effects* on us are much easier to evaluate.
 - ➔ Rank scenarios not by their likelihood but by their consequence
- Don't avoid forecasting, but don't base all planning on it. Be prepared for all relevant eventualities.
- To make a decision, focus on the consequences, not the probability.
- Avoid optimization.
- Favor redundancy.
- Compensate complexity with simplicity.



AntiFragility in Public Health

(My unvetted thoughts here.)

- Simplicity and Redundancy:
 - Build multiple, independent systems, each designed to mitigate a specific lost capability (rather than to address a particular scenario)
 - Build several such systems for each potential capability loss:
 - Power
 - Communications
 - Medical equipment/supplies
 - Healthcare personnel
 - Transportation
 - ...
 - Minimize dependence on communication
 - Operationally
 - Legally
 - Behaviorally