

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Automated Search for Gödel's Proofs

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We present *strategies* and *heuristics* underlying a search procedure that finds proofs for Gödel's incompleteness theorems at an *abstract axiomatic level*. As *axioms* we take for granted the representability and derivability conditions for the central syntactic notions as well as the diagonal lemma for constructing self-referential sentences. The *strategies* are logical ones and have been developed to search for natural deduction proofs in classical first-order logic. The *heuristics* are mostly of a very general mathematical character and are concerned with the goal-directed use of definitions and lemmata. When they are specific to the meta-mathematical context, these heuristics allow us, for example, to move between the object-and meta-theory. Instead of viewing this work as high-level proof search, it can be regarded as a first step in a proof-planning framework: the next refining steps would consist in verifying the axiomatically given conditions. Comparisons with the literature are detailed in Section 4. (The general mathematical heuristics are indeed general: in Appendix B we show that they, together with two simple algebraic facts and the logical strategies, suffice to find a proof of "$\sqrt{2}$ is not rational".)

1 Background

In a genuinely experimental spirit, we extended the *intercalation method for proof search* from pure first-order logic to parts of mathematics by interweaving general logical strategies with specific mathematical heuristics. The guiding question for our investigation was: What is needed, in addition to purely logical considerations, for finding proofs of significant theorems in a fully automated way? We answer the question for Gödel's incompleteness theorems [23]. When proved at an *abstract axiomatic level* they lend themselves naturally to such an investigation; they have intricate, yet not overwhelmingly difficult proofs, and they are obviously significant. During the academic years

1975–77, the first author had taken steps towards establishing them interactively. That work was done for a computer-based course on *Elementary Proof Theory*; a detailed report was given in [18] and a brief summary in [22].

Elementary Proof Theory presented the incompleteness theorems for ZF*, that is Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory without the axiom of infinity; see, for example, [7]. Its major innovation consisted in carrying out the meta-mathematical work in a formal theory of binary trees and elementary inductive definitions, called TEM.[1] Without the detour of their arithmetization, the inductively given syntactic notions were shown to be representable in ZF*; the diagonal lemma was established and the proof of the Hilbert–Bernays derivability conditions, central for the second theorem, was sketched. Within that high-level framework the standard material on the incompleteness theorems is compact and the proofs are direct. It was natural to ask, whether the proofs can be found via an appropriate extension of the intercalation method.

The arguments for the incompleteness theorems are carried out in the first-order theory TEM: instead of viewing syntactic objects as (having been coded as) natural numbers, we consider them as finitely branching trees; instead of defining syntactic notions recursively, we specify them by elementary inductive definitions, briefly, by eid's. In the language of TEM we have the constant S for the empty tree and the function symbol $[\ ,\ ]$ for the binary operation of building a tree from two given ones. We use X, Y, Z—possibly with indices—as variables ranging over binary trees. The axioms for S and $[\ ,\ ]$ are formulated in analogy to those of Dedekind–Peano arithmetic for zero and successor. The further axioms of TEM include the induction principle for binary trees, and closure and minimality conditions for the eid's. Instead of discussing these axioms in generality—the details do not matter for the current project—we specify some definitions that are actually needed to characterize the formal theory for which the incompleteness theorems are to be proved.

The theory to be considered is ZF*, Zermelo and Fraenkel's theory of sets without the axiom of infinity. The details of its axiomatic formulation do not matter either for the current project. Let us assume that it is formulated in a first-order language with x, y, z—possibly with indices—as variables ranging over sets. To indicate the general character of eid's we specify the generating clauses of the familiar notion of a formula (taking for granted the concepts of atomic formula and of variable); @ stands for any binary sentential connective, Q for the existential or universal quantifier:

If X is an atomic formula, X is a FORMULA;
If X is a FORMULA, $[\neg, X]$ is a FORMULA;
If X is a FORMULA and Y is a FORMULA, $[@, [X, Y]]$ is a FORMULA;
If X is a variable and Y is a FORMULA, $[[Q, X], Y]$ is a FORMULA.

[1] TEM abbreviates Theory for Elementary Meta-Mathematics. Feferman systematically investigates in his papers [10] and [11] the use of "finitary inductive" definitions in meta-mathematics.

We write also "FORM(X)" for "X is a FORMULA". TEM contains for such eid's a *closure* and a *minimality* principle. The first principle asserts that FORM is closed under the above clauses and is expressed by

FOR ALL X (if $\mathfrak{A}$(FORM, X) then FORM(X)).[2]

The minimality principle claims that FORM is the smallest such class. This is approximated in first-order logic by the usual principle of induction for formulas:

If FOR ALL X (if $\mathfrak{A}(P, X)$ then $P(X)$)
then FOR ALL X (if FORM(X) then $P(X)$).

Formulas are binary trees built up from the empty tree using pairing. In a similar way one can generate inductively the relation X *is a proof of* Y *from assumptions* $Z_1, \ldots, Z_n$ or from a(n inductively generated) class of axioms; if X is a proof of Y using axioms of ZF*, this relation is denoted by PROOF(X, Y). To indicate that there is a ZF*-proof for Y, we write ZF* $\vdash$ (Y), ZF* $\vdash Y$ or THEO(Y).

Using the constant $\emptyset$ and the set-theoretic pairing operation $\langle , \rangle$ one can build up terms in the language of ZF* whose parse trees are isomorphic to the binary trees; they are used as names for the meta-mathematical trees in the same way as numerals in Dedekind–Peano arithmetic are used as names for natural numbers. With every meta-mathematical tree we can directly associate its set-theoretic name or *code*: CODE(S) $= \emptyset$ and CODE($[X, Y]$) $=$ $\langle$CODE(X), CODE(Y)$\rangle$. We also write $\lfloor X \rfloor$ for CODE(X) or indicate it by $\boldsymbol{X}$. This is the apparatus needed to formulate the *representability conditions* for the syntactic notions. We give them paradigmatically for FORM and PROOF:

If FORM(X) then ZF* $\vdash$ form($\boldsymbol{X}$), and
If NOT FORM(X) then ZF* $\vdash \neg$ form($\boldsymbol{X}$).

"form" is a formula in the language of set theory for which these conditions are provable in TEM. Similarly, there is a formula "proof" in the language of ZF* that represents the proof relation PROOF:

If PROOF(X, Y) then ZF* $\vdash$ proof($\boldsymbol{X}, \boldsymbol{Y}$), and
If NOT PROOF(X, Y) then ZF* $\vdash \neg$ proof($\boldsymbol{X}, \boldsymbol{Y}$).

Using the first representability condition for PROOF one can establish:

If THEO(Y) then ZF* $\vdash$ theo($\boldsymbol{Y}$),

[2] $\mathfrak{A}(P, X)$ is obtained from the generating clauses; it is the disjunction of the following TEM-formulas: (i) X is atomic; (ii) $(X)_0$ is $\neg$ and $P((X)_1)$; (iii) $(X)_0$ is @ and $P(((X)_1)_0)$ and $P(((X)_1)_1)$; (iv) $((X)_0)_0$ is Q and $((X)_0)_1$ is a variable and $P((X)_1)$. P can be viewed as either a meta-variable over TEM-formulas or as a free second-order variable; under the second reading we have an appropriate substitution rule in the logical calculus for TEM.

where theo(y) abbreviates ($\exists x$) proof(x, y) Finally, we will use the *Self-reference Lemma* (or *Diagonal Lemma*) in the form: if F is a formula in the language of set theory (with one free variable), then there is a sentence D_F in that very language such that ZF* proves ($D_F \leftrightarrow$F(D_F)). Applied to the formula $\neg$theo(y), the self-reference lemma yields the Gödel sentence G that expresses its own unprovability, i.e., ZF* proves ($G \leftrightarrow \neg$theo(G)).

With this systematic background it is not difficult to prove that G is not provable in ZF* assuming, of course, that ZF* is consistent. So let us assume—in order to obtain a contradiction—that ZF* proves G; then, by the diagonal lemma concerning G, ZF* proves $\neg$theo(G). On the other hand, by the (semi-) representability of THEO, we can infer from the fact that ZF* proves G, that ZF* establishes theo(G). Thus, ZF* proves both $\neg$theo(G) and theo(G), and we have obtained a contradiction! The independence of G requires a proof that $\neg G$ is not provable either; for that a stronger assumption concerning ZF*, stronger than mere consistency, has to be made. Gödel used for that purpose the notion of ω-consistency; the corresponding concept for the context of our meta-mathematical set-up is τ-consistency, thinking of τ as the class of (sets denoted by codes for) binary trees. ZF* is τ-consistent is defined by the condition: there is no formula $F(y)$ such that ZF* proves $(\exists y)(\tau(y)$ &F$(y))$ and also $\neg$F(Y) for all Y; or equivalently, for all formulas $F(y)$, if ZF* proves $\neg$F(Y) for all Y, then ZF* does not prove $(\exists y)(\tau(y)$ &F$(y))$.

Assuming that ZF* is τ-consistent, we show now that ZF* does not prove the negation of the Gödel sentence G. By what we established already (and the fact that τ-consistency implies ordinary consistency) we know that

FOR ALL X: NOT PROOF(X, G);

the representability of PROOF implies

FOR ALL X: ZF* $\vdash \neg$ proof(X, G).

But then the τ-consistency of ZF* ensures

NOT ZF* $\vdash (\exists y)$ proof(y, G).

As the formula $(\exists y)$ proof(y, G) is abbreviated by theo(G), we can use the self-reference lemma for G to infer that this formula is in ZF* provably equivalent to $\neg G$. Thus, NOT ZF* $\vdash (\neg G)$, and the independence of G from ZF* has been established.

Given the axiomatic context provided by the representability of PROOF and THEO and the self-reference lemma applied to $\neg$theo(y), the proofs are direct, yet intricate. To take a first step towards describing the search algorithm that finds proofs of these and related theorems, we present briefly the basic ideas underlying the intercalation method for classical logic; for the theoretical underpinnings we refer to Sieg [19], Sieg and Byrnes [20] and Byrnes [6]. We should emphasize at this point that, in our view, logical formality per se does not facilitate the finding of proofs. However, logic within a natural deduction framework does help to bridge the gap between assumptions and

conclusions by suggesting very rough structures for arguments, i.e., *logical structures* that depend solely on the syntactic form of assumptions and goals. This role of logic, though modest, is the crucial starting-point for moving up to subject-specific considerations that support a theorem. In the case study at hand we will show, how far these logical considerations go, and how they can be extended quite naturally by the *leading mathematical ideas* underlying Gödel's proofs.

2 Intercalation: broad strategies & special heuristics

The intercalation method is a proof search procedure that is goal-directed and guided by the possibly expanding syntactic context of the problem at hand. In first-order logic it is a complete procedure and a basis for broad logical strategies. The fundamental idea is straightforward. In order to bridge the gap between premises $A_1, \ldots, A_n$ and a goal B, one applies *systematically* the rules of the natural deduction calculus, i.e., the elimination rules are applied only from "above", whereas the introduction rules are inverted and applied from "below". Such systematic applications of the rules generate a search space that either contains a proof of B from the assumptions $A_1, \ldots, A_n$ or provides a semantic counterexample to the claim that B is a logical consequence of $A_1, \ldots, A_n$—tertium non datur; in addition, proofs contained in the search space are necessarily normal. The argument for this sharpened completeness theorem provides a method for searching directly for normal proofs; indeed, it yields also a semantic argument for normal form theorems in natural deduction. Such arguments concerning classical first-order logic were first given in [19], later also for intuitionistic logic and some modal logics in collaboration with Cittadini in [21].

Normal proofs satisfy a similar *subformula property* as cut-free derivations in the sequent calculus. That, of course, allows a restriction of the systematic search and is basic for broad strategies underlying our proof search: (i) extracting B via elimination rules—if B is a strictly positive subformula of an assumption, (ii) sub-goaling via the appropriate inverted introduction rule—if B is a logically complex formula, (iii) refuting B via the elimination rule for negation—if an appropriate pair of contradictory formulas is available.[3] In the latter case there must be a negation that is a strictly positive subformula of an assumption. It is evident that direct proof search is strongly and naturally constrained by the syntactic context of the problem, as only particular subformulas can be intercalated between assumptions and goals.

With these logical strategies in the background let us return to the proof of the first part of the first incompleteness theorem and examine, how the

[3] This condition was modified for the republication. The old formulation was "(iii) refuting B via the rules for negation—if B is a negation or an atomic formula and if an appropriate pair of contradictory formulas is available". Negated formulas are actually treated under (ii); the restriction to atomic formulas is too restrictive.

intercalation method might find it with "a little help" (when pure logic is unable to proceed any further). So we begin with the goal NOT(ZF* ⊢ (*G*)) and the premise ZF*CONS. We also have a definition and a lemma available, namely, the definition

ZF*CONS IFF NOT[ZF* ⊢ (*G*) AND ZF* ⊢ (¬*G*)]

and the consequence of the diagonal lemma for ¬ theo(x), i.e.,

ZF* ⊢ ($G \leftrightarrow \neg$ theo($\boldsymbol{G}$)).[4]

The goal cannot be extracted from the premises. Thus, the algorithm proceeds indirectly with the assumption ZF* ⊢ (*G*) and needs a pair of contradictory formulas as new goals. However, no negation occurs as a strictly positive subformula of the premise. As there is a negation in the definition of the premise, we use it and the premise to infer

NOT[ZF* ⊢ (*G*) AND ZF* ⊢ (¬*G*)].

This negation is one element of a contradictory pair, and the algorithm attempts to prove [ZF* ⊢ (*G*) AND ZF* ⊢ (¬*G*)]. This formula cannot be extracted: even though it is a subformula of a premise, it is not a strictly positive one. So the algorithm inverts the formula and attempts to prove the new goals ZF* ⊢ (*G*) and ZF* ⊢ (¬*G*). The former goal is already an assumption of the indirect proof, so we examine the latter goal.

It is here that we make the first significant change to the proof search procedure. ZF* ⊢ (¬*G*) cannot be extracted, but as an existential formula it can be inverted. Instead of searching for a term in the language of TEM describing a ZF*-proof of ¬*G*, the search proceeds "inside" ZF*. The claim ZF* ⊢ (¬*G*) can be justified, after all, by the presentation of a proof of ¬*G* within ZF*. The procedure tries now to find a ZF*-proof for the goal ¬*G*. As the formula ¬*G* cannot be extracted, indirect proof is applied to ¬*G*: assume *G* and find a contradictory pair. There is no negation immediately available in the premises, except through the diagonal lemma for *G*. Note that this lemma is formulated within TEM as a provability claim for ZF* and should be available for any ZF*-proof. In general, when attempting an extraction or looking for contradictory pairs within a ZF*-proof, strictly positive subformulas of ZF*-formulas *A* must be considered, where ZF* ⊢ (*A*) occurs as a strictly positive subformula of a premise or available assumption in TEM. So, the diagonal lemma makes available the formula ¬ theo($\boldsymbol{G}$), which is used to construct the contradictory pair. This leaves theo($\boldsymbol{G}$) as a new goal, which cannot be extracted. The regular proof search procedure would attempt an inversion. But here an additional step can be considered, since theo is a semi-representable relation: we can justify theo($\boldsymbol{G}$) by establishing ZF* ⊢ (*G*) in TEM. ZF* ⊢ (*G*) is an assumption in TEM, so the proof is complete.

[4] We could have chosen one of the more general formulations of consistency, for example, NOT(EXISTS X)(ZF* ⊢ (X) AND ZF* ⊢ (¬X)). The quantificational search in the SH-expansion (see [20]) would find the appropriate instance quickly.

The expanded version of the proof search algorithm, which results from the careful examination of the above proof, interweaves mathematical and purely logical considerations in an intercalating and goal-directed manner. It has the following main steps:

Extraction

If the goal is in TEM, then extraction functions as described above for first-order logic. If the goal is in ZF*, then the set of formulas available for extraction is expanded by those formulas A, for which the claim ZF* ⊢ (*A*) is extractable in TEM and the goal is extractable from *A*. That is the inference Prov E, which is used to turn *A* into a part of the ZF*-proof.

Inversion

For the standard connectives inversion is applied as discussed earlier. There are two additional cases where "inversion" is applied. The first case occurs, when the goal in TEM is a statement of the form ZF* ⊢ (*A*). Here the algorithm tries to find a proof of *A* in ZF*; that is the inversion of the inference Prov I.[5] In the second case, when the goal is a formula like [¬] rel($\boldsymbol{X}$) in ZF*, and when the relation REL is represented by rel, the procedure tries to prove [NOT] REL(X) in TEM, after having explored indirect strategies in ZF*. For semi-representable relations such as ZF* ⊢ (X), this step is obviously not applied to the negation ¬ rel(X) in ZF*.

Extended extraction and inversion ("Meaning of premises and goals")

Definitional and other mathematical equivalences are used to obtain either a new available formula from which the current goal is extractable or to get an equivalent statement as a new goal. This we would like to do relative to a developing background theory; currently, we just add the definitions and lemmata explicitly to the list of premises.

Indirect strategies are pursued in the same way as in pure first-order logic, with one exception: the set of contradictory pairs for indirect proofs in ZF* is expanded by pairs whose negations are strictly positive subformulas of *A* in case ZF* ⊢ (*A*) (and this TEM-statement is itself extractable from an available TEM-claim).

This completes the informal description of the algorithm that searches for statements surrounding the first incompleteness theorem. The extensions of extraction and inversion mentioned have a very general mathematical character, whereas the extensions via ProvE and ProvI express most directly meta-mathematical content. The former rule reflects, in part, that theorems can be appealed to in proofs, and the latter rule expresses that the search mechanism provides syntactically correct object theoretic proofs.

[5] If the goal is of the form ZF* ⊢ ([¬] rel($\boldsymbol{X}$)), the algorithm tries first to prove [NOT] REL(X) directly.

The extended search procedure evolved out of a probing analysis of the standard proofs for the first incompleteness theorem and incorporates what we take to be the *leading mathematical ideas* for this part of meta-mathematics. It finds proofs not only for the first and second incompleteness theorems (after incorporating the derivability conditions), but also for a broader range of theorems and lemmata in this general area; cf. Appendix A for a proof of Löb's Theorem and Appendix D for two further examples. Even without the specifically meta-mathematical steps the algorithm is of real mathematical interest, as it discovers the structure of the proof for the irrationality of the square root of 2; see Appendix B.

3 Machine proofs & new heuristics

We present now the proofs of the first and second incompleteness theorem and start out by explaining the format of proofs. Proofs are presented in a modified Fitch-style format, which can be given using only plain text; cf. [12].[6] A line of dashes sets off the assumptions themselves. To distinguish the parts of the proof which occur in TEM and those which are embedded ZF*-proofs, we mark every line in the object language with a star. Note that ZF*-proofs retain the scope indications from the meta-language, and appeals to representability will use all available TEM-assumptions.

The rules include the standard natural deduction rules. For example, conjunction introduction has the name "And I", and the left and right-hand versions of conjunction elimination are named "And E L" and "And E R" respectively. To these basic rules we add special rule names for every heuristically applied theorem or lemma. "Rep" names the rule for representable or semi-representable relations, where the premise is a representable relation in TEM and the conclusion the corresponding relation in ZF*. "Prov E" and "Prov I" indicate provability elimination and introduction.

We present first the machine proof of non-provability of the Gödel sentence G, assuming that ZF* is consistent. In addition, the machine uses an instance of the diagonal lemma $\mathsf{ZF}^* \vdash (G \leftrightarrow \neg(\mathsf{theo}(\boldsymbol{G})))$ and the definition of consistency, $\mathsf{ZF}^*\mathsf{CONS}$ IFF NOT $(\mathsf{ZF}^* \vdash (G)$ AND $\mathsf{ZF}^* \vdash (\neg(G)))$.

[6] Dawn McLaughlin modified the presentation of proofs in such a way that the next sentence in the original publication could be dropped. That sentence was: "We show the scope of assumptions by inserting bars between the number and formula on each line, with nested assumptions being noted by alternating bars and exclamation points."

Proof. [7]

1.	$\mathsf{ZF}^* \vdash (G \leftrightarrow \neg(\mathsf{theo}(\boldsymbol{G})))$	Premise
2.	$\mathsf{ZF}^*\mathsf{CONS}$	Premise
3.	$\mathsf{ZF}^*\mathsf{CONS}$ IFF NOT $(\mathsf{ZF}^* \vdash (G)$ AND $\mathsf{ZF}^* \vdash (\neg(G)))$	Premise
4.	$\mathsf{ZF}^* \vdash (G)$	Assumption
* 5.	G	Assumption
* 6.	$\mathsf{theo}(\boldsymbol{G})$	Rep 4
* 7.	$(G \leftrightarrow \neg(\mathsf{theo}(\boldsymbol{G})))$	Prov E 1
* 8.	$\neg(\mathsf{theo}(\boldsymbol{G}))$	Iff E R 7, 5
* 9.	$\neg(G)$	Not I 5, 6, 8
10.	$\mathsf{ZF}^* \vdash (\neg(G))$	Prov I 9
11.	$\mathsf{ZF}^* \vdash (G)$ AND $\mathsf{ZF}^* \vdash (\neg(G))$	And I 4, 10
12.	NOT $(\mathsf{ZF}^* \vdash (G)$ AND $\mathsf{ZF}^* \vdash (\neg(G)))$	Iff E R 3, 2
13.	NOT $(\mathsf{ZF}^* \vdash (G))$	Not I 4, 11, 12 □

To prove the independence of G we have also to establish the non-provability of $\neg G$. As remarked earlier, that requires the stronger hypothesis of τ-consistency. Here are the premises for the non-provability of $\neg G$:

- the diagonal lemma $\mathsf{ZF}^* \vdash (G \leftrightarrow \neg(\mathsf{theo}(\boldsymbol{G})))$,
- $\mathsf{ZF}^*_\tau\mathsf{CONS}$,
- $\mathsf{ZF}^*_\tau\mathsf{CONS}$ IMPLIES [(FOR ALL X)
  $(\mathsf{ZF}^* \vdash (\neg(\mathsf{proof}(\boldsymbol{X}, \boldsymbol{G})))$ IMPLIES NOT $(\mathsf{ZF}^* \vdash (\mathsf{theo}(\boldsymbol{G}))))$],
- $\mathsf{ZF}^*_\tau\mathsf{CONS}$ IMPLIES $\mathsf{ZF}^*\mathsf{CONS}$,
- and a reformulation of what was established above, namely
  $\mathsf{ZF}^*\mathsf{CONS}$ IMPLIES (FOR ALL X)(NOT $(\mathsf{PROOF}(X, G))$).

[7] When following this argument and all the other machine proofs, the reader should keep in mind the intercalation strategies for bridging the gap between assumptions and goals. After all, they motivate the steps in the arguments.

Proof.

1.		$\mathsf{ZF}^* \vdash (G \leftrightarrow \neg(\mathsf{theo}(G)))$	Premise
2.		ZF^*_τCONS	Premise
3.		ZF^*_τCONS IMPLIES	Premise
		[(FOR ALL X)($\mathsf{ZF}^* \vdash (\neg(\mathsf{proof}(X, G)))$	
		IMPLIES NOT ($\mathsf{ZF}^* \vdash (\mathsf{theo}(G))$)]	
4.		ZF*CONS IMPLIES ZF*CONS	Premise
5.		ZF*CONS IMPLIES	Premise
		(FOR ALL X)(NOT (PROOF(X, G)))	
6.	|	$\mathsf{ZF}^* \vdash (\neg(G))$	Assumption
* 7.	|	$\neg(\mathsf{theo}(G))$	Assumption
* 8.	|	$(G \leftrightarrow \neg(\mathsf{theo}(G)))$	Prov E 1
* 9.	|	G	Iff E L 8, 7
* 10.	|	$\neg(G)$	Prov E 6
* 11.	|	$\mathsf{theo}(G)$	Not E 7, 9, 10
12.	|	$\mathsf{ZF}^* \vdash (\mathsf{theo}(G))$	Prov I 11
13.	|	(FOR ALL X)($\mathsf{ZF}^* \vdash (\neg(\mathsf{proof}(X, G)))$	Imp E 3, 2
	|	IMPLIES NOT ($\mathsf{ZF}^* \vdash (\mathsf{theo}(G))$)	
14.	|	ZF*CONS	Imp E 4, 2
15.	|	(FOR ALL X)(NOT (PROOF(X, G)))	Imp E 5, 14
16.	|	NOT (PROOF(X, G))	All E 15
* 17.	|	$\neg(\mathsf{proof}(X, G))$	Rep 16
18.	|	$\mathsf{ZF}^* \vdash (\neg(\mathsf{proof}(X, G))$	Prov I 17
19.	|	(FOR ALL X)$\mathsf{ZF}^* \vdash (\neg(\mathsf{proof}(X, G)))$	All I 18
20.	|	NOT ($\mathsf{ZF}^* \vdash (\mathsf{theo}(G))$)	Imp E 13, 19
21.		NOT ($\mathsf{ZF}^* \vdash (\neg(G))$)	Not I 6, 12, 20 □

For the proof of the *second incompleteness theorem*, i.e., the non-provability of the formal consistency statement zf*cons under the assumption of the consistency of ZF*, the formalism has to satisfy the *Hilbert–Bernays derivability conditions* D_1 and D_2. D_1 is the formalized semi-representability condition for the theorem predicate $[\mathsf{theo}(X) \rightarrow \mathsf{theo}(\mathbf{theo}(X))]$, whereas D_2 is the provable closure under modus ponens $[\mathsf{theo}(X \rightarrow Y) \rightarrow (\mathsf{theo}(X) \rightarrow \mathsf{theo}(Y))]$. The algorithm makes use of these conditions as rules with one additional heuristic to exploit D_2: if $\mathsf{theo}(F)$ is the goal and F, as a consequent of a conditional (or biconditional), is a strictly positive subformula of an available purely implicational formula, apply D_2 repeatedly and try to extract $\mathsf{theo}(F)$.

Proof.

1.		$\mathsf{ZF}^* \vdash (\mathsf{theo}(G) \leftrightarrow \neg G))$	Premise[8]
2.		$\mathsf{ZF}^* \vdash (\mathsf{zf}^*\mathsf{cons} \leftrightarrow \neg(\mathsf{theo}(G) \,\&\, \mathsf{theo}(\neg G)))$	Premise
3.		NOT ($\mathsf{ZF}^* \vdash (G)$)	Premise
4.	|	$\mathsf{ZF}^* \vdash (\mathsf{zf}^*\mathsf{cons})$	Assumption
* 5.	|	$\neg(G)$	Assumption
* 6.	|	$(\mathsf{theo}(G) \leftrightarrow \neg G)$	Prov E 1
* 7.	|	$\mathsf{theo}(G)$	Iff E L 6, 5
* 8.	|	$\mathsf{theo}(\mathbf{theo}(G))$	Der 1 7
* 9.	|	$\mathsf{theo}(\mathbf{theo}(G)) \rightarrow \mathsf{theo}(\neg G)$	Der 2 6
* 10.	|	$\mathsf{theo}(\neg G)$	Imp E 9, 8
* 11.	|	$\mathsf{theo}(G) \,\&\, \mathsf{theo}(\neg G)$	And I 7, 10
* 12.	|	$(\mathsf{zf}^*\mathsf{cons} \leftrightarrow \neg(\mathsf{theo}(G) \,\&\, \mathsf{theo}(\neg G)))$	Prov E 2
* 13.	|	$\mathsf{zf}^*\mathsf{cons}$	Prov E 4
* 14.	|	$\neg(\mathsf{theo}(G) \,\&\, \mathsf{theo}(\neg G))$	Iff E L 12, 13
* 15.	|	G	Not E 5, 11, 14
16.	|	$\mathsf{ZF}^* \vdash (G)$	Prov I 15
17.		NOT ($\mathsf{ZF}^* \vdash (\mathsf{zf}^*\mathsf{cons})$)	Not I 4, 17, 3 □

This argument made use of the special character of the Gödel sentence G—in order to obtain the two conjuncts of line 11. Instead, one can exploit the elegant way of proceeding made possible by Löb's theorem in [14]:

For all sentences F: $\mathsf{ZF}^* \vdash (\mathsf{theo}(F) \rightarrow F)$ IFF $\mathsf{ZF}^* \vdash (F)$.

Löb's theorem expresses that a sentence F is provable in ZF* if and only if its *reflection formula* $(\mathsf{theo}(F) \rightarrow F)$ can be established in ZF*. Consider a *refutable* sentence H (i.e., a sentence whose negation is provable in ZF*) and assume that ZF* is consistent; then H is not provable in ZF*. Löb's theorem implies that the corresponding reflection formula $(\mathsf{theo}(H) \rightarrow H)$ is not provable either. Thus, the *second incompleteness theorem* amounts to establishing NOT ($\mathsf{ZF}^* \vdash (\mathsf{zf}^*\mathsf{cons})$) from the premises NOT ($\mathsf{ZF}^* \vdash (\mathsf{theo}(H) \rightarrow H)$), $\mathsf{ZF}^* \vdash (\mathsf{zf}^*\mathsf{cons} \leftrightarrow \neg(\mathsf{theo}(H) \,\&\, \mathsf{theo}(\neg H)))$, and $\mathsf{ZF}^* \vdash (\neg H)$. That is done in the next proof.

[8] Notice that the diagonal lemma is used here in a propositionally equivalent form; the current algorithm does not find the proof, when it is given in its standard form.

Proof.

1.	NOT $(ZF^* \vdash (\text{theo}(\boldsymbol{H}) \rightarrow H))$	Premise
2.	$ZF^* \vdash (\text{zf}^*\text{cons} \leftrightarrow \neg(\text{theo}(\boldsymbol{H}) \,\&\, \text{theo}(\neg\boldsymbol{H})))$	Premise
3.	$ZF^* \vdash (\neg H)$	Premise
4.	$ZF^* \vdash (\text{zf}^*\text{cons})$	Assumption
* 5.	$\text{theo}(\boldsymbol{H})$	Assumption
* 6.	$\neg(H)$	Assumption
* 7.	$\text{theo}(\neg\boldsymbol{H})$	Rep 3
* 8.	$\text{theo}(\boldsymbol{H}) \,\&\, \text{theo}(\neg\boldsymbol{H})$	And I 5, 7
* 9.	$(\text{zf}^*\text{cons} \leftrightarrow \neg(\text{theo}(\boldsymbol{H}) \,\&\, \text{theo}(\neg\boldsymbol{H})))$	Prov E 2
* 10.	zf^*cons	Prov E 4
* 11.	$\neg(\text{theo}(\boldsymbol{H}) \,\&\, \text{theo}(\neg\boldsymbol{H}))$	Iff E R 9, 10
* 12.	H	Not E 6, 8, 11
* 13.	$\text{theo}(\boldsymbol{H}) \rightarrow H$	Imp I 5, 12
14.	$ZF^* \vdash (\text{theo}(\boldsymbol{H}) \rightarrow H)$	Prov I 13
15.	NOT $(ZF^* \vdash (\text{zf}^*\text{cons}))$	Not I 4, 14, 1 □

This proof of the second incompleteness theorem uses Löb's Theorem only in the discussion leading up to the precise derivational problem. In Appendix A the preliminary considerations are incorporated into the proof; there we also show an elegant machine proof of Löb's Theorem.

4 Comparisons

A number of researchers have pursued goals similar to ours, but with interestingly different programmatic perspectives and strikingly different computational approaches. We focus on work by Ammon [1], Quaife [15], Bundy et al. [5] and Shankar [17]. We first discuss Ammon's and Quaife's work, as theirs is programmatically closest to ours: Ammon aims explicitly for a *fully automatic* proof of the first incompleteness theorem, and Quaife establishes the incompleteness theorems and Löb's theorem in a setting that is similarly "abstract" as ours.

In his 1993 Research Note *An automatic proof of Gödel's incompleteness theorem*, Ammon describes the SHUNYATA program and the proof it found for the first incompleteness theorem. SHUNYATA's proof is structurally identical with the proof in Kleene's book *Introduction to Metamathematics* (pp. 204–8); the latter proof is discussed in great detail in Sections 4 and 5 of Ammon's note. Two main claims are made: (i) Gödel's undecidable sentence is "constructed" by the program "on the basis of elementary rules for the formation

of formulas", and this is taken as evidence for the subsidiary claim (on p. 305) that the program "implicitly rediscovered Cantor's diagonal method"; (ii) the proof of its undecidability is found by a heuristically guided *complete proof procedure* involving Gentzen's natural deduction rules for full first-order logic. The first claim (made on p. 291 and reemphasized on p. 295) is misleading: the Gödel sentence is of course constructible by the elementary rules for the (suitably extended) language of number theory, but that the formula so constructed expresses its unprovability has to be ensured by other means (and is "axiomatically" required to do so by Ammon's definition 3 and lemma 1).[9] As to the second claim (made on p. 294), the paper contains neither a logical calculus nor a systematic proof procedure using the rules of the calculus. What one finds are local heuristics for analyzing quantified statements and conditionals together with directions to prove the negation of a statement, i.e., to use the not introduction rule. These latter directions are quite open-ended, as there is no mechanism for selecting appropriate contradictory pairs. (Cf. Ammon's discussion of the "contradiction heuristic" on p. 296.)

In 1988 Quaife had already published a paper on *Automated proofs of Löb's Theorem and Gödel's two incompleteness theorems*. The paper presents proofs of the theorems mentioned in its title[10] "at a suitable level of abstraction"—as the author emphasizes on p. 219—"from the underlying details of Gödel numbering and of recursive functions". The suitable level of abstraction is provided by the provability logic $K4$. That well-known logic contains as special axioms the derivability conditions and as its special rule (beyond modus ponens) the rule of "necessitation"; the additional rule corresponds to the semi-representability of the theorem predicate. In order to make use of the resolution theorem proving system ITP, the first-order meta-theory of $K4$ is represented in ITP by five "clauses", which are listed in Appendix C. Four of the clauses correspond to the axioms and rules just mentioned, whereas the very first clause guarantees that all tautologies are obtained. The tautologies are established by "applying properly specified demodulators" and transforming given sentential formulas into conjunctive normal form; the underlying procedure is complex and involves particular weighting schemes. Quaife illustrates the procedure by presenting on pp. 226–7 a derivation of a "reasonably complex tautology"; the derivation uses a sequence of 73 demodulation steps. Quaife concludes the discussion of this derivation by saying: "ITP can also be asked to print out the line-by-line application of each demodulator, but that detailed proof is too long for this article". We present this tautology and its direct (and easily found) natural deduction proof in Appendix C.

[9] Our assessment of this claim is in full agreement with that found in the *Letter to the Editor* by Brüning et al. [3].

[10] Quaife establishes only the unprovability of G, not of its negation under the assumption of ω-consistency. On p. 229 he asserts, "With the right axioms, its proof [i.e., the other half of the first incompleteness theorem, S&F] could be reproduced about as easily as the principal half above".

In contrast to Ammon's paper, we find here a conceptually and technically straightforward meta-mathematical and logical set-up: representability and derivability conditions are axiomatically assumed, and the logical inference machinery is precisely and carefully described. However, it is very difficult to understand, how the syntactic context of axioms, theorems and assumptions directs the search in a way that is motivated by the leading ideas of the mathematical subject.[11] The proofs use in every case "axioms and previously proven theorems" in addition to the standard hypotheses for the theorem under consideration. It is clear that the "previously proven theorems" are strategically selected, and it is fair to ask, whether the full proof—from axioms through intermediate results to the meta-mathematical theorems—should be viewed as "automated" or rather as "interactive" with automated large logical steps. So the direct computational question is, would proofs of the main theorems be found, if only the axioms were available?

The answer is most likely "No". OTTER, the resolution theorem prover that developed out of ITP, was not able to prove, under appropriately similar conditions, the full first incompleteness theorem in 1996; that is reported in Bundy, Giunchiglia, Villafiorita and Walsh's paper *An incompleteness theorem via abstraction*.[12] It was precisely this computational problem that motivated their paper, namely to show how "abstraction" can be useful to attack it. They present a proof of Gödel's theorem, where the real focus is not on the particular meta-mathematical proof, but rather on the process of abstraction and refinement that aids proof planning. This process is not a fully automated one, since both the choice of the abstraction and the subsequent refinement of the abstract proof into the original language require external guidance. While we share the ultimate goal of limiting the search space for mathematical proofs by "abstraction", their semi-automated abstraction process is a very different, though complementary approach.

The three approaches we have been discussing are as "abstract" as ours in the sense that the diagonal lemma, the representability condition and, in Quaife's and our case, the derivability conditions are taken for granted. Shankar's book *Metamathematics, Machines, and Gödel's Proof* focuses on an interactive proof of (the Rosser version of) the first incompleteness theorem.[13] The explicit goal was to find out, whether the full proof could *in practice be checked* using a computer program, i.e., the Boyer–Moore theorem prover. In the preface to his book Shankar points out that "A secondary goal was to determine the effort involved in such a verification, and to identify the strengths and weaknesses of automated reasoning technology". The

[11] A similar reservation is articulated by Fearnley-Sander in his review [9] of Quaife's book [16].

[12] On p. 10 they write: "This proof [of the full first incompleteness theorem; S&F] turns out to be a considerable challenge to an unguided theorem prover. We have given these axioms to OTTER (v. 3.0) ... but it blew up".

[13] In addition, Shankar provides a "mechanical proof" of the Church–Rosser Theorem in Chapter 6.

crucial meta-mathematical task and most significant difficulty consisted in verifying the representability conditions—for a particular theory (the system Z_2 for number theory in Cohen's book) and a particular way of making computability precise (via McCarthy's Lisp). That required, of course, a suitable formalization of all meta-mathematical considerations within, what Shankar calls on p. 141, "a constructive axiomatization of pure Lisp". In Sections 5.4 and 5.5 Shankar gives a very informative analysis of, and an excellent perspective on, the work presented.

Moving back from interactive theorem proving to automated proof search, it is clear that the success of our search procedure results from carefully interweaving mathematical and logical considerations, which lead from explicitly formulated principles to a given conclusion. Proofs provide *explanations* of what they prove by putting their conclusions in a context that shows them to be correct. This need not be a global context providing a foundation for all of mathematics, but it can be a rather more restricted one as here for the presentation of the incompleteness theorems. Such a local deductive organization is *the* classical methodology of mathematics with two well-known aspects: the formulation of principles and the reasoning from such principles; we have illustrated only the latter aspect by using suitable strategic considerations and appropriate heuristic "leading mathematical ideas".

The task of considering a part of mathematics, finding appropriate basic notions, and explicitly formulating principles—so that the given part can be systematically developed—is of a quite different character. For Dedekind the need to introduce new and more appropriate notions arises from the fact that human intellectual powers are imperfect. The limitation of these powers leads us, Dedekind argues in [8], to frame the object of a science in different forms or different systems. To introduce a notion, "as a motive for shaping the systems", means in a certain sense to formulate a hypothesis concerning the inner nature of a science, and it is only the further development that determines the real value of such a notion by its greater or smaller *efficacy* [*Wirksamkeit*] in recognizing general truths. In the part of meta-mathematics we have been considering, Hilbert and Bernays did just that: their formulation of representability and derivability conditions ultimately led to more "abstract" ones and, in particular, to the principles for the provability logic $K4$ and related systems; see [2].[14]

5 Concluding remarks

No matter how one might mechanize an attempt of gaining such a principled deeper understanding of a part of mathematics, the considerations for a sys-

[14] In a different, though closely related case, Hilbert and Bernays succeeded in providing "recursiveness conditions" for the informal concept of calculability in a deductive formalism; that was done in a supplement of the second volume of their *Grundlagen der Mathematik*.

tematic and efficient automated development would still be central. In our given meta-mathematical context, there is an absolutely natural step to be taken next. As we emphasized earlier, there is no conflict or even sharp contrast between proof search and proof planning: proof search is hierarchically and heuristically organized through the use of "axioms" and their subsequent verification (or refutation). The guiding idea for verification in the intercalation approach is to generate sequences of formulas, reduce differences, and arrive ultimately at syntactic identities. Such difference reduction also underlies the techniques for inductive theorem proving that have been developed by Bundy et al. in their recent book [4]. We conjecture that those techniques can be seamlessly joined with the intercalation method to take the *next step* and prove the representability conditions. The strictly formal proof in TEM might then be transformed into a ZF* proof of the first derivability condition, automatically. From a different, more proof-theoretic perspective one might wish to compare the intercalation method for natural deduction calculi with appropriately formulated methods for sequent calculi with and without cuts. That might lead to interesting heuristics for choosing suitable cut formulas (to make proof search more efficient).[15]

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Appendix A: Löb's theorem

The context of the theorem is given in Section 3. Here we present an argument obtained by our automated proof search and re-prove the second incompleteness theorem; in the latter proof, the appeal to Löb's theorem is explicitly

[15] This issue was suggested as a good research direction by an anonymous referee.

[16] This paper was first published in the *Annals of Pure and Applied Logic* **133**, 2005, pp. 319–338. It was dedicated to Helmut Schwichtenberg who shares our fascination with automated proof search. He also introduced, a long time ago in lectures at the University of Münster, the first author to the intricacies of Gödel's arguments.

The paper is republished with the permission of Elsevier; it was reset by Dawn McLaughlin, who improved the graphical presentation of text and proofs.

The AProS system—implementing the strategically informed proof search—can be downloaded from `www.phil.cmu.edu/projects/apros/` The proofs of the theorems in this paper can be obtained, sometimes with slight modifications: the implementation of the search algorithm has been dramatically improved by Tyler Gibson; he also constructed the beautiful interface.

built into the argument. In order to prove Löb's theorem in TEM, one faces two claims, namely,

(i) $\mathsf{ZF}^* \vdash (\mathsf{theo}(\boldsymbol{F}) \to F)$ IMPLIES $\mathsf{ZF}^* \vdash (F)$

and

(ii) $\mathsf{ZF}^* \vdash (F)$ IMPLIES $\mathsf{ZF}^* \vdash (\mathsf{theo}(\boldsymbol{F}) \to F)$.

The last claim is immediate, whereas the first is difficult: its proof uses the instance of the diagonal lemma for the formula $(\mathsf{theo}(x) \to F)$. Here is the precise derivational problem at the heart of Löb's theorem: $\mathsf{ZF}^* \vdash (F)$ can be proved from the premises

$$\mathsf{ZF}^* \vdash (\mathsf{theo}(\boldsymbol{F}) \to F)$$

and

$$\mathsf{ZF}^* \vdash (L \leftrightarrow (\mathsf{theo}(\boldsymbol{L}) \to F)).$$

We actually have two proofs of Löb's theorem, which differ in the presentation of the derivability conditions. In the first proof the conditions are formulated as premises and are instantiated for this problem. They enter the search through the standard extraction procedure. In the second proof heuristics guide their application. The heuristics were described above and have a fairly general character; they are designed to apply each condition when it may be useful. The resulting proofs are very similar, differing mainly in the greater number of extraction rule applications necessary in the first proof to make use of the axiomatically given derivability conditions. We present only the first proof.

Proof.

1.	$\mathsf{ZF}^* \vdash (L \leftrightarrow (\mathsf{theo}(\boldsymbol{L}) \rightarrow F))$	Premise
2.	$\mathsf{ZF}^* \vdash (\mathsf{theo}(\boldsymbol{L}) \rightarrow (\mathsf{theo}(\mathbf{theo}(\boldsymbol{L})) \rightarrow \mathsf{theo}(\boldsymbol{F})))$	Premise
3.	$\mathsf{ZF}^* \vdash (\mathsf{theo}(\boldsymbol{L}) \rightarrow \mathsf{theo}(\mathbf{theo}(\boldsymbol{L})))$	Premise
4.	$\mathsf{ZF}^* \vdash ((\mathsf{theo}(\boldsymbol{F}) \rightarrow F))$	Assumption
* 5.	$\mathsf{theo}(\boldsymbol{L})$	Assumption
* 6.	$\mathsf{theo}(\boldsymbol{L}) \rightarrow (\mathsf{theo}(\mathbf{theo}(\boldsymbol{L})) \rightarrow \mathsf{theo}(\boldsymbol{F}))$	Prov E 2
* 7.	$(\mathsf{theo}(\mathbf{theo}(\boldsymbol{L})) \rightarrow \mathsf{theo}(\boldsymbol{F}))$	Imp E 6, 5
* 8.	$(\mathsf{theo}(\boldsymbol{L}) \rightarrow \mathsf{theo}(\mathbf{theo}(\boldsymbol{L})))$	Prov E 3
* 9.	$\mathsf{theo}(\mathbf{theo}(\boldsymbol{L}))$	Imp E 8, 5
* 10.	$\mathsf{theo}(\boldsymbol{F})$	Imp E 7, 9
* 11.	$(\mathsf{theo}(\boldsymbol{F}) \rightarrow F)$	Prov E 4
* 12.	F	Imp E 11, 10
* 13.	$(\mathsf{theo}(\boldsymbol{L}) \rightarrow F)$	Imp I 5, 12
* 14.	$(L \leftrightarrow (\mathsf{theo}(\boldsymbol{L}) \rightarrow F))$	Prov E 1
* 15.	L	Iff E L 14, 13
16.	$\mathsf{ZF}^* \vdash (L)$	Prov I 15
* 17.	$\mathsf{theo}(\boldsymbol{L})$	Rep 16
* 18.	F	Imp E 13, 17
19.	$\mathsf{ZF}^* \vdash (F)$	Prov I 18
20.	$(\mathsf{ZF}^* \vdash ((\mathsf{theo}(\boldsymbol{F}) \rightarrow F)) \text{ IMPLIES } \mathsf{ZF}^* \vdash (F))$	Imp I 4, 19
21.	$\mathsf{ZF}^* \vdash (F)$	Assumption
* 22.	$\mathsf{theo}(\boldsymbol{F})$	Assumption
* 23.	F	Prov E 21
* 24.	$(\mathsf{theo}(\boldsymbol{F}) \rightarrow F)$	Imp I 22, 23
25.	$\mathsf{ZF}^* \vdash ((\mathsf{theo}(\boldsymbol{F}) \rightarrow F))$	Prov I 24
26.	$(\mathsf{ZF}^* \vdash (F) \text{ IMPLIES } \mathsf{ZF}^* \vdash ((\mathsf{theo}(\boldsymbol{F}) \rightarrow F)))$	Imp I 21, 25
27.	$(\mathsf{ZF}^* \vdash ((\mathsf{theo}(\boldsymbol{F}) \rightarrow F)) \text{ IFF } \mathsf{ZF}^* \vdash (F))$	Iff I 20, 26 □

Now we present the proof of the second incompleteness theorem with the explicit use of Löb's Theorem.

Proof.

1.	$\mathsf{ZF}^*\mathsf{CONS}$	Premise
2.	$\mathsf{ZF}^* \vdash (\neg(H))$	Premise
3.	$(\mathsf{ZF}^*\mathsf{CONS} \text{ IFF } \mathsf{NOT}((\mathsf{ZF}^* \vdash (H) \text{ AND } \mathsf{ZF}^* \vdash (\neg(H)))))$	Premise
4.	$\mathsf{ZF}^* \vdash (\mathsf{zf}^*\mathsf{cons} \leftrightarrow \neg((\mathsf{theo}(\boldsymbol{H}) \,\&\, \mathsf{theo}(\neg(\boldsymbol{H})))))$	Premise
5.	$(\mathsf{ZF}^* \vdash (H) \text{ IFF } \mathsf{ZF}^* \vdash ((\mathsf{theo}(\boldsymbol{H}) \rightarrow H)))$	Premise
6.	$\mathsf{ZF}^* \vdash (\mathsf{zf}^*\mathsf{cons})$	Assumption
7.	$\mathsf{NOT}((\mathsf{ZF}^* \vdash (H) \text{ AND } \mathsf{ZF}^* \vdash (\neg(H))))$	Iff E R 3, 1
* 8.	$\mathsf{theo}(\boldsymbol{H})$	Assumption
* 9.	$\neg(H)$	Assumption
* 10.	$(\mathsf{zf}^*\mathsf{cons} \leftrightarrow \neg((\mathsf{theo}(\boldsymbol{H}) \,\&\, \mathsf{theo}(\neg(\boldsymbol{H})))))$	Prov E 4
* 11.	$\mathsf{zf}^*\mathsf{cons}$	Prov E 6
* 12.	$\neg((\mathsf{theo}(\boldsymbol{H}) \,\&\, \mathsf{theo}(\neg(\boldsymbol{H}))))$	Iff E R 10, 11
* 13.	$\mathsf{theo}(\neg(\boldsymbol{H}))$	Rep 2
* 14.	$(\mathsf{theo}(\boldsymbol{H}) \,\&\, \mathsf{theo}(\neg(\boldsymbol{H})))$	And I 8, 13
* 15.	H	Not E 9,14, 12
* 16.	$(\mathsf{theo}(\boldsymbol{H}) \rightarrow H)$	Imp I 8, 15
17.	$\mathsf{ZF}^* \vdash ((\mathsf{theo}(\boldsymbol{H}) \rightarrow H))$	Prov I 16
18.	$\mathsf{ZF}^* \vdash (H)$	Iff E L 5, 17
19.	$(\mathsf{ZF}^* \vdash (H) \text{ AND } \mathsf{ZF}^* \vdash (\neg(H)))$	And I 18, 2
20.	$\mathsf{NOT}(\mathsf{ZF}^* \vdash (\mathsf{zf}^*\mathsf{cons}))$	Not I 6, 19, 7 □

Appendix B

The square root of 2 is not rational. The logical search algorithm uncovers directly the following proof of the claim from the premises:

(1) $\sqrt{2}$ is rational $\leftrightarrow (\exists x)(\exists y)(\sqrt{2} * x = y \,\&\, \neg(\exists z)(z|x \,\&\, z|y))$
(2) $(\forall x)(\forall y)(2 * x^2 = y^2 \rightarrow 2|x \,\&\, 2|y)$
(3) $(\forall x)(\forall y)(\sqrt{2} * x = y \rightarrow 2 * x^2 = y^2)$

The universe of discourse consists of the set of all reals or just the algebraic ones, but the range of the quantifiers consists just of the sort of positive integers. Here is the translation of the automatically generated proof; "translation", as the parser understands only a more restricted language.

Proof.

1.	$\sqrt{2}$ is rational $\leftrightarrow (\exists x)(\exists y)(\sqrt{2} * x = y \,\&\, \neg(\exists z)(z\|x \,\&\, z\|y))$	Premise
2.	$(\forall x)(\forall y)(2 * x^2 = y^2 \rightarrow 2\|x \,\&\, 2\|y)$	Premise
3.	$(\forall x)(\forall y)(\sqrt{2} * x = y \rightarrow 2 * x^2 = y^2)$	Premise
4.	$\sqrt{2}$ is rational	Assumption
5.	$(\exists x)(\exists y)(\sqrt{2} * x = y \,\&\, \neg(\exists z)(z\|x \,\&\, z\|y))$	Iff E R 1, 4
6.	$(\exists y)(\sqrt{2} * u = y \,\&\, \neg(\exists z)(z\|u \,\&\, z\|y))$	Assumption
7.	$(\sqrt{2} * u = v \,\&\, \neg(\exists z)(z\|u \,\&\, z\|v))$	Assumption
8.	$(\forall y)(2 * u^2 = y^2 \rightarrow 2\|u \,\&\, 2\|y)$	All E 2
9.	$(2 * u^2 = v^2 \rightarrow 2\|u \,\&\, 2\|v)$	All E 8
10.	$(\forall y)(\sqrt{2} * u = y \rightarrow 2 * u^2 = y^2)$	All E 3
11.	$(\sqrt{2} * u = v \rightarrow 2 * u^2 = v^2)$	All E 10
12.	$\sqrt{2} * u = v$	And E L 7
13.	$2 * u^2 = v^2$	Imp E 11, 12
14.	$2\|u \,\&\, 2\|v$	Imp E 9, 13
15.	$(\exists z)(z\|u \,\&\, z\|v)$	Ex I 14
16.	$\neg(\exists z)(z\|u \,\&\, z\|v)$	And E R 7
17.	$\bot$	$\bot$ I 15, 16
18.	$\bot$	Ex E 6, 7, 17
19.	$\bot$	Ex E 5, 6, 18
20.	$\neg(\sqrt{2}$ is rational$)$	Not I 4, 19 □

$\bot$ is taken as a placeholder for an appropriate contradiction, say, $(P \,\&\, \neg P)$.

Appendix C

In [15, pp. 226–227], this "reasonably complex tautology" is presented:

$$[(P \rightarrow (Q \rightarrow R)) \rightarrow ((Q \rightarrow (R \rightarrow S)) \rightarrow (Q \rightarrow (P \rightarrow S)))].$$

Its proof, however, is considered to be too long for incorporation into the article. In our natural deduction framework the proof is absolutely canonical and direct; here it is—in twelve lines:

Proof.

1.	$(P \rightarrow (Q \rightarrow R))$	Assumption
2.	$(Q \rightarrow (R \rightarrow S))$	Assumption
3.	Q	Assumption
4.	P	Assumption
5.	$(R \rightarrow S)$	Imp E 2, 3
6.	$(Q \rightarrow R)$	Imp E 1, 4
7.	R	Imp E 6, 3
8.	S	Imp E 5, 7
9.	$(P \rightarrow S)$	Imp I 4, 8
10.	$(Q \rightarrow (P \rightarrow S))$	Imp I 3, 9
11.	$((Q \rightarrow (R \rightarrow S)) \rightarrow (Q \rightarrow (P \rightarrow S)))$	Imp I 2, 10
12.	$((P \rightarrow (Q \rightarrow R)) \rightarrow ((Q \rightarrow (R \rightarrow S)) \rightarrow (Q \rightarrow (P \rightarrow S))))$	Imp I 1, 11 □

As mentioned in Section 4, Quaife's framework is a formulation of the first-order meta-theory of $K4$ within ITP. The predicate $\mathrm{Thm}K4(x)$ expresses that the formula x is a theorem of $K4$. Here are the clauses generating theorems (from p. 223):

(ITP.A1) If $\mathrm{taut}(x)$ then $\mathrm{Thm}K4(x)$;
(ITP.A2) $\mathrm{Thm}K4((b(x \rightarrow y) \rightarrow (b(x) \rightarrow b(y))))$;
(ITP.A3) $\mathrm{Thm}K4(b(x) \rightarrow b(b(x)))$;
(ITP.R1) If $\mathrm{Thm}K4((x \rightarrow y)) \,\&\, \mathrm{Thm}K4(x)$ then $\mathrm{Thm}K4(y)$;
(ITP.R2) If $\mathrm{Thm}K4(x)$ then $\mathrm{Thm}K4(b(x))$.

A1 guarantees that all tautologies are theorems; A2 and A3 correspond to the derivability conditions; R1 is modus ponens, and R2 expresses the semi-representability of the theorem predicate.

Appendix D

Here we present two further computer-generated proofs surrounding the incompleteness theorems. The first claim is a version of the first half of the first incompleteness theorem, asserting the unprovability of the reflection formula for the Gödel sentence.

(i) ZF*CONS IMPLIES NOT (ZF* $\vdash$ (theo(G) $\rightarrow G$)).

Proof.

1.	(ZF*CONS IFF NOT ((ZF* ⊢ (G) AND ZF* ⊢ (¬(G)))))	Premise
2.	ZF* ⊢ ((G ↔ ¬(theo(G))))	Premise
3.	| ZF*CONS	Assumption
4.	| ZF* ⊢ ((theo(G) → G))	Assumption
5.	| NOT ((ZF* ⊢ (G) AND ZF* ⊢ (¬(G))))	Iff E R 1, 3
* 6.	| (G ↔ ¬(theo(G)))	Prov E 2
* 7.	| | theo(G)	Assumption
* 8.	| | (theo(G) → G)	Prov E 4
* 9.	| | G	Imp E 8, 7
* 10.	| | ¬(theo(G))	Iff E R 6, 9
* 11.	| ¬(theo(G))	Not I 7, 7, 10
* 12.	| G	Iff E L 6, 11
13.	| ZF* ⊢ (G)	Prov I 12
* 14.	| | G	Assumption
* 15.	| | theo(G)	Rep 13
* 16.	| | ¬ theo(G)	Iff E R 6, 14
* 17.	| ¬(G)	Not I 14,15,16
18.	| ZF* ⊢ (¬(G))	Prov I 17
19.	| (ZF* ⊢ (G) AND ZF* ⊢ (¬(G)))	And I 13, 18
20.	NOT (ZF* ⊢ ((theo(G) → G)))	Not I 4, 19, 5
21.	(ZF*CONS IMPLIES NOT (ZF* ⊢ ((theo(G) → G))))	Imp I 3, 20 □

The argument is perfectly canonical—up to the extraction step in line 12; at this point G could have been extracted from the formula $(\mathrm{theo}(G) \rightarrow G)$ in line 4. The resulting proof is "symmetric" to the given one.

The second claim asserts that for any refutable sentence R, the formula expressing its unprovability, i.e., $\neg(\mathrm{theo}(R))$, is in ZF* equivalent to its reflection formula $(\mathrm{theo}(R) \rightarrow R)$.

(ii) ZF* ⊢ (¬(R)) IMPLIES ZF* ⊢ ((¬(theo(R)) ↔ (theo(R) → R))).

Proof.

1.	ZF* ⊢ (¬(R))	Premise
* 2.	| ¬(theo(R))	Assumption
* 3.	| | theo(R)	Assumption
* 4.	| | | ¬(R)	Assumption
* 5.	| | R	Not E 2, 3
* 6.	| (theo(R) → R)	Imp I 5
* 7.	(¬(theo(R)) → (theo(R) → R))	Imp I 6
* 8.	| (theo(R) → R)	Assumption
* 9.	| | theo(R)	Assumption
* 10.	| | ¬(R)	Prov E 1
* 11.	| | R	Imp E 8, 9
* 12.	| ¬(theo(R))	Not I 10, 11
* 13.	((theo(R) → R) → ¬(theo(R)))	Imp I 12
* 14.	(¬(theo(R)) ↔ (theo(R) → R))	Iff I 7, 13
15.	ZF* ⊢ ((¬(theo(R)) ↔ (theo(R) → R)))	Prov I 14 □

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Proofs as Efficient Programs

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There may, indeed, be other uses of the system than its use as a logic.
A. Church [8]

Logic and theory of computation have been intertwined since their first days. The formalized notion(s) of effective computation are at first technical tools for the investigation of first order systems, and only ten years later – in the hands of John von Neumann – become the blueprints of engineered physical devices. Generally, however, one tends to forget that in those same years, in the newly-born proof-theory of Gerhard Gentzen [20] there is an implicit, powerful notion of computation – an effective, combinatorial procedure for the simplification of a proof. However, the complexity of the rules for the elimination of cuts (especially the commutative ones, in the modern jargon) hid the simplicity and generality of the basic computational notion those rules were based upon. We had to wait thirty more years before realizing in full glory that Gentzen's simplification mechanism and one of the formal systems for computability (Church's λ-calculus) were indeed one and the same notion.

As far as we know, Haskell Curry is the first to explicitly realize [11] that the *types* of some of his basic combinators correspond to axioms of intuitionistic implicational calculus, and that, more generally, the types assignable to expressions made up of combinators are exactly the provable formulae of intuitionistic implicational logic. It is William Howard in 1969 to extend this *formulas as types* correspondence to the more general *proofs as programs* isomorphism ([27], published in 1980 but widely circulated before). Under this interpretation, the two dynamics – proof normalization on one hand, and β-reduction on the other – are identified, so that techniques and results from one area are immediately available to the other.

In this paper, we will discuss the use of the Curry-Howard correspondence in *computational complexity theory*, the area of theoretical computer science concerned with the definition and study of complexity classes and their relations. The standard approach to this discipline is to fix first a machine model (e.g., Turing machines) equipped with an explicit cost (e.g., number of transi-

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Preface

This volume is located in a cross-disciplinary field bringing together mathematics, logic, natural science and philosophy. Reflection on the effectiveness of proof brings out a number of questions that have always been latent in the informal understanding of the subject. What makes a symbolic construction significant? What makes an assumption reasonable? What makes a proof reliable? Gödel, Church and Turing, in different ways, achieve a deep understanding of the notion of effective calculability involved in the nature of proof. Turing's work in particular provides a "precise and unquestionably adequate" definition of the general notion of a formal system in terms of a machine with a finite number of parts. On the other hand, Eugene Wigner refers to the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences as a miracle.

Where should the boundary be traced between mathematical procedures and physical processes? What is the characteristic use of a proof as a computation, as opposed to its use as an experiment? What does natural science tell us about the effectiveness of proof? What is the role of mathematical proofs in the discovery and validation of empirical theories? The papers collected in this book are intended to search for some answers, to discuss conceptual and logical issues underlying such questions and, perhaps, to call attention to other relevant questions.

Can every 'real' proof be translated into a 'formal' proof? Although Hilbert and Gentzen's positive answer is widely shared, there are also reasons for disagreement. To deals with this matter Carlo Cellucci addresses two fundamental questions - Why proof? What is a proof? - which he settles by contrasting the notion of axiomatic proof with the notion of analytic proof.

The contribution by Andrea Cantini concentrates on the nature and role of formal proofs. It is argued that formal proofs do not target certainty or formalistic foundations. Recent results in proof theory are considered in order to illustrate the role of formal proofs in exploring ideas and clarifying foundational questions in mathematics. The question is raised to what extent are proofs for mathematics what experimental procedures are for empirical sciences?