

# Integrated Assessment of Economics and Science Applied to Multiple Pollutant Legislation for Electricity

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*Resources for the Future*

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Background materials at <http://www.rff.org/multipollutant>

# Roadmap

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- **Integrated Assessment**
- **Applications**
  - 1990 CAAA
  - NO<sub>x</sub> SIP Call
- **Multi-pollutant legislation**
  - Efficient Emission Fees for SO<sub>2</sub>, NO<sub>x</sub>
  - Guidelines for Hg
  - Architecture for Carbon

# Integrated Assessment: Meaning and Method

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- Integration of full-form models with “internal” validity
- Emphasis on “external” integrity
- Account for correlated uncertainty
- Include assessment
- Value of additional information

# TAF Simultaneously Produced by a Distributed Team


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- Adopted software engineering methods
  - Specifications, interfaces for each component
  - Library of common variables for time, space, species, etc.
- Progressive refinement based on the integrated model
- Public Domain: [www.lumina.com/taflist](http://www.lumina.com/taflist)
- Analytica platform (PC and Mac)
- Monte Carlo uncertainty analysis


## Going Forward...

- Ongoing development at RFF, U.Maine
- Technical support by ENRICH and Lumina
- Web interface


# TAF- Version 1.0 (ca.1994)



# TAF- Version 2.0 (ca.1996)




# TAF Findings: Benefits and Costs of Title IV



“Integrated Assessment” (NAPAP, 97) and “Benefits and Costs of Title IV” (CEP, 98)

# Uncertainty in Benefits, But Assessed Benefits Still Exceed Assessed Costs



# The Weak Links

	Expected Benefit:	<i>Short-Term</i> Value of Additional Information:
Health: Mortality	●	●
Health: Morbidity	◉	◉
Visibility	◉	◉
Materials and Cultural Resources	◉	◉
Nonuse Values: Ecosystem Health	●	◐
Aquatics: Recreation	◉	◐
Forests: Recreation	◉	◐
Ag / Commercial Forestry	◐	◉
Radiative Forcing	◉	○

<p><i>Categories</i></p> <p>● high          ● high-mid          ◐ mid          ⊙ low-mid          ○ low</p>	<p><u>1. Link Between Science and Economics:</u>            Are benefit endpoints well established? Does science provide information needed for economic analysis?</p>	<p><u>2. Economic Methods:</u>            Are economic methods adequately developed?</p>	<p><u>3. Data Availability:</u>            Is data available from science and from economics for an assessment of benefits?</p>	<p><u>4. Expected Benefit:</u>            Are expected benefits large?</p>	<p><u>5. Value of Additional Information:</u>            With the goal of improving benefit estimates, what is the relative short-term return on investment?</p>
Health: Mortality	◐	◐	◐	●	●
Health: Morbidity	◐	◐	◐	◐	◐
Visibility	●	◐	⊙	◐	◐
Materials / Cultural	⊙	◐	○	◐	◐
Nonuse Value: Ecosystem	⊙	⊙	⊙	●	◐
Aquatics: Recreation	●	●	⊙	⊙	◐
Forests: Recreation	⊙	◐	○	⊙	◐
Ag. / Comm. Forestry	●	●	◐	◐	⊙
Radiative Forcing	⊙	○	○	⊙	○

# Spatial Effects of Trading


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- In 1993, the NY AG sued EPA to restrict allowance sales.
- NY Assembly, later Senate, voted to constrain trades.
- 1998 agreement with Long Island Lighting Company (LILCO).
- 1998 Senator D'Amato likened long-range transport of acid rain to “airborne terrorism.”

“Regional Analysis of SO<sub>2</sub> Allowance Trading” (*EST*, 99)


# Effect of Trading on Emissions

Percent Change in Title IV Baseline  
Utility Emissions Attributable to Trading for 2005




# Effect of Trading on Health

Percent Change in Title IV Baseline Benefits Attributable to Trading for 2005



# Effect of Trading on Deposition

Percent Change in Title IV Baseline Sulfur Deposition Attributable to Trading for 2005



# The Second Grand Experiment: NO<sub>x</sub> SIP Call

- NO<sub>x</sub> emissions contribute to multiple problems:
  - ozone, particulates, nitrogen deposition, visibility
- Nonattainment of ozone standard provides regulatory handle for EPA NO<sub>x</sub> SIP Call
- Policy aimed at ozone, a seasonal problem
- But, other NO<sub>x</sub>-related effects are realized throughout the year
- Costs of NO<sub>x</sub> control are largely fixed and capital costs.

Annual vs. Seasonal NO<sub>x</sub> Controls” (*JAWMA 01; Land 03*)

# Question: What is the most cost-effective way to achieve $\text{NO}_x$ reductions given full set of $\text{NO}_x$ related problems?

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## Three $\text{NO}_x$ reduction scenarios:

1. Summer cap in 19 state SIP Call region
2. Annual cap in the same SIP Call region
3. National Annual cap

# Major Uncertainties

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
1. Market Structure
2. Epidemiology / Mortality
3. Valuation / Mortality

# RFF “Haiku” Electricity Model

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- Intra-regional market modeling
  - Market equilibrium in 13 regions
  - Demand: 3 customer classes, 4 time periods, 3 seasons
  - Supply constructed using model plants
    - Defined by technology, fuel type, vintage
    - Investment and retirement
    - Emission compliance
    - Fuel market prices adjust
- Inter-regional power trading
  - Equilibrates regional prices, transmission constraints

# Net Benefits for the Nation, 2008



# Main Findings Favor Annual NO<sub>x</sub> Controls

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- Under all scenarios **SIP Annual policy** yields greater net benefits than current policy; Ohio Valley included.
- National annual policy is slightly less cost-effective than current under preferred assumptions  
...but it is more cost-effective under majority of scenarios.
- If any one assumption realizes “high” value then national annual policy is preferred to current one (SIP Seasonal).
- SIP region always realizes greatest net benefits under National Annual policy.
- Omitted benefits do not change ranking for SIP Annual

# The Clean Air Act's Requirements

## NSR Permits for new sources & modifications that increase emissions

### Ozone

1-hr Serious Area Attainment Date

OTC NO<sub>x</sub> Trading

NO<sub>x</sub> SIPs Due

Designate areas for 8-hr Ozone NAAQS

1-hr Severe Area Attainment Date

Marginal 8-hr Ozone NAAQS Attainment Date

8-hr Ozone Attainment Demonstration SIPs due

Assess Effectiveness of Regional Ozone Strategies

Possible Regional NO<sub>x</sub> Reductions? (SIP call II)<sup>1</sup>

Moderate 8-hr Ozone NAAQS Attainment Date


**Note:** Dotted lines indicate a range of possible dates.

<sup>1</sup> Further action on ozone would be considered based on the 2007 assessment.

<sup>2</sup> The SIP-submittal and attainment dates are keyed off the date of designation; for example, if PM or ozone are designated in 2004, the first attainment date is 2009

EPA is required to update the new source performance standards (NSPS) for boilers and turbines every 8 years

Serious 8-hr Ozone NAAQS attainment Date



Phase II Acid Rain Compliance

Mercury Determination

Proposed Utility MACT

Designate Areas for Fine PM NAAQS

Interstate Transport Rule to Address SO<sub>2</sub>/ NO<sub>x</sub> Emissions for Fine PM NAAQS and Regional Haze

## Acid Rain, PM<sub>2.5</sub>, Haze, Toxics

Final Utility MACT

New Fine PM NAAQS Implementation Plans

Regional Haze SIPs due

Compliance with Utility MACT

Latest attainment date for Fine PM NAAQS <sup>3</sup>


Compliance for BART Sources

Compliance for BART sources under the Trading Program

Second Regional Haze SIPs due

In developing the timeline of current CAA requirements, it was necessary for EPA to make assumptions about rulemakings that have not been completed or, in some case, not even started. EPA's rulemakings will be conducted through the usual notice-and-comment process, and the conclusions may vary from these assumptions.

# EIA forecasts over time for 2010




# Percent of Total Generation in the Baseline


	<b>Coal</b>	<b>Gas</b>
<b>Today</b>	54%	15%
<b>Forecast for 2020</b>	48%	25%
<b>Growth</b>	20%	106%

# Old generating units have highest emission rates...

## Average NOx Emission Rates for Coal-Fired Boilers by Vintage



# But just a small share of emissions



Legislative Comparison of Multipollutant Proposals:  
S. 366, S. 485, and S. 3135.


Legislative Proposal	S. 366 Jeffords (108 <sup>th</sup> )	S. 485 Clear Skies (108 <sup>th</sup> )	S. 3135 Carper (107 <sup>th</sup> )
<b>National Annual Allowance Allocation Caps</b>			
<b>Sulfur Dioxide (SO<sub>2</sub>) Million Tons</b>	2.25 in 2009. Two regions. <sup>1</sup>	4.5 in 2010. 3.0 in 2018.	4.5 in 2008. 3.5 in 2012. 2.25 in 2015.
<b>Nitrogen Oxides (NO<sub>x</sub>) Million Tons</b>	1.51 in 2009.	2.1 in 2008. 1.7 in 2018. Two regions. <sup>2</sup>	1.87 in 2008. 1.7 in 2012.
<b>Mercury (Hg) Tons</b>	5 in 2008. Facility specific. Non-tradable.	26 in 2010. 15 in 2018.	24 in 2008. 5 to 16 in 2012. <sup>3</sup> Facility specific. <sup>4</sup>
<b>Carbon Dioxide (CO<sub>2</sub>) Billion Tons</b>	2.05 in 2009. <sup>5</sup>	No CO <sub>2</sub> policy.	2.59 in 2008. <sup>6</sup> 2.47 in 2012. <sup>7</sup> Sequestration increases CO <sub>2</sub> cap.

# Efficient Emission Levels for SO<sub>2</sub> and NO<sub>x</sub>


## Scenario and Key Assumptions

- PM-health modeled only; no ozone benefits
- Examine SO<sub>2</sub> and NO<sub>x</sub> emission fees
- No CO<sub>2</sub> or mercury requirements
- Results for 2010
- Title IV SO<sub>2</sub>, SIP Call NO<sub>x</sub> baseline
- Pope et al. (1995) for sulfates
- Nitrates as ordinary PM<sub>10</sub>
- VSL=\$2.25 million (Mrozek and Taylor, 2001)


# Marginal Benefits and Costs: SO<sub>2</sub>




# Marginal Benefits and Costs: NO<sub>x</sub>



# Value of SO<sub>2</sub> Emission Reductions by State



# NO<sub>x</sub> & SO<sub>2</sub> Electricity Sector Emissions in 2020



# Main Points on Criteria Pollutants

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- SO<sub>2</sub> and NO<sub>x</sub> caps for all of the proposals appear justified... there is room for more SO<sub>2</sub> reductions; NO<sub>x</sub> reductions about right.
  - Efficient SO<sub>2</sub> fee (\$4,700 - \$1,800 per ton) would yield 0.9 – 3.1 million tons.
  - Efficient NO<sub>x</sub> fee (\$1,200 - \$700 per ton) would yield 1.0 – 2.8 million tons.
- Evidence supporting regional caps.
- Ancillary CO<sub>2</sub> reductions.

# Mercury

## Target:

What does benefit literature say?

MACT~7.4 tons/yr to Ancillary~28 tons/yr

(current levels in coal burned: ~75 tons/yr)

## Timetable:

Help states

## Design:

Trading enables tougher goals. Perhaps with...

- Maximum emission rate constraint

(not minimum emission rate reduction), and

- State opt out of trading for local protection

# Architecture for Carbon

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## *Principles:*

1. The fundamental divide: voluntary or **binding**
2. More important to **start early** than to start large
3. More important to **end economy-wide** than to start there
4. **Compensation** through allocation
5. **Efficiency** is essential if constraints tighten

# Annual Asset Value of Emission Allowances

**Venus**



**Earth**



**Jupiter**



**Neptune**



**NO<sub>x</sub>**  
**\$1.7 Billion**

**SO<sub>2</sub>**  
**\$2.7 Billion**

**Carbon 34%  
Reduction (Kyoto)  
Economy Wide  
\$450 Billion**

**Carbon 6%  
Reduction  
in Electricity  
\$15-\$24 Billion**

# Key Ingredients to Multipollutant Policy

- **SO<sub>2</sub> and NO<sub>x</sub> caps** are justified on benefit-cost.
- **Mercury trading**, with constraints, can lower costs; benefits not well quantified.
- Architecture is very important for **carbon** policy.
  - ✓ Start soon rather than start large.
  - ✓ Auction is **less costly** to society, and preserves **asset values** better than output-based allocation.
  - ✓ The auction institution is **expandable** beyond electricity.
  - ✓ A hybrid allocation approach to balance **compensation** and **efficiency**.

# Final Thoughts on Integrated Assessment, in Any Domain

- **Embrace and understand uncertainty** to assess confidence in your knowledge and in the policy implications of your assessment
- **Progressively refine model scope, and model components**, to improve credibility and relevance of your analysis to policy
- **Maintain an open architecture** to support easy model expansion, as well as adoption of the model by others